CHINESE INVESTMENT
IN AFRICA

by

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ABSTRACT

Chinese investment in Sub-Saharan Africa has increased dramatically in the last decade. In contrast to Western financial institutions, China employs a no-strings-attached method of investment in a resources-for-infrastructure model. This policy, consequently, does not require host countries to commit to reform measures before investments are made.

In order to determine the effect of this policy on the general population in Africa, I will use three countries as case studies: Angola, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Within each country, I will apply three indicators to measure the impact of Chinese investment: transparency within governance, environmental degradation, and human rights. I will make the argument that Chinese investment, with its lack of attached conditions, does not benefit the local population of these case study countries and those of Sub-Saharan Africa in general.

This thesis is organized thematically. Chapters two, three, and four address the broader issues of transparency, environmental impact, and human rights respectively. These chapters are divided into a literature review and sub-sections focusing on Angola and Sudan. The final chapter addresses the DRC and serves as the conclusion; it applies insights from the previous chapters in order to consider the long-term implications of Chinese investment in Africa. Because the Congo has only recently entered the realm of large-scale Chinese investment projects, the chapter is arranged differently than those
addressing the thematic issues. The DRC chapter is divided into a literature review and sub-sections that address each thematic issue individually.
INTRODUCTION

China has engaged in trade and business with African countries since the 1950s. However, in the last decade the scale of these relations has skyrocketed, raising concerns about who, exactly, is benefiting—and how. This thesis will examine emblematic cases of Chinese investment in Africa and seek to determine the cost of economic growth. I will make the argument that the model that China applies when engaging in deals with African countries does not address preexisting issues and consequently does not benefit the general population. Both European imperialism and Western investment in the second half of the 20th century had tremendous negative effects on African countries and their populations, pillaging the continent for resources and supporting autocratic regimes. As China becomes the largest player in Africa, might we expect similar consequences?

Given the predominance of Chinese investment in Africa and the no-strings-attached model that it employs, we might inquire if such non-conditional presence at best complicates or at worst directly aggravates transparency, environmental, or human rights issues. From this, we can formulate three possible hypotheses: 1) Chinese unconditional investment practices allow African countries to subvert Western standards of transparency, environment, or human rights, 2) Chinese investment directly aggravates local situations, or 3) China directly causes these problems. Compared to hypothesis one, hypothesis two can be applied to more isolated incidents that do not affect the countries as a whole. Hypothesis three can be applied to either isolated or pandemic issues, but
places culpability on the Chinese. Based on the evidence presented below, this thesis maintains that at present, Sino-African business does not benefit the local African population because it does not develop skill sets or address the issues of transparency, environmental degradation, or human rights.

This thesis will utilize Western or international standards of transparency, environment, and human rights as a benchmark to measure both China and African countries within the last decade. These three indicators were chosen in order to paint a broad picture of the issues currently facing Sub-Saharan Africa. I elected not to pursue economic indicators because data for gross domestic product (GDP) distribution are unavailable for the case study countries, and as the distribution of wealth gap continues to grow, GDP per capita values would not provide an accurate representation of the conditions in each case study countries. Western officials do not perceive Chinese investment in Sub-Saharan Africa as a positive enterprise, as evidenced by comments made by former World Bank president Paul Wolfowitz and former European Investment Bank president Phillippe Maystadt. Their remarks, and those of other Western officials and analysts will be used throughout the thesis in order to contrast Chinese investment with current Western practices and norms.
Chinese Economic Expansion

In the early and mid-1950s PRC revolutionary leader, Mao Zedong, gave primacy to the establishment of an economic infrastructure as a prerequisite to China’s development. ¹ He adopted the Stalinist model, stressing steel, machine building industries, and energy production. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Mao focused increasingly on institutional issues such as the role of the Party and the refinement of campaigns as a technique for implementing his policy. However, by the late 1960s, he considered the attitudes of the bureaucrats and the general population to be obstacles to China’s modernization; this was the impetus for the Cultural Revolution, a violent period of social, political, and economic upheaval.

The economy was limited by Mao’s policies, which deliberately promoted a primitive economy. His demands for maximum local self-sufficiency, strict limitations on the number of commodities that could be traded on the regulated free market, and his simultaneous truncation of the capacity of the planning agencies to apportion goods according to plan—all sought to minimize the division of labor in society and the extent of commerce. In order to attain this sweeping, dramatic shift, Mao led as a totalitarian ruler, using violence to facilitate change. It was in this fashion that China was ruled until Mao’s death in September 1976.

The post-Mao era saw dramatic changes in China. New leader, Deng Xiaoping, believed that the Cultural Revolution had had disastrous effects. Under Deng’s leadership, China saw dramatic reform in the late 1970s. He believed in unity through increased economic interdependence. According to Deng’s assessment in 1978, a major impediment to China’s development was the lack of economic infrastructure. However, the swift implementation of steel mills, coal mines, and hydroelectric projects would not be enough. Deng concluded that institutional reform was vital, so between 1979 and 1980 he focused on overhauling industrial management.

From the 1980s to the present, Chinese leadership pursued a modernization program primarily built on traditional economic development models: heavy industrialization, labor- and capital-intensive manufacturing industries, export-led growth and low labor cost and high environmental damage. By 1993, China had shifted from a petroleum exporting country to a petroleum importing country. In 1995 then President Jiang Zemin gave a speech encouraging Chinese businesses to go abroad; this is noted as the catalyst for China’s “Go Global” strategy. China had amassed large amounts of foreign reserves by this time and was facing calls from the international community to float its currency on the international market. In order to placate these requests, China

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sought to actively employ its foreign reserves by acquiring assets abroad. In a speech given at Tiananmen Square on 1 October, 1999, Communist China’s 50th anniversary, Jiang described how China would go forth as a great power in the 21st century. Since 1999, China’s construction sector alone has seen annual growth of over 20 percent, making China the largest construction market in the global economy. This sector in particular has been pivotal to China’s economic expansion in overseas, including in Africa.

A large impact of the Chinese development model is China’s growing hunger for more energy and natural resources, leading to enormous extractive projects within China and around the world. Today, China consumes 7.8 million barrels of oil per day (bbl/d); although the United States (a developed country) is consuming 20.7 million bbl/d, China is expected to double its consumption in the next two decades. As China has industrialized and developed its economy, its demand for raw materials such as oil, copper, and cobalt have grown—all of which can be found on the African continent.

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History of Sino-African Relations

There are four major milestones in the history of Sino-African relations: Premier Zhou Enlai’s tours of Africa in 1963 and 1964, the TAZARA Railroad, Jiang Zemin’s May 1996 tour, and the Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC). Each event marks a different shift or watershed in the evolution of these relations.

Premier Zhou Enlai’s visit to Africa in 1963 and 1964 is considered a fundamental part of Sino-African history. Zhou engaged in public diplomacy exactly like what China uses today: the essential morality of China’s action in Africa, a clear difference between China and the West in dealings with Africa, absolute respect for state sovereignty, support for anti-colonial struggles, no-strings developmental assistance, and notions of supporting self reliance. By 1963, China had established diplomatic relations with Egypt, which formally recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as China’s official government in 1956. In the following decade, more than ten other African countries had followed suit. Zhou’s visit facilitated China’s international recognition and Africa’s collective support for China joining the United Nations (the Chinese seat was still held by the exiled Republic of China government in Taiwan). In part thanks to widespread African support, catalyzed by Zhou’s visit, China was awarded the Chinese seat at the United Nations on 23 November 1971.

8 Ibid.
The second monumental event in Sino-African history is the Tazara Railroad. This project consisted of a 1,860 kilometer-long railroad connecting Tanzania and Zambia and was intended as a showcase development project, filling a gap for Africa that Western engineers had publicly declined to do. Temporally (1969-1976), it was a particularly impressive undertaking because it coincided with the politically and economically chaotic Cultural Revolution.

In the intervening three decades between Zhou’s visit and President Jiang Zemin’s tour in May of 1996, only one high-profile Chinese official toured Africa: Premier Zhao Ziyang in 1982. Zhao’s tour of ten African countries came at the time of economic reform in China. He emphasized China’s “all-weather” friendship with Africa and stressed that the challenges faced during economic reform were “temporary phenomena in the process of development.” President Jiang Zemin’s visit, 13 years hence, was framed by very different conditions. By the 1990s China was confident of economic reform, thereby allowing Jiang to secure several bilateral trade agreements with the six countries that he visited. He emphasized that China and Africa had never fought, but that both had “suffered enormously under colonialists and foreign aggression,” and promised that China “will provide a more favorable condition and open up a broader

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10 Ibid.
prospect for Sino-African friendship and cooperation.”

This visit would serve as the precursor to the FOCAC.

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was first held in Beijing in 2000 and is held every three years (the 2003 forum was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, followed by Beijing in 2006 and Sharm ‘El Shaik, Egypt in 2009). Specific items discussed at the meetings include large infrastructural projects, increases in bilateral trade, opening of markets, cancellation of debts, and pledges to increase the amount of monetary assistance and human development.

A reoccurring metaphor for Sino-African relations at the FOCAC is that of the 15th century Chinese explorer Zheng He, who visited Africa and is the first historical case of trade between China and Africa. Jiang has, on multiple occasions, used Zheng He’s explorations to implicitly assert the long-standing non-aggressive, peaceable and trading intentions of the PRC towards Africa in contrast to colonial and exploitative West. Throughout the history of Sino-African relations, many Chinese officials have spoken of analogous pasts of underdevelopment and suffering at the hands of Western powers. However, this platform has lost a degree of credence as China has recorded high growth rates for the last 20 years and is now positioned as an aspiring economic superpower.

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12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
is China’s enormous economic growth and development that has allowed it to engage in large-scale trade agreements with so many African countries.

In 2006 Beijing hosted a China-Africa Summit that was attended by 48 of 53 African heads of state and ministers; Chinese President Hu Jintao announced that by the end of 2010 Chinese-African trade was expected to total $100 billion. Additionally, China promised $5 billion in loans and credits for Africa. In China, 2006 was dubbed the “Year of Africa,” because China quadrupled its investments in Sub-Saharan Africa to $7 billion; the following year China increased its investments even further by committing another $4.5 billion. China’s newfound economic clout is a direct result of its explosive growth in the last decade. This growth has been the impetus for new analysis of Chinese presence in Africa. The Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) is a World Bank affiliate that works with the governments of developing countries to improve the quality of infrastructure through partnerships with the private sector. In 2008 it published a report on China’s increasing role as the infrastructure financier in Sub-

Saharan Africa. That year Chinese investment in the region reached $40.7 billion—up from $5.5 billion only four years earlier in 2004.

Sub-Saharan Africa and China’s economies are, to a degree, symbiotic. Africa suffers from a major infrastructure deficit, which prevents it from realizing the full potential of its natural resources wealth. China has a large, globally competitive construction industry and a need for natural resources greater than its domestic reserves can supply.\(^\text{17}\) This complementarity has led to a dramatic increase in Sino-African trade the last decade.

**Methodology of Chinese Investment**

It is important to understand how China directs its money into overseas projects. There is only one Chinese institution empowered to provide concessional loans to overseas projects: the state-owned China Export-Import Bank (China Ex-Im). The projects that will be discussed in later chapters are primarily or solely funded by China Ex-Im Bank. Chinese state-owned corporations such as Sinohydro or Sinopec receive the funds agreed to for the project in the bilateral agreements between China and the host country. The host country does not receive any funds from China for the projects.
In 2006 the total value of China Ex-Im’s commitments globally was nearly $26 billion—four times what it was in 2000. Unfortunately, China Ex-Im does not disclose its data on concessional lending, the relevant form of financing for its investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. These investments primarily focus on the natural resources sector, specifically petroleum products.\(^\text{18}\) China Ex-Im’s failure to release its concessional lending figures raises the concern of questionable business practices or trends that need to be concealed.

As the country case study chapters will illustrate, the projects funded by China Ex-Im loans have been primarily geared towards infrastructure. Many projects are developed and executed by Chinese firms, which are backed by China Ex-Im loans. This practice creates a circularity of money flows within the Chinese government and its companies, thereby preventing local African companies from benefiting financially. By shutting out African companies in these projects, China prevents them from developing their capabilities and enabling them to oversee such projects in the future.

Questions and Case Study Selection

China’s burgeoning investment and developmental presence in Africa raises several questions—namely, what benefit will the African people get from their respective

countries’ business deals with China? Will the population see an improvement in transparency of governance, environmental impact, or the development of social norms such as human rights? As I will explain later in the section, Chinese lending (in comparison to Western loan packages) does not address the preexisting issue areas in African countries. We can hypothesize that, given the no-strings-attached model of Chinese investment in Africa, such non-conditional presence at best complicates or at worst directly aggravates the issue areas in those countries. From this, we can form three specific hypotheses: 1) Chinese unconditional investment practices enable African states to subvert Western standards in areas such as transparency, environmental protection, and human rights, 2) Chinese unconditional investment practices more directly aggravate local situations, and 3) China directly causes these problems. To examine the correlation between Chinese investment in Africa and the degree of transparency, environmental degradation, and human rights, I will use two countries as case studies: Angola and Sudan. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) will serve as a conclusion chapter, drawing insight from the two main case studies.
Angola serves as a unique case. The Chinese-Angolan method of trade—a direct exchange of cash for natural resources with no attached conditions regarding democracy, human rights, social or environmental standards—has been appropriately dubbed the “no-strings-attached” approach, or the “Angola Model.” Large cash infusions geared toward infrastructural development without the conditions typical of Western loan packages are of great appeal to most African heads of state, whose countries lack the means or the initiative to implement such changes. For many of the autocratic leaders with whom
China does business, initiating human rights or transparency reforms would undermine their power. Consequently, more and more African countries are entering bilateral agreements with China. With nearly a decade of political stability and economic growth, Angola will serve as the control subject for the purposes of this thesis.

Angola emerged from a 27-year-long civil war in 2002 and has since been working to rebuild its infrastructure and economy. Legislative elections were held in September 2008 and presidential elections were held in late 2009.\(^\text{19}\) China purchases Angolan crude oil; despite rapid economic growth fueled by high international oil prices, Angola remains dependent upon lines of credit from other countries. In 2004 China opened a $2 billion line of credit to Angola, which was later extended to $7 billion to overhaul public infrastructure. According to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 32.7 percent of Angola’s export trade in 2008 went to China.

Sudan, by contrast, is engaged in a polarized civil conflict. The western region of Darfur serves as the primary arena of the violence. The Sudanese government employs Arab militias known as the Janjaweed as a counter-insurgency force to supplement the military in its quest to crush the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and

Equality Movement (JEM) rebel forces. Allocations of war crimes and crimes against humanity have been levied against both sides, adding another dimension to the already dire humanitarian crisis. On 9 September 2004, then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell labeled the conflict as genocide, citing it as the worst humanitarian crisis of the 21st century. In March 2005, under the auspices of the UN Security Council Resolution 1591, an arms embargo was passed against Sudan. China, along with Russia, has been accused of violating the terms of the embargo by supplying the government-backed Janjaweed with attack helicopters, bombers, and arms to attack civilians. This issue will be further discussed in the human rights chapter.

Sudan’s large oil reserves compound the situation. A number of these oil fields lie within the Darfur region, with many more being found along the North-South demarcation. Oil and petroleum products are one of Sudan’s primary export commodities. China is Sudan’s largest trade partner, accounting for 56.3 percent of exports in 2008. A joint venture between China and Sudan granted the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) a 40 percent stake in several contested oilfield blocks in

western and southern Sudan. Many Western countries and their companies refuse to do business with Sudan because of its poor human rights record and the ongoing conflict in Darfur. This leaves Sudan rather dependent upon Chinese business and investment.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been mired in conflict and beset by rebel groups for nearly the last two decades. Civil war and ethnic strife were ignited in 1994 as the large inflow of refugees fleeing the Rwandan genocide flooded the eastern regions. In more recent years, the conflict has been complicated by a number of warring factions, including various rebel movements backed by the DRC’s neighbors (Rwanda and Uganda) who threaten the fragile government. The large deposits of natural resources in the region further complicate the situation. The northeast region, along the border with Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda, is rich in tin deposits, which are being mined by local rebel militias in order to fund their mini-wars. The country also possesses a wealth of copper and cobalt, the majority of which are found in the southeastern Katanga province. These deposits could be easily translated to domestic revenue—if the country

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25 Katanga is a resources-rich province in the southeast. In 1960 it declared independence and attempted to secede from The Congo, creating a crisis involving Belgian military forces and the UN. Then-UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, while brokering a peace deal between the multiple factions, died when his plane crashed under mysterious circumstances.
was not consumed by conflict. The CIA’s 2008 figures indicate that 44.7 percent of DRC’s exports went to China. The most recent project in the DRC involves a $6 billion loan from the state-owned China Ex-Im Bank (down from the originally brokered $9 billion) that will be used to develop the extractive industries to mine millions of tons of copper and thousands of tons of cobalt. In return, China will develop five sectors of the DRC’s infrastructure: water, electricity, education, health, and transportation. The project will be discussed in depth later in the thesis.

Because the DRC has only recently entered the realm of large-scale Chinese resources-for-infrastructure agreements, it will serve as a concluding chapter, drawing from the Angolan and Sudanese chapters and hypothesizing future paths of Sino-African business agreements.

Although both Angola and Sudan produce oil and petroleum products, they serve different purposes. Angola is the control country because it is not engaged in conflict and has been at peace for nearly ten years. Sudan, on the other hand, is engaged in a more polarized civil conflict, while still producing lucrative petroleum products. The DRC exports minerals used in industry and is engaged in a multifaceted civil conflict, arguably making it the most complicated situation of the three case studies. The diverse political situations in the case study countries do not impede business deals because China handles

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26 The DRC’s primary exports include diamonds, gold, copper, cobalt, and wood products.
each country and each project individually. A prime example of China’s indifference to political environments is its relations with Sudan; on 4 March 2009 the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on the charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{27} Despite such negative international attention, there have been no detrimental effects on Sino-Sudanese trade.

\textbf{Research Goals and Methods}

This thesis will seek to determine the consequences of Chinese presence in the three case study countries. Will China’s no-strings-attached approach complicate or aggravate the preexisting issues in the case study countries? Will it result in a further degradation of human rights and the environment, while constraining efforts to increase transparency? Or will it only stymie further advances? Will Chinese ideology permeate African modes of governance? In that vein, the Chinese have thus far not exported their communist, one-party ideology; the relationship between the Chinese and their African business partners remains strictly business. Why? Why is China not taking fuller advantage of its relationships with African nations by impressing communism and expanding its sphere of influence? The China of today is far more powerful than it was 40 years ago, raising concerns of how its influence will affect the African continent.

Bearing in mind the egregious and ongoing human rights violations in the DRC and Sudan, the lack of Chinese conditions does not create an impetus for the situations to improve.

Also in contention are the provisions of Sino-African business deals. Although these deals do not have attached conditions concerning governance or human rights development, they do come with a catch: the loans must be used to purchase goods or services from companies (many of them state-run Chinese companies) that Chinese officials select themselves. Competitive bidding is discouraged and the Chinese hide crucial data such as project costs, loan terms, and repayment aid. Anticorruption activists argue that such practices debase foreign aid to these floundering, developing countries. At a more grassroots level, such practices prevent local economies from benefiting.

China is also reluctant to hire local workers, both for managerial and unskilled labor positions. Consequently, most of the people who work in Chinese enterprises in countries like Angola are Chinese nationals. They live separately from the native population and go to their own schools. Not surprisingly, this practice has led to resentment among the local population, as evidenced by demonstrations against the Chinese in Zambia and Namibia\(^8\). Lee and Shalmon\(^9\) observe, “it is ironic that China, a

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country insistent on local content requirements and the hiring of local labor in contracts with foreign firms doing business in China, ignores this issue outside of its borders.”

Rather than train and employ local Angolans, thereby supporting the local economy, the Chinese construct separate enclaves for their own imported workers to live. This practice stands in stark contrast to Chevron, which employs 2,500 Angolans—88 percent of the company’s in-country workforce. Robert Rotberg observes:

“The widespread use of imported Chinese labor, rather than the hiring of local workers on infrastructural and factory projects—a common phenomenon—deprives Africans of innumerable employment opportunities. In Angola, China pays for new railways and roads but uses mostly Chinese contractors and workers, thus denying jobs to anxious Angolans.”

Similar concerns are voiced in Lubumbashi, a city in the southwestern province of Katanga in the DRC. Gilbert Malemba N’Sakila, a former Lubumbashi law school dean, observed: “The Chinese are not even making use of Congolese talent. They hire laborers, and that’s it. When they pack up and go, the Congo will be left with nothing, not even an

29 Henry Lee is a lecturer in public policy and co-chair of the Kennedy School’s Program on Infrastructure in a Market Economy. Dan Shalmon is research associate at the Kennedy School’s Environment and Natural Resources Program.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
upgrade in our human resources.” China’s creation of such exclusivity in employment tremendously curtails the benefits of Chinese projects to the local populations. N’Sakila’s remark points to a long-term concern: China’s practice of importing its workforce rather than training native workers both prevents the local population from developing necessary capabilities (e.g. building roads and power plants) and augurs a dependence on Chinese investment. Indeed, the aforementioned Tazara Railroad built by the Chinese in the early 1970s has required Chinese maintenance in the three decades following its completion. “We will run this train into the ground, and then we will tell the Chinese we need another one. This is not development,” said a Tanzanian engineer aboard the train in 2010. Failure to develop skill sets within the local population perpetuates dependency and hamstrings development.

The “no strings attached” concessional loan model is flexible and permits China to work around a wide variety of issues in order to still get the natural resources that it needs—without consequence. For each of the case study countries I will examine the level governance, social standards such as human rights, as well as what effect Chinese projects have on the environment.

I used reports from international organizations such as the United Nations and World Bank to compile quantitative data regarding the volume of trade and the business deals between China and the case study countries. In order to determine the degree to which good governance is practiced in each country I utilized reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Transparency International, the Harvard University Kennedy School of Governance, as well as the UN. For the human rights and environmental issues I relied primarily upon publications from NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and International Rivers. The publication *The China Quarterly* was used to establish historical and economic contexts for Chinese investment in Africa, as well as supplementary data for Sino-African trade. The Brookings Institute publication, *China Into Africa*, a compilation of several China scholars’ works, was useful in addressing all three indicators.

This thesis is organized thematically. Chapters two, three, and four of part two address the broader thematic issues of transparency, environmental impact, and human rights respectively. Each of those chapters is divided into an overview and two case study sub-sections to illustrate the problems associated with each thematic issue. I will also use anecdotes from other Sub-Saharan African countries in order to demonstrate that the issues in the case study countries are not isolated incidents. The final chapter addresses the DRC and serves as the conclusion; it applies insights from the previous chapters in order to think about the long-term implications of Chinese investment in
Africa. Part three contains the DRC chapter and a general conclusion. Because the Congo has only recently entered the realm of large-scale Chinese investment projects, the chapter is arranged differently than those addressing the thematic issues. The DRC chapter is divided into a literature review and sub-sections that address each thematic issue individually.
Overview

Corruption stymies development by stealing or redirecting funds from public works and infrastructural projects. Corruption damages a country’s development in several ways. It reduces growth; scares away foreign investment; and channels investment and loan and aid funds into projects of little or no benefit to the people but which carry with them high returns to the corrupt decision-makers. According to the African Union, corruption in Africa is costing the continent $150 billion per year. Research by the African Development Bank indicates that corruption leads to a loss of nearly 50 percent of tax revenue, which in some cases is a greater amount than a country’s total foreign debt.

According to the World Bank “corruption is the greatest obstacle to reducing poverty. It distorts the rule of law, weakens a nation's institutional foundation, and severely affects the poor who are already the most disadvantaged members of our society.” Corruption on the part of governments affects development initiatives at their very root by skewing decision-making, budgeting, and implementation. When these actors abuse their entrusted power for private gain, corruption denies the participation of citizens and diverts public resources into private hands. Those in poverty find themselves

on the losing end of the corruption chain—without government support or the basic services they need.\textsuperscript{38} Simultaneously, corruption is a byproduct of poverty. In a corrupt environment, wealth is captured, income inequality increases, and the state’s governing capacity is truncated. For citizens, this creates an environment that leaves the poor trapped and development stalled.\textsuperscript{39}

Transparency International, an NGO dedicated to the international anti-corruption movement, defines corruption as “abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” The most direct treatment for corruption is to increase transparency in governance and within the economy. Transparency is “a principle that allows those affected by administrative decisions, business transactions or charitable work to know not only the basic facts and figures but also the mechanisms and processes. It is the duty of civil servants, managers and trustees to act visibly, predictably and understandably.”\textsuperscript{40} When transparency is absent, officials are able to siphon away public funds without consequences. In many areas of the world, including Sub-Saharan Africa, this abuse of power is widespread. This is the impetus for NGOs such as Transparency International, which raises awareness and diminishes apathy and tolerance of corruption, and devises and implements practical


\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.

actions to address it. Programs or changes in policy geared towards improving transparency will be discussed later in the chapter.

The lack of transparency within governance and in business deals augurs corruption because there are no provisions to hold those in power responsible for their actions. At present, Sino-African business relations suffer from a high degree of opacity, which allows for illegal kickbacks and other corrupt practices. Indeed, in Namibia (Angola’s southern neighbor), the government accused a Chinese company of having facilitated a $55.3 million deal through millions of dollars of illegal kickbacks. The company—until recently run by Chinese president Hu Jintao’s son—enjoyed the backing of the Chinese government. When Namibian investigators requested assistance in looking into the matter, China threw up barriers. As soon as the allegations were raised, China’s domestic censors blocked all mention of the scandal in the news media and on the Internet. Similar issues are found in Angola and Sudan. Each side—the governments of Angola and Sudan as well as Chinese government-backed banks—perpetuate the lack of transparency.

Transparency International publishes an annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which ranks most of the world’s countries based on public perceptions of corruption. The CPI is a compilation of indices from ten international groups or organizations, including the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank. Polled individuals include country teams, experts within and outside of

the banks, as well as local correspondents. They were asked questions relating to transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector; the government’s capacity to punish and contain corruption; and corruption, conflict of interests, and diversion of funds. By aggregating data from ten different sources, the CPI has a ninety percent confidence rate.\footnote{Corruption Perceptions Index 2009: Methodological Brief. Rep. Transparency International, 18 Nov. 2009. Web. 29 Jan. 2010.} In 2009, out of 180 countries, Angola and Sudan ranked 162 and 176 respectively.\footnote{“CPI 2009 Table.” Transparency International. Web. 27 Jan. 2010. <http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table>.} Angola shares the 162\textsuperscript{nd} rank with such countries as Venezuela and the DRC, while Sudan sits between Iraq and Myanmar. (China is ranked 79\textsuperscript{th}). In 2003, Angola tied for 124\textsuperscript{th} out of 133, sharing the rank with Tajikistan and Cameroon. Sudan ranked 112, sharing its place with Zimbabwe and Honduras. (China ranked 66\textsuperscript{th} in 2003).\footnote{“CPI 2003 Table.” Transparency International. Web. 19 Apr. 2010. <http://transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2003>.} In 2004, the first year it was ranked on the CPI, the DRC ranked 134 out of 146, sharing the rank with Angola.\footnote{“CPI 2004 Table.” Transparency International. Web. 19 Apr. 2010. <http://transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2004>.} While the number of surveyed countries has expanded over the six-year period, we can still note overall trends in the three countries. Between 2003 and 2009, Angola climbed from the bottom 7 percent to the bottom 10 percent of the countries ranked. Over the same period, Sudan fell from the bottom 16 percent to the bottom 3 percent. Between 2004 and 2009, the DRC saw a rise from the bottom 9 to the bottom 10 percent. It is worth remembering it was only at the end of this period that the DRC began to enter large-scale resources-for-infrastructure deals with China. While
Angola and the DRC seem to have weathered the six-year period with little change in their ratings, Sudan experienced a notable drop.

Additionally, Transparency International publishes a Bribe Payers Index (BPI), which examines the propensity of companies from the 30 leading global exporting countries to bribe abroad. It ranks these countries from 1 to 30, with 1 being the least likely to bribe and 30 being the most likely. Although China is the world’s fourth-largest exporter, it ranked 29th out of 30 in the 2006 BPI—edging out India for last place. Casey Kelso, Transparency International’s Regional Director for Africa, said, “Foreign companies that commit the crime of bribery are undercutting Africa’s anti-poverty efforts. African countries should prosecute them vigorously.”

China’s tendency to offer bribes has a detrimental effect on the citizenry of developing countries. Transparency International’s Chair, Huguette Labelle, remarked, “Bribing companies are actively undermining the best efforts of governments in developing nations to improve governance, and thereby driving the vicious cycle of poverty.” While neither of these remarks directly targets China or its corporations, they both address concerns surrounding Chinese investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. As hypothesis one states, Chinese unconditional investment practices allow African countries to subvert Western standards. We can hypothesize that it is the subversion of these standards that allows for the perpetuation of corruption, which in turn hurts the general population. Because virtually all of the Chinese companies engaged in business or projects in Angola and Sudan are

state-owned or state-operated, it is not only the companies but also the government, which are prolonging poverty and human suffering.

In contrast to Chinese companies, U.S. firms must abide by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977, making it unlawful for U.S.-based companies to bribe foreign government officials to obtain or retain business. Penalties for violating the FCPA include a fine of up to $2 million, and or imprisonment up to five years. The goal of the FCPA was to “have an enormous impact on the way American firms do business.” Several firms that paid bribes were the subject of civil and criminal enforcement actions, resulting in large fines, suspension and debarment from federal procurement contracting, and their employees and officers have gone to jail. In order to avoid such consequences, many firms have implemented detailed compliance programs intended to prevent and detect any improper payments by employees or agents. Conversely, China has no specific law against bribing foreign officials. As a result, China’s no-strings-attached investment model and its lack of anti-bribery laws augur the subversion of transparency standards in African countries.


50 Ibid.
Bartholomew reported on Chinese investment in Africa. She described how China is offering a “wealth of assistance in building African infrastructure without concern about whether the benefits are accruing to the African people, or only to corrupt leaders and without conditions to improve governance.”

Bartholomew went on to add that the United States “formally recognized that lasting progress and sustainable economic growth on the African Continent [would] not happen without transparent governments.”

Although Bartholomew’s testimony is biased towards U.S. interests, she raises the salient point that the general population will not see an improvement in their way of life unless fundamental change occurs—and that Chinese investment is a contributing factor to this issue.

Deborah Brautigam is a professor at American University’s International Development Program and is the author of several books regarding Chinese aid and development practices. In her chapter in China Into Africa, she argues, “the bulk of China’s significant economic activities in Africa—natural resources imports, bank loans, infrastructural construction projects, and foreign investment—is carried out by government-owned banks, companies, and departments that are generally nontransparent.” Chinese companies’ proclivity for nontransparent business practices fails to establish a desirable model for Sub-Saharan African countries that already suffer

54 Ibid, 46
from high levels of corruption. Although Brautigam identifies Chinese enterprises as nontransparent, she fails to address the livelihood of the general population.

One benchmark for Angola and Sudan to aim for in terms of combating corruption is to join the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI). The Initiative was launched by British Prime Minister Tony Blair at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development and consists of a coalition of governments, investors and international organizations that set a global standard for transparency in oil, gas, and mining. As two of the top African oil exporters, both countries could benefit tremendously from such membership.

In order to become a member of the Initiative, a country must first meet four minimum requirements: 1) the government must issue a public statement of its intention to implement EITI, 2) the government must commit to collaborating with civil society and companies on EITI implementation, 3) the government must appoint a senior individual to head EITI implementation, and 4) the government must publish and disseminate a fully itemized Work Plan containing measurable targets, a timetable for completion and an assessment of capacity limitations (government, private sector and civil society). By fulfilling these criteria, a country reaches the level of “candidate” and is closer to becoming a full-fledged member of the EITI. Once a country reaches candidate status, it must undergo validation within two years. Validation is a process that

both promotes dialogue and learning at the country level and preserves the EITI brand by holding all EITI implementing countries to the same standard worldwide. If a country passes the validation process, it reaches the level of compliant. Compliant countries must undergo validation every five years.\(^58\) The EITI Board may revoke compliant and candidate statuses if validation indicates that a country has made no meaningful progress. EITI assists in strengthening accountability and good governance, as well as promoting greater economic and political stability. This, in turn, can contribute to the prevention of conflict based around the oil, mining and gas sectors.\(^59\) Executing these standards would be an enormous step in the right direction in terms of curbing corruption and allowing for sustainable growth and development in both Angola and Sudan.

Li Anshan is a professor at the School of International Studies at Peking University in Beijing. He has authored books on Chinese history in Africa, as well as European colonialism in Africa. Li supplies the lone defense for the lack of transparency surrounding Chinese business ventures on the African continent. He concedes “there are no accurate figures available for China’s aid to Africa from official sources in Chinese,” but fails to offer a proper explanation as to why that is the case. He argues, “China is a developing country, with more than 20 million people below the poverty line. With a large number of poor people, it is not wise for the Chinese leadership to publicize the


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amount of China’s aid to Africa.” This justification seems to be a poor excuse to sweep Chinese foreign aid under the rug rather than disclose it. If there were such a large number of Chinese citizens living below the poverty line, would it not be in the Chinese government’s best interest to direct the millions or billions of dollars domestically? Li notes, “It is not only a matter of saving face, but also a matter of sovereignty.” He reiterates the policy on noninterference. China perceives criticism of domestic policy as an infringement on its sovereignty. As a result, China is willing to disregard rogue behavior by countries (such as Sudan) with which it has intimate economic ties. There seem to be two ways of examining this position. First, Beijing construes criticism of either its domestic or foreign policy as an interference of its sovereignty. Second, China refuses to make demands of African governments because it would violate the sovereignty of the host government.

Additionally, disclosing financial information at the behest of Western nations or groups would also be considered a forfeiture of sovereignty. However, David Shambaugh of George Washington University observes “Foreign aid really is a glaring contradiction to the broader trend of China’s adherence to international norms. It is so strikingly opaque it really makes one wonder what they are trying to hide.”

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With the exception of Li Anshan, there is a standard opinion that Chinese enterprises and their African host governments are not transparent. However, except for Carolyn Bartholomew’s passing remark, no literature focuses on the impact felt by African people as a result of Chinese investment. In post-conflict nations like Angola and war-torn countries like Sudan, development and improving the standard of living should be second only to maintaining or establishing peace.

Angola

Chinese involvement in infrastructure finance in Angola began in 2002 following the end of the civil war, which left the country in ruins. Initial projects were relatively small and involved the rehabilitation of power transmission infrastructure and the installation of a new fiber-optic link.63

Henry Lee and Dan Shalmon note that, following Angola’s destructive civil war, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to provide a substantial loan on the condition that the government commit to transparency reforms and to the IMF stabilization program, which offers financial support and policy advice as well as assistance for the creation of modern tax and fiscal structures, central banking institutions, and financial supervision in transition economies.64 The IMF was particularly concerned that Angola’s oil revenue was being siphoned off and not being

directed towards social needs. According to the IMF, over $8.5 billion of public money was unaccounted for between 1997 and 2001.\textsuperscript{65}

Robert Rotberg is the director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. He labels Angola an “autocratically ruled nation-state,” and emphasizes the fact that Angola ranked forty-two out of forty-eight Sub-Saharan African states in the 2007 Index of African Governance list.\textsuperscript{66} The Index is a collaborative report published by the World Peace Foundation and the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government that ranks all African countries based on five indicators: safety and security; rule of law, transparency, and corruption; participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human development.\textsuperscript{67} It ranks countries on a scale of zero to 100, with zero being the worst and 100 being a perfect score. Between 2001 and 2007 Angola experienced only marginal improvement in transparency, climbing from 24.7 in 2000 to 35.3 in 2007 in the Index of African Governance list.\textsuperscript{68} Angola already ranked very poorly at the time of China’s first $2 billion line of credit in 2002, and saw negligible improvement in the intervening five years. Because of its no-strings-attached style of investment, China’s presence has done nothing to improve the level of good governance. It can be argued that because of the lack of attached conditions to its loans, China has stymied improvements

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
to the degree of governance in Angola. In this case, we can posit that hypothesis one, that Chinese unconditional investment practices enable the subversion of Western transparency standards, applies.

In 2004, Angola abruptly broke off its negotiations with the IMF—on the heels of China Ex-Im’s $2 billion loan agreement. In 2004, Angola abruptly broke off its negotiations with the IMF—on the heels of China Ex-Im’s $2 billion loan agreement. The line of credit will be paid back over twelve years in the form of setting aside 15,000 barrels of oil a day (bbl/d). This figure has since increased to 40,000 bbl/d until the loan is fully repaid. While Angolan infrastructure will benefit from this cash infusion in the form of power grid development and road construction, it would be further developed and stable if those in power had not siphoned away billions of dollars for their personal gain during the previous decades. If corruption is permitted to continue at the highest levels of governance, it will hamstring the development of Angola in the long-term. This form of developmental handicap will, in turn, serve as a detriment to the general population because funds that would otherwise be directed towards public works—that would improve their standard of living—are being channeled into the pockets of corrupt politicians and businessmen. Angola’s foremost oil company is Sonangol, the only state institution to have weathered the 1976-2000 civil war. During the conflict it sustained the economy with cash infusions and used oil as collateral to purchase weapons for government troops. Sonangol has never been plagued by the bureaucracy and red tape associated with other government

70 Ibid, 119.
institutions and is regarded as highly opaque.\textsuperscript{72} It was with Sonangol that China’s Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC) created a joint venture in 2006 to exploit three blocks of Angola’s offshore oilfields. Under the venture, named Sonangol Sinopec International (SSI), Sinopec held a 75 percent stake, while Sonangol held the remaining 25 percent. It is estimated that the three oil blocks would bring Sinopec (and thus, China) 100,000 barrels of oil output per day.\textsuperscript{73}

China’s foray into Sub-Saharan African countries in search of natural resources has undermined the transparency standards or protocols that western organizations strive to uphold because Chinese agreements allow African governments to avoid reform projects such as the IMF’s stabilization program. Western governments have accused the Chinese of undercutting their efforts to press the Angolan government to institute reforms, specifically those related to transparency. As indicated by the African Governance Index and Transparency International’s CPI, Angola continues to rank among the most corrupt countries in the world.\textsuperscript{74} Chinese investment allows Angola to forego IMF lending that would subject government finance to greater scrutiny.\textsuperscript{75} Some Western analysts believe that by ignoring transparency concerns, China gains a


significant competitive advantage in a jurisdiction with a high level of corruption.\textsuperscript{76} China’s method of investment appears to be a complicating element, impeding the development of transparency standards and aggravating preexisting corruption in both the commercial and governmental sectors. Consequently, hypothesis one, that the Chinese method of no-strings-attached investment undermines Western standards of transparency, is supported. Because the lack of transparency in Angola is pandemic, hypothesis two, that Chinese presence aggravates a local situation is not supported. Additionally, because the corruption predates Chinese investment, hypothesis three, that China directly causes this problem, is not supported.

Sudan

While China has faced criticism by some for its enterprises in Angola, its practices in Sudan provoke the greatest controversy. Sudan, like Angola, is another African country whose oil resources are not yet fully explored. As mentioned previously, the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) faces virtually no competition from Western multinationals, which left the country because of the Sudanese government’s conduct. As indicated by Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, which examined transparency, accountability, and corruption, Sudan ranked 176 out of 180—placing it in the bottom five percent of ranked countries. With regard to Sub-Saharan African countries, Sudan ranked second to last—only outranking Somalia,

which is considered by many to be a failed state.\textsuperscript{77} Despite its poor ranking, 55 percent of Sudan’s oil exports went to China in 2008.\textsuperscript{78} China’s unconditional trade and investment practice place no demands on the Sudanese government, which can continue its corrupt practices rather than implement transparency reforms as would be required with Western agreements. China’s apparent indifference or disregard for transparent business partners bears additional negative consequences for the general population, which will be discussed in the following chapters.

Sudan’s Christian-Muslim, North-South discord compounds the oil situation. Most of the oil is found in the South—but close to the North-South demarcation. Originally, the reserves were thought to be relatively small. However, when it became clear that the oil reserves might be far greater in quantity, the government in Khartoum (located in the North) reasserted authority over the oil fields. Out of concern for the security of the supplies, the Sudanese government decided to pump the oil to the country’s only refinery near Khartoum—over 1,000 kilometers away from the source. This venture permitted the North to control oil supplies and, more importantly, oil revenue—a portion of which was retained by the government and used to fund military and militia groups. These oil revenues were critical to the North’s ability to fight the war against the South, prior to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. China provided the technical expertise and provided financial investments to develop the reserves. It also

provided workers to expand, construct, and operate the oilfields, pipelines, and refinery.\textsuperscript{79} By directing the oil away from the South, Khartoum effectively redirected oil revenue away from the South and its local economy.

Since 2001, China has invested over $1.3 billion in Sudan.\textsuperscript{80} In the aforementioned 2007 African Governance Index, Sudan scored 29.0 out of 100, a considerable drop from its 2000 score of 41.4. This score ranked it 50 out of all 53 African countries (outplaying Liberia, the DRC, and Somolia).\textsuperscript{81} Like Angola, Sudan was ranked poorly when Chinese investment began. However, unlike Angola, which has seen minimal improvement in its African Governance score, Sudan has dropped.

In this case, China’s unconditional investment model allows Sudan to circumvent Western transparency standards. As mentioned earlier, most Western companies have left Sudan because of the political environment and the ongoing violence in Darfur. This leaves China as one of very few countries still engaging in trade with Sudan. Similar to Angola, corruption is ubiquitous in Sudan, thereby discrediting hypothesis two, that Chinese presence aggravates a local situation. Chinese investment complicates the situation and provides the government in Khartoum with a lifeline to continue its corrupt practices, thereby supporting hypothesis one.

Conclusion

The governments of Angola and Sudan suffer from a lack of transparency, which has been exacerbated by conflict and poor governance. With Angola in the midst of shaky reconstruction and Sudan engaged in civil, ethnic conflict, both countries are in need of financial aid and infrastructural rehabilitation. However, the Chinese approach of granting loans or opening lines of credit without attached conditions for the improvement of transparency curtails any significant movement to mitigate corruption. The existing system of governance in Angola and Sudan fails to adequately provide for the general population—in part because those in power siphon off billions of dollars that could otherwise be directed towards reconstruction and public works projects. China contributes to this condition by maintaining its “no strings attached” and noninterference policies.
Environment

Overview

Africa is the continent most vulnerable to environmental degradation as a result of lax regulatory frameworks and weak enforcement capacity.\textsuperscript{82} Between 2007 and 2010, China Ex-Im pledged to commit $20 billion in loans to Africa, dwarfing the $4.6 billion that the World Bank had committed in project loans in 2006.\textsuperscript{83} Chinese banks and Chinese government-backed corporations have engaged in projects in many African countries that are detrimental to the environment and the local populations. Although China Ex-Im Bank has its own environmental standards for domestic ventures, its policy for foreign projects is to follow the environmental regulations of the host country.\textsuperscript{84} Chinese bankers do not impose governance conditions on their lending, and are willing to follow the host government’s system for evaluating the environmental impacts of projects. However, there are no measures to hold either party accountable and the lack of environmental safeguards is beginning to create resistance among African civil society groups.\textsuperscript{85} Indeed, in 2006 and 2007 the DRC and Gabon both closed down several Chinese companies because of alleged environmental abuses.\textsuperscript{86} In countries such as Gabon, governments have responded to civil society appeals by requiring stronger

environmental due diligence for Chinese projects. In January 2008, Sierra Leone banned timber exports because, as the country’s environment minister said in an interview with the BBC, Chinese and other logging companies were plundering forests without any respect for the law.\(^{87}\) This can point to one of two possibilities for China’s practices in Sub-Saharan Africa: 1) China does not actually adhere to the environmental regulations of host countries, or 2) host countries either lack environmental regulations or lack the means to enforce them.

Robert Rotberg submits, “China’s slapdash approach to safety issues, especially in mining, has…been exported to Africa, along with its refusal to take environmental concerns seriously.”\(^{88}\) Stephanie Rupp\(^{89}\) echoes this sentiment by adding, “Many African commentators note with trepidation the environmental degradation of China’s own landscapes and resources, and express serious concerns about uncritical acceptance of Chinese development initiatives in Africa.”\(^{90}\)

In June 2003, ten commercial banks launched the Equator Principles, a framework for managing social and environmental risk in project finance. They have become the common baseline and framework of leading financial institutions active in project finance for the implementation of their own social and environmental policies.


\(^{88}\) Ibid, 15

\(^{89}\) Stephanie Rupp is a professor of anthropology at Lehman College and was a joint research fellow with the Program on Intrastate Conflict and the International Security Program at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Project finance is a method of funding in which the lender looks primarily to the revenues generated by a single project, both as the source of repayment and a security for the exposure. This mode of financing is typically applied to large, complex and expensive projects such as oil and gas development, mines, power plants and chemical processing plants. The Equator Principles are applied to projects greater than $10 million in value.\textsuperscript{91} In practice, the Principles require financial institutions to categorize projects as A, B, or C based on the magnitude of their environmental impacts. Group A projects are the most invasive or detrimental and require the borrowers to carry out social and environmental assessments. Additionally, they must prepare action plans and social and environmental management systems to implement the action plans. Most projects are not categorized as A, but as B or C and therefore have less stringent requirements.

The Equator Principles have strengthened cooperation among Equator Principle Financial Institutions (EPFIs). EPFIs include commercial banks as well as export credit agencies in Africa, Asia, Europe, Oceania, North and South America. In the first half of 2007, EPFIs arranged 86 percent of the project finance transactions in developing countries. By February 2008, 58 financial institutions had adopted the Equator Principles.\textsuperscript{92} Because most project finance transactions require the involvement of several financial institutions, following the Equator Principles has, de facto, become a precondition for such transactions. However, because the Principles are in fact voluntary and not mandated by law, China and its financial institutions are not required to adhere to

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
them. Consequently, the failure of Chinese financial institutions to follow the Principles allows the recipients of its funding to avoid those standards.

In a 2006 interview, then-World Bank president Paul Wolfowitcz expressed his concern “about Africa as a whole,” and criticized Chinese banks for their lax environmental standards. He acknowledged that The Equator Principles have been implemented, but added, “Almost 80 percent of commercial banks worldwide respect these principles when they finance projects. The big Chinese banks, for their part, don’t apply them.” Among these banks is China Ex-Im, which provides the concessional loans for many of China’s projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. The official procedure for China Ex-Im’s overseas projects is far less stringent than the Equator Principles, allowing for greater latitude in environmentally sensitive projects. It stipulates, “social and environmental impact assessments that meet the host country laws are required; China Ex-Im will actively participate in the environmental impact monitoring thought the entire project cycle and reserves the right to cancel financing if environmental impacts are not adequately addressed.” However, because China Ex-Im is the sole financier for many projects in Africa, facilitating bilateral agreements between China and the host country, there are no means to ensuring that China Ex-Im’s environmental policy is adhered to in practice. These investments and projects in Africa cover various sectors, many of which can have deleterious effects on the environment.

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Angola

Article 24 of the Angolan constitution stipulates, “The protection of the environment and natural resources is constitutionally recognized as a duty of the State, which has the responsibility to formulate environmental strategies, policies and laws.” Additionally, “The Environmental Framework Law goes further by providing guiding principles for the prevention and combat of pollution, and standards to protect the environment.”\(^\text{95}\) These provisions are geared towards combating the environmental problems currently facing Angola, which include desertification as a result of deforestation. This, in turn, increases soil runoff, and contamination of the water supply.\(^\text{96}\)

As noted in the introduction, Angola accounted for 51 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s oil exports to China between 2001 and 2006; Sudan was a distant second, accounting for 18 percent.\(^\text{97}\) With 15 percent of its total oil imports coming from Angola, China has invested heavily in the Angolan oil sector since 2002. This has primarily taken the form of offshore exploration and drilling. When oil is extracted from beneath the sea floor, it is contained in pipes leading directly up to the rig, thereby leaving a very small environmental impact.\(^\text{98}\) Many Western firms are also engaged in oil extraction industries in other Angolan offshore blocks that employ similar techniques. Because


Chinese investment focuses heavily on oil extraction, which has a considerably smaller environmental impact than dam construction or strip mining, one could make the argument that the harm to the environment as a result of Chinese projects in Angola is negligible. However, this does not undermine the argument that Chinese investment in Angola and Sudan does not benefit the general population overall. Rather, it demonstrates that Chinese investment in Africa is amorphic; it modifies and reshapes itself to achieve a set goal: oil in Angola and Sudan, or minerals in the DRC. China extracts the resources that it needs and then leaves. The lack of attached conditions to Chinese lending agreements makes it more appealing to autocratic leaders who would otherwise shy away from Western lending packages with provisions for mitigating corruption or improving human rights.

The Chinese offer basic infrastructure, but the long-term benefit to the general population is difficult to ascertain. However, as in the case of Angola, we have seen how Chinese investment erodes efforts to curb corruption. The fact that environmental degradation is not a byproduct of the Sino-Angolan business is a small consolation.

Sudan

Early Chinese infrastructure projects in Sudan began in 2001 and were all related to the power sector. China later agreed to finance three substantial thermal generation projects for coal-fired and gas-fired plants in Port Sudan, Al-Fulah, and Rabak.99 All told, these Chinese-backed projects created more than 1,400 megawatts (MW) of new

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thermal generating capacity to the power grid. These projects, however, collectively pale when compared to the Merowe Dam project.

In the late 1990s Sudan was in arrears to the World Bank and IMF and therefore could not secure financing for the dam project; Sudanese authorities approached Canada, China, Malaysia, as well as European and Arab countries in search of funding. France’s official export credit agency refused to fund the project because of its environmental and social impacts, which are mentioned below. Eventually, sufficient funds were secured from China Ex-Im Bank and several Arab countries, but German and French companies also participated in the project. When contracts were signed for the Merowe Dam in 2004, the $1.2 billion cost made it the largest international project that China had ever participated in (a new hydropower project in Nigeria will be twice as large). China Ex-Im Bank financed a $520 million loan (the largest single financier of the project), while various Chinese corporations including Sinohydro took over construction of the transmission lines (1,776km) and participated in constructing the power plant. At full capacity, the dam will produce 1,250 MW of hydroelectric power.

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102 Ibid.
By damming a segment of the Nile River, the project has forcibly displaced tens of thousands of people as a 174 kilometer-long reservoir forms behind it. Nearly 70,000 people have been displaced from the fertile lands of the Nile River Valley to the surrounding Nubian Desert. Displaced communities asked to be relocated to the shores of the newly formed reservoir rather than the desert locations. Project authorities rejected the demands of the population; in April 2006, militias employed by the project authority killed three people and wounded 47 others for protesting the forced


displacement. In August 2007, the UN Special Rapporteur on housing rights voiced concern regarding “numerous reports of violations of civil and political rights due to the government’s response to community protests” in the Merowe Project. These reports included “the shooting of unarmed demonstrators, arbitrary arrests of activists, and repressive measures against the press when journalists attempted to cover events.” He strongly encouraged “States, in particular China…ensure that the work of their national companies does not—directly or indirectly—negatively impact the human rights of the affected people.” Many of these issues could have been avoided or minimized if proper impact assessments had been carried out.

Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) published by independent institutes found that “key environmental issues such as reservoir sedimentation, irrigation, water quality and downstream ecological impacts were not addressed adequately.” Additionally, the newly created reservoir will, over time, pose health threats to the surrounding population. The initial EIA concluded “pollution and the decomposition of organic matter may create public health hazards for people drinking water or eating fish

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from the reservoir.” Given the forceful and violent means used to move the local population and subdue protests, it is difficult to perceive the relocations as a positive step taken by the government to protect the people from the above mentioned health hazards. Furthermore, a visit to the project’s first resettlement site in 2005 showed that the poverty rate was rapidly increasing among displaced people. The soil in the resettlement areas was so poor and arid that the farmers could only harvest two to three bags of wheat per acre, compared to the fifteen to twenty bags they were able to harvest along the shores of the Nile.

In violation of Sudan’s Environmental Protection Act of 2000, which stipulates that all environmental feasibility studies need to be reviewed and certified by the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Environment’s technical body was never allowed to see the EIAs. Peter Bosshard of International Rivers notes, “the dam does not adhere to environmental standards required in Sudan, let alone those set by ECAs (export credit agencies) in OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries [parentheses added].” This calls into question China Ex-Im’s environmental policy and whether it is practiced in overseas projects. International

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111 Ibid.

Rivers also noted, “Civil society and dam-affected peoples’ movements are concerned that China’s own poor record on protecting human rights and the environment could mean trouble for African rivers now targeted for Chinese-built large dams.”

Conclusion

In terms of impact on the environment by Chinese investment, we can contrast the two case countries. Angola, with its burgeoning oil industry, relies on Chinese investment to rehabilitate its infrastructure, which in turn facilitates oil extraction and production. This process is of great importance, as it allows Angola to repay China for the lines of credit extended by China Ex-Im Bank in 2004 and 2007. However, such projects do not enjoy the same degree of media attention as the emblematic case in Sudan, nor do they affect the general population on the same scale. Although Chinese projects in Angola do not share the same degree of environmental degradation or harm to the local population as in Sudan, it does not mean that they are otherwise wholesome enterprises. Rather, it indicates that Chinese investment in Angola, and in Africa as a whole, does not always leave the same footprint; different projects leave different issues in their respective wakes. Because the projects associated with Chinese investment in Angola have negligible environmental footprints, and because there is no evidence of the undermining of environmental standards, hypothesis one, two, and three cannot be affirmed.

113 "Chinese Dams in Africa."
It is clear that the Merowe Dam project in Sudan has had a negative effect on both the environment and the local population. The forced displacement of 70,000 people from fertile land to arid desert, the tainting of local water supplies, and the expected long-term health hazards are all glaring problems created by the dam’s construction. In this case, Chinese investment aggravates the local situation in Merowe, thereby affirming hypothesis two.

Outcry against environmental degradation as a result of Chinese investment is far more muted than that against corruption of human rights, but it is equally salient. Among those who raise environmental concerns, there is a standard opinion that projects financed by Chinese institutions or companies are not taking the appropriate measures to ensure that they are environmentally friendly or sustainable.
Human Rights

Overview

Violations of social norms such as human rights include censorship, inability to access the justice system, torture, and discrimination based on sexual or ethnic identity. For the purposes of this chapter and this thesis, I will examine the grimmer facets of human rights violations: torture, forced displacement and violence—and their relation to Chinese investment.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), passed on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations, was the first international recognition that all human beings have fundamental rights and freedoms. It details the rights to which every human being is entitled. Among these are the rights to “life, liberty, and security of person,” as well as freedom from “slavery or servitude,” and “torture or…cruel and inhuman punishment.”

On the 60th anniversary of its proclamation in 2008, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said that the UDHR was the “first global statement of what we now take for granted—the inherent dignity and quality of all human beings.” While this was a milestone in terms of international recognition of human rights norms, the UDHR lacked the legally binding nature of treaties.

The Third Geneva Convention of 1949 established a legally binding set of human rights norms, particularly in regards to armed conflict within a state. Common Article Three of the Convention stipulates that persons not taking part in the conflict, “including

members of armed forces who have laid down their arms…shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.”117 The Convention prohibits practices such as “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture”. Angola and Sudan have both ratified the Convention, meaning that the torture, mutilation and murder of civilians that has occurred in both countries are in direct violation of the provisions of the Convention. These violations place legal culpability on the national governments in Luanda and Khartoum. Because of its intimate relations with both governments, and taking into consideration that it, too, has ratified the Convention, there is a correlation between China and these abuses. However, it is difficult to determine what degree the Chinese should be held accountable.

In their chapter “China’s Role in Human Rights Abuses in Africa: Clarifying Issues of Culpability” in China into Africa, Stephen Brown and Chandra Lekha Sriram118 examine the impact of Chinese investment and the legal culpability of Chinese corporations or the Chinese government for abuses carried out by local business partners in the host country. In addition to the case studies, these countries include Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea, and Zambia. For example, the treatment of workers at one Chinese-run copper mining operation in Zambia, where unsafe and inhumane working conditions were reported, could be more aptly labeled as the inadequate observance of or adherence

118 Stephen Brown is a professor of political science at the University of Ottawa and focuses on democratization, foreign aid, political violence, and peace building. Chandra Lekha Sriram is a professor of human rights and director of the Center on Human Rights in Conflict at the University of East London.
Chinese managers banned union activity and paid Zambian workers less than the agreed upon $67 per month minimum wage. In 2005, more than 50 Zambians were killed in an accidental explosion in a factory that served the mine. The following year, during protests against pay and work conditions, a Chinese supervisor opened fire on the crowd of Zambian workers with a shotgun, wounding several. Because Chinese companies or their employees do not actively carry out violations (aside from the case of the manager firing on the crowd), there is no legal culpability. However, the continued business relationships between Chinese companies and their African counterparts, who engage in abuses, indicate moral culpability. While moral culpability would not stand up in a court of law, it does indicate the degree to which China is connected to human rights abusers. Brown and Sriram make the important point that moral arguments are not irrelevant.

China has faced criticism from many policy makers and human rights advocates because several African countries in which China or Chinese-owned companies are engaged in business deals have very poor human rights records. As mentioned in the environmental chapter, Sudan was unable to secure funding from Western countries or international financial institutions for the construction of the Merowe Dam project because it was already in arrears with the IMF. Other countries are unwilling to accept

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the attached conditions of Western lending packages. Herein lies the appeal of Chinese lending agreements; the no-strings-attached investment method allows countries to receive funding for projects without having to address preexisting issues. Compared to privately owned companies from the West, the state-owned Chinese companies engaged in projects throughout Africa have a direct relation to China itself.

The large Chinese corporations engaged in business deals in many African countries are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), meaning that they are run by or report to the government—and reflect government policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. The apparent indifference towards such violations in African countries is, perhaps, a reflection of China’s lax domestic approach to human rights standards. This does not mean that China is directly culpable for such abuses. However, despite the lack of legal culpability in violations of human rights, there is still a correlation between Chinese investment and the violation of human rights norms in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Brown and Sriram note, “China permits African countries to circumvent the conditions upon which assistance from the West and international financial institutions is predicated.”

122 This does not mean that such conditions are dependent on contractual agreements; such norms are independent sources that carry their own obligations. The sentiment that China is undercutting reform efforts is echoed in an article from The Financial Times in late-2006, which states, “China has done deals in countries such as Sudan, in which it secured valuable oil concessions, where the World Bank’s human

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rights and environmental safeguard rules prevent it [from] operating."¹²³ The same article quotes then-president of the European Investment Bank, Phillippe Maystadt, as saying that Chinese banks can invest in Africa because they “don’t bother about social or human rights conditions.”¹²⁴ In 2004 China’s deputy foreign minister, Zhou Wenzhong said in regard to the crisis in Darfur:

“Business is business. We try to separate politics from business. Secondly, I think the internal situation in the Sudan is and internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose upon them.”¹²⁵

It is this indifference that underscores the correlation between Chinese investment and human rights abuses in Angola and Sudan.

The official nomenclature for China’s foreign relations policy is “noninterference in domestic affairs.” Stephanie Hanson of the Council on Foreign Relations posits that “Chinese leaders say human rights are relative, and each country should be allowed their own definition of them and timetable for reaching them. In fact, China has argued that attempts by foreign nations to discuss democracy and human rights violate the rights of a sovereign country.”¹²⁶ This position is fundamental to China’s policy when approaching

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business ventures in Africa. One explanation for this attitude is China’s intolerance for political dissent domestically. Another could be China’s historically hard-nosed receipt of international criticism regarding its human rights record.

The explanation for apparent Chinese indifference towards human rights abuses in Africa is two-fold. First, China has a very indefinite domestic human rights policy. The Chinese government maintains that human rights are a Western creation and are inappropriate for China, and believes that civil and political rights should not be given primacy over economic, social, and cultural rights. For example, Chinese ethnic minorities like Muslim Uighurs face discrimination or forced crackdowns. Uighurs have Turkic roots and comprise only part of the four percent minority of China’s population (96 percent of China’s 1.3 billion people belong to the Han ethnic group). However, in the northwestern Chinese province of Xinjiang, Uighurs are the major ethnicity. In the post-September 11th era, China has taken advantage of the global war on terror to crackdown on Uighurs who it feels are threats to the state. Second, China has adamantly insisted that promotion of human rights must not impede on state sovereignty or be used as a political tool to interfere in the internal affairs of states. While this position was primarily articulated to prevent criticism of China’s own human rights record, it also

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127 Brown and Sriram, 252.
130 Ibid.
serves as an explanation for China’s hesitancy to rebuke African governments for abuses or to impose upon them human rights standards.

A different interpretation of Chinese policy towards Africa comes from Li Anshan. He postulates that China faces accusations that it is “developing relations with Africa solely to secure oil and other natural resources and…is engaging in ‘new colonialism’ or acting as ‘new economic imperialists.”” Li continues by arguing that “linked” to the neocolonial accusations are the criticisms that “China, in order to gain raw materials, supports corrupt authoritarian regimes at the expense of ‘human rights.’” His defense is that state behavior is based on Western ideals, and China does not accept “the naming and shaming of certain Africa regimes as corrupt,” the way Western countries do.

Li addresses the crisis in Darfur, but is selective in his disclosure of facts and analysis. He labels it as a “regional tragedy,” but emphasizes how “China has constantly supported the Sudanese people with humanitarian aid.” However, he fails to mention China’s direct supply of weapons to the Sudanese military—both before and after the imposition of a UN arms embargo on the sale of weapons to Sudan bound for Darfur. (UN Security Council Resolution 1591 banned the sale of arms to Sudan in an attempt to stem the violence.) With his sympathetic argument towards Chinese investment in

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132 Ibid.
Africa and selective disclosure of facts, Li is the outlier of the commentators on social norms when compared to Western commentators.

It is worth noting that China abstained from voting on UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1591 regarding the crisis in Darfur. By permitting resolutions to be passed within the Security Council, but simultaneously continuing its investment, China signals both disregard for the sanctions and the UNSC resolutions. This inconsistency helps to support the hypothesis that Chinese investment undermines Western standards of human rights.

If China could be persuaded by the international community to press countries like Angola or Sudan to adopt human rights standards, it could use its economic power as leverage to implement change. However, the international community must first convince China to agree to international standards of human rights before any Chinese-influenced changes can occur.

**Angola**

Despite having officially been at peace since 2002, Angola still suffers from widespread human rights abuses. While the most prevalent issue is the high poverty rate, human rights abuses also occur throughout the country, primarily in the form of torture, arbitrary arrests and inaccessible justice. As mentioned earlier in the transparency

chapter, Angola’s autocratic government suffers from a high degree of corruption. Such opacity contributes to human rights abuses.

In a 2004 report, Human Rights Watch (HRW) claimed that a country’s “substantial reliance on natural resource revenues can have a negative impact on human rights unless measures are taken to ensure that they are managed and spent transparently.” It added that human rights are a key indicator of quality of governance. However, “when a ruler or a governing elite are otherwise unaccountable to their citizens...human rights abuses thrive.” The bottom line is that “these problems are clearly present in Angola.”

From a social perspective, such corruption undermines access to justice, as well as funding of health, education, and social services. Corruption and a heavy reliance on oil revenues manifests themselves in the form of more grim human rights abuses in Cabinda, an oil-rich enclave geographically separated from the rest of Angola by the DRC. Brown and Sriram point out that Angola is “often condemned for its disregard for human rights, especially in Cabinda.”

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Cabinda has an estimated population of 300,000 (as of July 2009 Angola’s total population was estimated to be 12.8 million) and produces more than half of Angola’s oil. Following the end of the civil war in 2002, a separatist movement continued in Cabinda; the military reacted with a large-scale counterinsurgency operation until 2003. In 2006 a peace agreement was signed between the Angola government and the Liberation Front for the Independence of the Enclave of Cabinda. However, HRW found that “peace has still not taken root in Cabinda,” and that the Angola Armed Forces have 30,000 troops stationed in the enclave and have used arbitrary arrests and torture as

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tools against a small rebel movement since 2007.\textsuperscript{140} Between September 2007 and March 2009 the Angolan military and intelligence officials in Cabinda arrested at least 38 people. These detainees were subjected to brutal physical torture and were denied basic due process as well as the right to a fair trial. All 38 detainees were held for lengthy periods—ranging from 26 days to six months—before being transferred to the civilian system and being formally charged.\textsuperscript{141}

According to Georgette Gagnon, HRW’s Africa director, “the Angolan armed forces are committing serious human rights violations in Cabinda.”\textsuperscript{142} Because Cabinda accounts for 60 percent of Angola’s oil production, which is the backbone of the Angolan economy, separatist movements are harshly subdued. HRW called for Angola to resume talks with The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in order to negotiate a solution that strengthens human rights in the region and throughout the country. Gagnon added that Angola “is going back on its word to support a constructive dialogue and increased cooperation with the UN human rights office,” and that the “Angolan government’s decision to shut down this important human rights office signals growing government intolerance of human rights scrutiny.” (The government committed in writing to the president of the UN General Assembly that it would increase dialogue with the UN human rights offices before joining the Human Rights Council in


\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.

Large oil reserves play a significant role in the ongoing human rights violations in Angola.

Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 25 percent of China’s gross crude oil imports and over half of that total is derived from Angola—Africa’s largest producer. Between 2001 and 2007, Chinese investment commitments to the Angolan oil sector were valued at $2.4 billion; these commitments are completely separate from the lines of credit provided by China Ex-Im Bank in 2004 and 2007. As mentioned earlier in the transparency chapter, the Chinese-Angola joint venture (SSI) has stakes in several offshore oil blocks. Additionally, China facilitates the transportation of the oil from Cabinda’s offshore blocks, as well as other regions of the country, to Angola’s only refinery in Lobito. By providing a growing import market for Angolan oil, as well as over $4 billion in lines of credit for infrastructure development (without attached conditionalities) between 2004 and 2007, China enables the system of no accountability, which in turn permits human rights abuses.

There is no direct connection between Chinese investment in Angola and the arrests and torture in Cabinda. However, China’s loose relationship to this debacle comes in the form of its no strings attached business approach. Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction, the “Angola Model” is characterized by loans or grants intended for infrastructure development in return for natural resources (in the case of Angola, oil),

without attached conditions. In terms of human rights violations in Angola, China merely complicates a preexisting situation.

**Sudan**

In her aforementioned testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, Carolyn Bartholomew noted that “lasting progress…on the African Continent” would not occur without governments that acknowledge “the basic human rights of their citizens.” This concern is saliently manifested in Sudan.

Figure 5. Map of Sudanese Regions. Image taken from BBC News “Bashir War Crims Bid Challenged” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7833415.stm>.

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China has directly supplied arms and materiel to the Sudanese military since the mid-1990s. Between 1996 and 2003 these sales totaled over $100 million in value.\textsuperscript{146} In 1997 Human Rights Watch observed eight howitzers, five tanks, and one anti-aircraft gun (all Chinese-made) in a southern garrison that had been abandoned by government forces.\textsuperscript{147} Sales have included ammunition, tanks, jets and helicopter gunships, which have been used to forcefully displace civilians in the South during the government’s conflict with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Between 2001 and 2006 Chinese sales of small arms to Sudan increased 137 times, with approximately 88 percent of Sudan’s imported small arms coming from China.\textsuperscript{148} These transactions occurred both before and after a UN arms embargo on the sale of weapons to Sudan destined for Darfur.

In the South, Chinese weapons and military technology have been used in attacks that resulted in large-scale civilian casualties and forced displacement. The government also forcibly removed populations from areas targeted for oil exploration by the Chinese National Petroleum Company.\textsuperscript{149} Human Rights Watch reported that the military or government-backed militia forcibly displaced over 200,000 civilians from oil blocks in the South between mid-1998 and 2001.\textsuperscript{150} Unfortunately, this process is cyclical. As much as 70 percent of the income generated by oil revenue has been dedicated to

\textsuperscript{146} Brown, Stephen, and Lekha Sriram. 257.
\textsuperscript{149} Brown, Stephen, and Lekha Sriram. 257.
acquiring and manufacturing arms.\textsuperscript{151} As both a large buyer of oil and a supplier of weaponry, China perpetuates this vicious cycle.

In 2006, a series of UN investigations found that a majority of the small arms being used in Darfur were manufactured in China—despite an international ban on arm sales in the region.\textsuperscript{152} Amnesty International reported that China provided hundreds of military trucks to Sudan, which were later spotted in the possession of Arab militias. It also found that small arms and aircraft supplied by China have been spotted in Darfur and that the aircraft have been used by the Sudanese military to support Janjaweed attacks on civilians.\textsuperscript{153} China responded that the arms cited by the UN’s reports were sold to Khartoum and that it was beyond China’s control how they arrived in Darfur. Furthermore, China argued that the arms embargo did not restrict sales to Khartoum; it merely banned the sale or transfer of weapons into Darfur itself.\textsuperscript{154} While this remains technically correct, it does not diminish the fact that Chinese weapons have been used by agents of the Sudanese government to massacre women and children in Darfur. In addition to its sales of small arms and aircraft, China has helped Sudan construct three weapons factories, including one that produces tanks.\textsuperscript{155} This evidence supports hypothesis two, which posits that Chinese investment directly aggravates local situations.

\textsuperscript{153} Brown, Stephen, and Lekha Sriram. 258.
\textsuperscript{155} "China, Sudan and the Darfur Conflict." \textit{Save Darfur}. Web. 1 Mar. 2010. \langle http://savedarfur.org/page/content/china_sudan_darfur\rangle.
Conclusion

As mentioned in the introduction, Angola serves as the control case study because it has been at peace for nearly a decade. Perhaps, because it is not engaged in civil conflict, which is conducive to human rights abuses, there are fewer situations for Chinese investment to complicate or aggravate. Despite of Angola’s peace and stability, the human rights violations that occur in Cabinda and throughout the country are pervasive violations of the UDHR and the Third Geneva Convention. By failing to require the Angolan government to adopt more stringent human rights measures, China enables the continuation of human rights abuses in Cabinda and throughout Angola.

In the case of Angola, it is difficult to make the argument that hypothesis one is supported. At best, the argument could be made that Chinese unconditional investment complicates the preexisting situation in Cabinda. While the violence, arrests, and torture in Cabinda predate the bulk of Chinese investment, they are still ongoing and are not connected to Chinese projects. Chinese investment and its no-strings-attached model only complicate the situation by allowing human rights standards to be undercut or simply not adopted.

In Sudan, hypothesis two, that Chinese investment practices directly aggravate local situations, is supported. China is one of the primary arms suppliers to the Sudanese government, which continues to engage in violence in Darfur. As Brown and Sriram note, “in countries engaged in vicious internal conflict, the sale of arms to any party will
[conceivably] result in harm to civilians.“\textsuperscript{156} Without Chinese arms deals, it would be far more difficult for the Sudanese government to supply its military, thereby making it more difficult for the violence to continue. Chinese arms deals with Sudan enable or help perpetuate conflict and human suffering.

\textsuperscript{156} Brown, Stephen, and Chandra Lekha Sriram. 257.
THE FUTURE OF SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS

The Democratic Republic of Congo: A New Trend in Sino-African Relations?

Introduction

As mentioned in the introduction, the DRC has been mired in civil conflict for decades, which has more recently been exacerbated by rebel militias vying for control of natural resource deposits in the eastern regions of the country. President Joseph Kabila came to power in 2001 after his father, President Laurent Kabila, was assassinated. At the time, Joseph Kabila was a 29 year-old general in the army who received his military training in China. Five years later, in 2006, he solidified his political power by winning the DRC’s first democratic election. Despite the election results and Kabila’s popularity in the eastern regions of the country, widespread lawlessness and violence continues in the region.  

Rwandan militias that migrated to the DRC after the 1994 genocide have, in recent years, contributed to the conflict. Rebel Congolese military commanders lead other domestic militias. Both the Congolese and Rwandan governments support various militias in a chaotic proxy war. Further complicating the situation is the presence of a poorly led national government military. MONUC, the United Nations’ 20,500-strong peacekeeping mission in the Congo—the world’s largest—attempts to protect civilian

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populations and support Congolese troops combat Rwandan rebel groups. However, it is currently in the process of pulling out of Congo completely.\textsuperscript{158} Compared to Angola, which has been officially out of conflict since 2002 and Sudan, which is engaged in a polarized civil conflict, the DRC’s fragmented conflict and instability makes it the most convoluted case study country.

More importantly for the purposes of this thesis, Congo has recently become the subject of large-scale Chinese investment and extractive industry projects.\textsuperscript{159} With a total area of 900,000 square miles (the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River), the DRC holds vast reserves of natural resources, including copper, cobalt, and tin.\textsuperscript{160} According to the US Geological Survey, the DRC mined 25,000 tons of cobalt in 2009. As of 2010, the world’s cobalt reserves\textsuperscript{161} totaled 6.6 million tons—52 percent of which were located in the DRC.\textsuperscript{162} China’s dependence on Africa for minerals far outweighs its thirst for oil; it is almost exclusively reliant on Sub-Saharan Africa for its cobalt imports. Between 2001 and 2006 China accounted for over 50 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{159} Extractive industry pertains to oil, gas, and mining.
\item \textsuperscript{161} The term “reserves” applies to the amount of the lode that could be economically extracted or produced at the time of determination.
\end{itemize}
cobalt exports. Of this percentage, the DRC accounted for 33 percent in 2001, but jumped to 73 percent of Africa’s cobalt exports by 2006. This reliance has led to the largest Chinese loan project in Africa. Because this project is new and still unfolding the DRC serves as a speculative case study—drawing conclusions from the previous two cases and hypothesizing on the trends of future Sino-African projects.

Figure 6. Distribution of Congo’s Natural Resources. Image taken from “Democratic Republic of Congo’s Mineral Resources” <http://mondediplo.com/maps/congo2006>

In April 2008 China and the DRC announced a $9.25 billion ore-for-infrastructure loan for a copper and cobalt mining project. Six billion dollars would be directed towards desperately needed infrastructure projects and $3 billion would be directed towards mining projects in the southeastern Katanga Province. Under the provisions of the agreement, the money would be directly invested in two state-owned companies: China Railroad Engineering Company (CREC) and Sinohydro. CREC would receive approximately $2.9 billion; Sinohydro would receive $2.9 billion; and Gécamines, the Congolese mining company, would receive approximately $3 billion. Together, these three companies would form Socomin, a state-owned enterprise (SOE) joint venture. China would hold a 70 percent claim in the venture and Congo would hold the remaining 30 percent. The joint venture mining company would invest $3 billion in mainly new mining areas. This deal is unique in two ways. First, it is the largest ever foreign investor engagement in the history of the DRC economy. Second, the agreement stipulates that native Congolese workers must comprise 80 percent of the work force on all projects. This provision stands in stark contrast to China’s practice in Angola and

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other African states where Chinese workers are imported. Some speculate that this otherwise unusual provision was agreed to by the Chinese in order to avoid a destabilized environment, given the magnitude of its investment.\textsuperscript{167} By employing a mostly-Congolese workforce, China can avoid the malcontent of local populations that has been witnessed in countries like Angola. Given the political and social upheaval still present in the Congo, such measures on China’s part appear prudent in order to secure its investment.

Part of the agreement stipulates that China will fund a five-part infrastructural development project, covering water, electricity, education, health, and transportation. CREC is tasked with renovating the railway between the ports of Muambe, Matadi and Kinshasa; the railway between Kinshasa and Ilebo, Lubumbashi and Kasumbalesa (central Congo); and between Lubumbashi, Kindu, Kalemie and the northeast of Congo. Despite its expansive territory, the DRC only has 300 miles of paved roads.\textsuperscript{168} In and around Kinshasa, 250 km of roads will be built, including an orbital motorway round the city. Elsewhere too, many new roads are planned. Sinohydro will build high-voltage power lines and power plants. The company would also repair and expand water supply,

and construct 49 distribution centers supplying potable water, 31 hospitals each with 150 beds, 145 health centers each with 50 beds, four large universities, the parliament building, and 20,000 council houses or flats.\textsuperscript{169}

In return for the infrastructural development mentioned above, China will be repaid in natural resources. The project is expected to yield 10.62 million tons of copper and 620,000 tons of cobalt, valued at more than $30 billion.\textsuperscript{170} The profits of Socomin would be used to repay these mining investments and the investments in the big infrastructural works. The majority of the mining would be done in Kolwezi, a town in the resource-rich southeastern Katanga province. An existing mine, originally owned by the Belgians during their colonial rule of the Congo, had enough proven reserves to convince the Chinese that the investment was worth the risk.\textsuperscript{171} The mine began in the 1940s with one cut\textsuperscript{172}, with additional cuts being added in the 1950s and 1970s. Today, they have been combined into a single, expansive cut.\textsuperscript{173} The new project will further expand the existing cut in order to extract the copper and cobalt. Although the deal

\textsuperscript{172} A cut is another term for an open pit mine, otherwise known as strip mining.
stipulates a 4:1 ratio between Congolese and Chinese workers, the mine itself will be worked on by Chinese because they already have the necessary skills.\footnote{Jopson, Barney. "China and Congo Change Tack on Deal." \textit{Financial Times}. 18 Aug. 2009. Web. 21 Mar. 2010. \textless http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ac7fd79c-8c2a-11de-b14f-00144feabdc0.html\textgreater .} Part of the infrastructural development package would rehabilitate or rebuild over 3,200 km of rail lines from Katanga to the Atlantic port city of Matadi.

The scale of this deal raised alarm at the IMF, which warned that the deal would prevent debt-relief and new aid packages to the DRC (Congo currently has $11 billion in foreign debt).\footnote{"Chinese Companies Sign $6 Billion Congo Deal." \textit{LexisNexis}. 12 Oct. 2009. Web. 21 Mar. 2010.} In order to allay these concerns and to allow new aid from the IMF and other Western organizations, the DRC agreed to pare down the project to $6 billion. By cutting over $3 billion of funds from the original deal, a second phase of infrastructure projects will be placed on the backburner (the original $3 billion for mining remained unchanged, as did the location of the initial mining and both country’s percentage claim to the joint venture).\footnote{"Musonoi Mine, Kolwezi, Western Area, Katanga Copper Crescent, Katanga (Shaba), Democratic Republic of Congo." \textit{Mineralogy Database}. Web. 03 Apr. 2010. \textless http://www.mindat.org/loc-4322.html\textgreater .}

The first installment of $3 billion was made immediately in order to jumpstart the mining operations in the copper-rich Katanga Province in southeastern Congo. Even with this enormous cash infusion, operations will not begin until 2011. By relegating
infrastructure projects to the back of the queue, basic public works needs may not be met in the foreseeable future. Even in the capital city of Kinshasa, basic, reliable infrastructure is not available. According to Georges Bokundu of Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa, the DRC has “big energy sources of electricity but only 20 percent of the population has access to electricity because most of the energy is sold to foreign countries.” 177 He added, “People have seen lines of electricity being put in. These lines pass over their heads. The electricity will be going to Congo-Brazzaville, Zambia and Zimbabwe. For so many years they have seen these electricity lines but they have never seen a lit electric bulb.” This paradox underscores how the general population is not benefiting from industry even in the capital city.

The DRC began privatizing various enterprises in the mid-1990s under the pretense of increasing profits. However, the question many Congolese are asking is whether they will see any of the proceeds from such sales. Victor Nzuzi, a member of the Kinshasa-based social justice organization Platform for Development asks, “Are we just privatizing for the sake of privatizing?” 178 According to Nzuzi, multinational corporations own 65 percent of businesses in the DRC. Outsourcing on such a large scale prevents reform of public enterprises in order to make them profitable for the local populations.

178 Ibid.
In addition to the IMF’s objections, concerns have also been raised about how the deal will benefit the Congolese. According to Katanga-based lawyer Georges Kapiamba, “our worry is that [the agreement] is almost totally opaque. It permits a group of Chinese to get more than the Congolese—it’s not a win-win contract.” Despite these concerns, Congolese deputy mining minister, Victor Kasongo, says that the DRC “will do whatever’s necessary to keep the Chinese on board.” It is not a stretch to argue that China is taking advantage of the situation in Congo. Decades of kleptocratic rule and devastating civil war that claimed over four million lives—many of them children under the age of five—has left the DRC in desperate need of aid and development. Although the $3 billion part of the deal directed towards infrastructure development will desperately needed, China will pocket an estimated $14 billion to $80 billion of minerals once the deal is complete. With its voracious appetite for natural resources, China is eager to enter no-strings-attached agreements with the DRC in order to secure vital minerals for its growing industry.

A Congolese lawyer voiced another concern about the deal, emphasizing Congo’s lack of capacity to utilize or maintain the facilities that will be constructed in the coming years:

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“Six billion dollars in infrastructure is not development. Schools with desks are not going to educate our population. A road is not going to develop this country...Schools require a school system, and they need teachers. In this climate, roads last only 10 years without maintenance, and the Congo has no capacity in this regard.”

This salient point seldom appears in discussion of Chinese-built infrastructure. While there is value in development, if the population collectively lacks the skills to employ these facilities, they become moot.

**Transparency**

According to hypothesis one, we can expect to find that Chinese investment will undermine Western transparency standards in the Congo. As mentioned in the transparency chapter, the DRC ranked 162 out of 180 in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index. According the 2009 African Governance Index ratings, Congo ranked 50 out of 53 African countries with a score of 37.3. However, within the subcategory of “law, transparency, and corruption,” the DRC scored 23.2. This rating placed it 52 out of 53 countries—only outranking Somalia, which scored

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Within this category, the DRC has dropped noticeably from its 2000 score of 36.2.

In the aftermath of its destructive civil war, corruption runs rampant. The ongoing conflict in the eastern regions both hampers any substantive developments in transparency and perpetuates human suffering. Transparency concerns are ubiquitous within the government and armed forces. Army officers claimed the salaries of 300,000 soldiers when in fact there were only 130,000—the balance was pocketed. Dr. Muzong Kodi, a former lecturer at the University of Zaire (as the DRC was formerly known), describes the governments that have run the DRC since its independence from Belgium in 1960 as “predatory” and "characterized by greed, corruption, massive violations of human rights and the commission of all kinds of crimes with impunity." Because corruption is a preexisting condition in Congo as China begins its project, and we can anticipate China’s unconditional investment model to undermine Western efforts to establish transparency standards in the DRC. Similar to the cases of Angola and Sudan, corruption is ubiquitous in the Congo, thereby failing to support hypothesis two that Chinese investment aggravates a local situation.

185 Ibid.
Environment

In addition to the deplorable lack of governance, the DRC suffers from enormous environmental degradation as a result of the one enterprise that could provide an escape from abject poverty: mining. Here, too, we can expect Chinese investment to undercut environmental standards, thereby affirming hypothesis one. In contrast to the petroleum ventures of Angola and Sudan that require little more than constructing derricks or offshore rigs, mining the vast natural resources in the Congo leaves an enormous environmental footprint. As mentioned earlier, the mining project in Katanga will be an open mine project, meaning that large swaths of land will be deforested and excavated in order to extract the ore. The practice of strip mining employed in eastern DRC clears forested areas and strips the topsoil, allowing for increased runoff to carry toxins into the water supply. Deforestation compounds the erosion and runoff problem. In addition to minerals, China also imports timber from the DRC. In eastern regions like North and South Kivu, rinsing freshly mined ore washes contaminants into the Lualaba River. When the river floods, cholera and dysentery spread. By continuing its lumber imports and expanding its mining operations in Congo, we can anticipate that China’s investment

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will undermine environmental standards. In some instances, Chinese projects will aggravate local situations by directly contributing to environmental degradation, thereby also affirming hypothesis two.

**Human Rights**

Decades of civil war, ongoing fighting between militias and government troops in the east, and ethnic divisions have left a violent and bloody trail of human rights violations. The remoteness of the eastern regions near the DRC-Rwandan border permits rebel militias and even the national military to operate with impunity. In addition to the armed violence that has gripped the region for decades, rape has reached the level of an epidemic. Originally used a weapon of war and intimidation, it has metastasized into a wider cultural phenomenon.\(^{188}\) “The sexual violence in Congo is the worst in the world,” according to John Holmes, the United Nations under secretary general for humanitarian affairs. “The sheer numbers, the wholesale brutality, the culture of impunity—it’s appalling.” These vicious assaults are not limited to rebel militias; UN officials say Congolese government troops are among the worst offenders. The province of South Kivu has become the epicenter of the brutality. Victims range from 3 to 75 years of age. In the five month period between April and September 2009, 112 rapes were reported.

Shabunda Territory in South Kivu Province alone. Since 2006 there have been a reported 2,883 rapes in Shabunda.\textsuperscript{189} In 2008 there were a reported 16,000 rapes in Congo.\textsuperscript{190} With rebel commanders vying to control mines in order to fuel their militias, sexual violence will continue unabated and unpunished. Because the agreement fails to address human rights issues, we can expect that China’s presence in Congo will further complicate the preexisting situation by introducing new security concerns and the prospect of profitable and accessible resources.

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A myriad of violent and conflict issues face the Chinese as they prepare to begin infrastructure development and mining across the Congo. The ore-for-infrastructure agreement lacks provisions to qualitatively improve or even mitigate the existing problems such as lack of transparency or human rights violations. As a result of the continued and expanded mining under the newly created joint venture operation, environmental degradation will proliferate. With an estimated value of over $30 billion dollars of ore being extracted for the Chinese (at a cost of $6 billion), the question must be raised as to whether the people of Kolwezi and Katanga province will see any benefit as a result of the wealth generated by the mining. With a new rail line being constructed to ship the ore from the interior to the port cities, there is little hope for substantive benefit. Most importantly, the deal does not address the ongoing violence and egregious
human rights violations taking place throughout the country. These potential consequences raise the question as to whether the benefit of new roads and rehabilitated railways are worth the increased environmental degradation and continued human rights violations. Immediate, drastic change cannot be expected in a country that has been ravaged by war for so long, but given the lack of conditions to the Chinese loan agreement, one must wonder if there is a more direct route to an improved Congo.

It is worth bearing in mind that, while China will develop infrastructure in Kinshasa and rehabilitate railroads into the interior, the DRC lacks the infrastructure to maintain these new facilities once the Chinese have left. Four decades of war since its independence, compounded by kleptocratic rulers has left the DRC unable to sustain itself. This raises the concern of the DRC developing a dependence on Chinese investment or presence. If political stability falters or violence flares, thereby causing China to pull out, would the DRC be able to continue on its own?

In contrast to Angola and Sudan, Congo lacks any real form of control over its territory, which perpetuates the lawlessness that permeates the country—especially in the easternmost provinces. The situation in the DRC directly follows the bigger picture of China’s no-strings-attached business approach to its deals with African. Chinese lending—without attached conditions to improve accountability and justice systems—will do nothing to combat this problem.
Conclusion

Angola, Sudan, and the DRC are all developing countries rich in natural resources. They also all suffer from non-transparent governments, environmental degradation, and human rights violations. As mentioned in the introduction, Angola was selected as the control country because it was relatively stable and had been at peace for nearly a decade, unlike Sudan and the Congo. We have seen that Chinese investment has had a minimal impact or correlation to the environmental or human rights issues facing Angola, but this does not completely deflate the hypotheses applied throughout this thesis. We might not have witnessed some of the more visceral examples of human rights violations or environmental degradation, but the lack of advancement in these fields despite the influx of money and development of infrastructure supports the argument that China’s no-strings-attached investment model does not benefit the general population of host countries.

Sudan appears to best illustrate this issue. In the last decade it has seen a deterioration of transparency, a project that displaced thousands of people and had a detrimental effect on the population, as well as ongoing violence fueled by arms deals. As noted in the transparency chapter, between 2000 and 2007 Sudan fell from 41.4 to 29.0 in the African Governance Index. The Merowe dam project forcibly displaced 70,000 people and created various health hazards by forming a 174 kilometer-long reservoir. The most egregious consequence of Chinese investment in Sudan, however,
has been in the category of human rights. Chinese arms deals to the Sudanese government and military have facilitated the massacres of civilians in southern Sudan and in the Darfur region, despite an arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council. Compared to Angola, Sudan yields more concrete examples of the impact of Chinese investment within each indicator.

By contrasting Angola and Sudan, we can draw conclusions about the different effect that Chinese investment has on a state that is at peace and enjoys relative political stability, versus a state engaged in civil conflict. As the evidence in the thematic chapters illustrates, the overall footprint of Chinese investment in Angola is considerably smaller than in Sudan. Part of this can be attributed to the type of projects that are undertaken in each country. We have seen how offshore oil rigs have a considerably smaller environmental footprint than dam projects and how a country at peace suffers from fewer human rights violations than one engaged in civil conflict. The commonality between Angola and Sudan is their respective lack of transparency. Both countries ranked in the bottom ten percent of Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index. As developing countries (post-conflict or engaged in conflict), good governance is a necessity to maximizing revenue and directing it towards infrastructure projects and other developmental needs. Chinese investment, more specifically, the way it is delivered, does not address these issues and consequently allows them to continue.
An unfortunate characteristic of the Chinese no-strings-attached investment model is that issue areas are not addressed. Compared to Western loans, arbitrary arrests and torture in Angola, the massacres of civilians in Sudan, and the raids and rapes throughout the Congo will not be addressed by Chinese lending agreements, nor will the lack of transparency and the siphoning of public funds by government officials in all three countries. While it may not be customary for such agreements to consider these issues, the lack of such provisions reflect China’s noninterference policy and “business is business” attitude towards the plight of the general population of the case study countries. Taking into account the premium that the Chinese have placed on natural resources, and the cost that African people—including Angolans and Sudanese—have paid for their governments to trade resources for infrastructure, there is cause for alarm in the DRC. Of the three case study countries, the Congo is the most underdeveloped, the most war-torn and remains ravaged by conflict in the east. The new mining projects do not promise to address the instability and violence that continues in the region.

We have witnessed the various detriments that Chinese projects have been connected to: large-scale displacement in Sudan, corruption in Angola, and human rights violations in both. With the new project in the Congo in its infancy, one might expect similar consequences. Indeed, the deforestation and strip mining that the project entails will be detrimental to the environment and the corruption and human rights issues will not be addressed, let alone improved as result of the Chinese investment. However, the
aforementioned stipulation that 80 percent of the workforce in the DRC be Congolese workers marks a unique and noteworthy move on the part of an African country in negotiations with China. This provision stands in stark contrast to China’s historic practice of importing its own workforce in countries like Angola. While this fails to address the concern of what benefit the general population will see from this monumental project, the DRC’s insistence to have such a large grass roots role in the project could point to a new period in Sino-African business relations—one that perhaps sees greater benefits for the general populations of the African countries. As mentioned earlier in the environmental chapter, the DRC and Gabon shut down Chinese companies because of environmental violations and Sierra Leone barred China from logging because of its flagrant disregard for the law. These cases, in addition to the conditions of the Sino-Congolese agreement, point to a gradual shift to where African countries assert their domain when dealing with Chinese investment—a shift that may eventually benefit the people of those countries.
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