

**CURBING THE MAYHEM IN RIO DE JANEIRO'S SENSATIONS:
THE PHENOMENON OF PACIFIED FAVELAS**

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the University of Delaware in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Latin American Studies with Distinction

Spring 2012

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This opportunity has been such an amazing experience! I would like to thank the multitude of people who supported and helped me along the way since all this would not have been possible without all of you. Dr. Persephone Braham for encouraging me to study abroad in Brazil in the first place – you were right, Brazil changed my life. Dr. Carla Guerrón Montero for taking me on that study abroad and being such an incredible advisor, confidant, and support through this whole year. Dr. Julio Carrion and Dr. Danilo Yanich for all the guidance they have generously shown me. My family and friends who have all been so understanding and listened to me ramble on. Thank you all.

Thank you to the University of Delaware Undergraduate Research Office, the University of Delaware Alumni Relations, the University of Delaware Anthropology Department, and the PanAmerican Society of Philadelphia for the funding that made my work possible.

A very special thank you goes out to everyone in Brazil who I was fortunate enough to be able to work with. I am honored to have been able to meet with AfroReggae and see their influence first hand – the work that this organization has been able to achieve is truly inspirational. Rio de Janeiro is a city that I could not love more and while I cannot possibly convey all of its wonders, but I hope I came close.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES	vi
ABSTRACT	vii
INTRODUCTION	1
Rio de Janeiro – The Marvelous City	1
Brazil and its Growth.....	4
The World Cup and Olympic Games	9
Introduction to the Favelas	14
THEORETICAL APPROACH	19
Literature Review	19
Methodology.....	27
<i>AS COMUNIDADES (THE COMMUNITIES)</i>	31
Origins of Favelas in Rio de Janeiro	33
Characterizing the Favelas	39
Legacies of Removal	50
<i>O Tráfico</i>	57
<i>A PACIFICAÇÃO (PACIFICATION)</i>	69
Origins	69
Rationale and Policies	71
Police Policy	77
The Development of the Favela Pacification Program.....	86
Current State	92
Case Study – Cantagalo.....	100
TREATMENT OF RESIDENTS	110
Marginality	110
The Role of Government	119
Inability to Integrate	125
Development of Violence.....	132

CONCLUSIONS: BECOMING <i>GENTE</i>	140
REFERENCES	153

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1	Slum eviction statistics.....	32
Figure 2	Progressive favela settlement in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.....	34
Figure 3	Favela and population growth in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.....	34
Figure 4	The variety of favela demographics.....	41
Figure 5	Rio de Janeiro's planning zones.....	41
Figure 6	Favela characteristics.	46
Figure 7	Violence against the community.....	65

ABSTRACT

Does the Favela Pacification Program have a chance of altering the history of societal marginalization surrounding the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and their residents? The Favela Pacification Program, launched in 2008, presents a significant opportunity to affect change and alter one of Brazil's most enduring historical patterns of societal marginalization. The objective of this paper is to examine the development of the Favela Pacification Program - how it came into being, and how it is currently affecting the city of Rio de Janeiro. I will examine the possibilities for the future of the Program and the favelas themselves, as well as the roles that social marginalization, violence, and disintegration play in favela life and local perception of the favelas. In addition, I will explore the Favela Pacification Program through history, politics, ideology, and current affairs. Finally, I will provide an examination of the "formal" versus "informal" city through a case study in the favela of Cantagalo, where I conducted short-term research in 2011.

INTRODUCTION

Rio de Janeiro – The Marvelous City

*Eu só quero é ser feliz
Andar tranqüilamente
Na favela onde eu nasci*¹

The Federal Republic of Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world and has the largest population of Latin America with its 203,429,773 inhabitants; 6.3 million of whom live in the nation's second largest city - Rio de Janeiro. Approximately 11 million live in the surrounding state of Rio de Janeiro.² The nation itself boasts an ethnically diverse population due to multiple waves of immigration from Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, particularly Japan, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in addition to the existing Portuguese, African, and indigenous populations. Moreover, Brazil is the only Portuguese-speaking nation in Latin America. Located in Eastern South America, it borders the Atlantic Ocean and boasts immense ecological

¹ "I only want to be happy/Walking peacefully/In the favela where I was born." Cidinho and Doce. "Rap Da Felicidade." *O Melhor Do Funk*. Cidinho & Doce. 2010.

² Welcome to the CIA Web Site — Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA - The World Factbook," Last modified October 21, 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html>.

variety ranging from dense rainforest in the Amazon to semiarid coastlines to savannahs and rolling plains to some of the largest wetlands in the world.³

The images that Brazil most often calls to mind are those of its most famous city – Rio de Janeiro. The capital city of Brasília, the business giant of São Paulo, the dense rainforest of the Amazon, the treasures of Ouro Preto, and the vibrant history of Salvador, Pernambuco, and Recife all fade away to the lights of Rio de Janeiro. It is referred to as the cultural and touristic capital of Brazil and images of its verdant forests, blue waters, white sands, and of course its beautiful bikini-clad beach goers are seen around the world. Pão de Açúcar, Cristo o Redentor, the beaches of Copacabana and Ipanema grace postcards, must see lists, and travel magazines everywhere. The vibrant images of the world's greatest party, Rio's Carnaval, with the scantily clad samba dancers, fireworks, and boisterous revelers are international legend. Rio is truly the Marvelous City; its natural beauty combined with some of the most genuinely friendly and outgoing people in the world, the fusion of cultures and cuisines, and entertainment and activities for anyone, all while being situated in a major city is a fantastically unique environment.

It is within this inimitable setting that an equally distinct situation has arisen; the phenomenon of the pacification of *favelas* (slums or shantytowns) which is what

³ U.S. Department of State - Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, "Brazil," Last modified March 8, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35640.htm>.

this paper seeks to address. In the wake of the 2008 announcement that Rio de Janeiro would be hosting the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games, city officials made the decision to embark upon a new public security policy termed the Favela Pacification Program. Brazil is one of the fastest growing nations in today's world and the choice to award the city these mega-sporting events reflects Brazil's rising economic and political importance. In light of the fact that the world's eyes will be upon Rio de Janeiro, the Favela Pacification Program looks to remove the drug factions from selected favelas and reclaim the territory while simultaneously offering residents the basic services that have never been provided as well as other social programs to improve the quality of life for residents and to decrease violence within the communities and for the city as whole. This research focuses upon the essential question; does the Favela Pacification Program have a chance to alter the history of societal marginalization surrounding the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and their residents? Residents of the favelas have been traditionally marginalized, excluded from society, and exposed to notoriously high levels of violence and in light of the international attention that the city will be receiving it is crucial that the state find a way to address the favelas. Brazil cannot continue its rise forward and hope to attain a position among the leading nations if it does not find a way to contend with the inequality and marginalization that a major portion of its citizens face on a daily basis.

I argue that the Favela Pacification Program represents an opportunity in which to affect real change on the long ingrained pattern of societal marginalization of favela residents. However, the potential positive impact of the process, which would occur in

the second phase, is diminished by the brutality of the first phase. In order to proficiently address the entirety of such a complex theme it is necessary to explore a number of aspects. I will explore the theory and methodology. In order to provide a more complete view of the communities, the paper will then move into a discussion of favelas themselves, laying out the origins, legacies with which the communities' cope, and the influence of the drug gangs. Following will be an investigation of the Favela Pacification Program and of how marginality will be assessed within the bounds of this paper and thus applied to Pacification itself. I will illustrate my findings through a case study in the favela of Cantagalo. The conclusion seeks to provide a model for the Favela Pacification Program and how it is affecting the communities where it is taking place. The immensity and diversity of the favelas and the nascent nature of the Program make it difficult to make final conclusions about its effects. Nonetheless, it is possible to theorize based on the findings presented here. In addition, the theory and empirical data seen here have implications not only across Brazil in dealing with the pressing concerns of marginality, inequality, and shantytowns, but for all of Latin America and the developing world as other nations are faced with these similar topics.

Brazil and its Growth

Pedro Alvares Cabral claimed Brazil for Portugal in 1500 and shortly thereafter, in 1502, the Portuguese explorer Gaspar de Lemos founded Rio de Janeiro initially believing the site to be the mouth of a great river. The small colonial city expanded rapidly over the decades, benefiting immensely from its temporary status as

capital of the Portuguese empire during the monarchy's escape from Napoleon and the chaos of Europe from 1808 to 1821. After Dom Joao VI departed, his son Pedro II, remained and eventually declared independence from the Portuguese crown, establishing his own reign centered in Rio de Janeiro in 1822. The monarchy lasted for 67 years until a relatively smooth transition to independence occurred in 1889. A constitutional republic was instituted by the military, which lasted until 1930 when a military coup placed the dictator Getulio Vargas in power until 1945. The period that followed was marked by a series of presidents who failed to alleviate Brazil's rising inflation, economic stagnation, and were unable to cope with the rise of radical political elements until another military coup in 1964 removed President João Goulart and resulted in a dictatorship led by army officers, which lasted until 1985.⁴ The regime was marked by large-scale human rights abuse and repression however domestic entrepreneurship, foreign investment, and government investment were all encouraged. From 1970 to 1974 the nation experienced the so-called Brazilian Miracle; consistent economic growth of ten percent or more.⁵ The growth was not sustained past 4 years and the remaining two generals of the regime slowly began to transition towards democracy. Unlike the conversions of some Latin American countries like Argentina and Mexico, from military dictatorships to democracies,

⁴ U.S. Department of State - Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, "Brazil."

⁵ Larry Rother, *Brazil on the Rise: The Story of a Country Transformed*, (New York City: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 30-31.

Brazil had a relatively smooth and gradually enacted conversion initiated by the dictators themselves, which only benefited the establishment of the new democracy and the new Constitution of 1988.⁶ Since the return to democracy, which Brazil has had a successful experience with to the extent that it has become an ingrained aspect of civic society, a great deal of highly effective economic reform has been undertaken.

Brazil has done extremely well for itself in recent years in terms of economic figures and is currently the world's eight-largest economy and has become the first Latin American country to enter the international stage in such a profound and noticeable manner. In 2010 its economic growth was 7.5 percent and it is expected to maintain a 4-5 percent growth rate into the future, which allowed Brazil to surpass the United Kingdom as the world's sixth-largest economy in 2011.⁷ The nation's GDP is nearly \$2 trillion and Brazil exports more than \$200 billion every year. Brazil enjoys one of the most diversified economies in the world, largely due to the policies of former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, which emphasized financial discipline and an opening of the Brazilian economy. These policies were continued with former President Inacio Lula da Silva and current President Dilma Rousseff.⁸ In the past decade millions of Brazilians have been lifted out of poverty and for the first time in

⁶ Rother, *Brazil on the Rise*, 31.

⁷ Will Smale, "Brazil's Economy Marching to Samba Beat," *BBC News*, January 8, 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16407585>.

⁸ Rother, *Brazil on the Rise*, 141.

the nation's history a majority of Brazilians are middle-class and over 85 percent of the population lives in urban areas.⁹ The GDP – per capita in 2011 was \$11,600,¹⁰ which is a substantial increase from 1970 when it was barely \$1,000.¹¹ Despite these successes Brazil has not excelled at distributing its growth and today maintains some of the highest levels of inequality worldwide.

Additionally, Brazil has enjoyed a great deal of success on the international stage, much of which can be attributed to the nation's astounding growth patterns. Brazil has become a member of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) nations, countries who all demonstrate newly advanced economic development and it is predicted that by 2050 the combined GDP of these four nations has the potential to be greater than that of the nations that are currently the wealthiest and most developed.¹² Brazil is also a prominent member of the Group of Twenty (G-20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, which was “established in 1999 to bring together systemically important industrialized and developing economies to discuss key issues in the global economy.”¹³ Brazil also held a non-permanent seat on the UN Security

⁹ U.S. Department of State - Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, "Brazil."

¹⁰ Welcome to the CIA Web Site — Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA - The World Factbook."

¹¹ Rother, *Brazil on the Rise*, 140.

¹² Beth Kowitt, "For Mr. BRIC, Nations Meeting Is a Milestone," *CNNMoney - Business, Financial and Personal Finance News*, June 17, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/17/news/economy/goldman_sachs_jim_oneill_interview.fortune/index.htm.

¹³ "What is the G-20," *G-20*, <http://www.g20.org>.

Council for the 2010-11 term.¹⁴ Former President Inacio Lula da Silva (2002-10), better known as Lula, served to further propel Brazil into the world's eye with his extreme charisma and center-leftist policies that had, and continue to have, dramatic results on the lives of ordinary Brazilians and have propelled the nation forward in previously unattainable ways. One of his notable accomplishments was managing the complete repayment of Brazil's debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a feat that has been unheard of in Latin America. The nation is now one of the IMF's creditor nations; with over \$250 billion in foreign currency reserves Brazil is now "the fourth-largest creditor of the United States."¹⁵ He also placed some priority on social programs, beginning a number of longer-term programs, which he warned would take years while prudent fiscal policies would have to be maintained.¹⁶ Lula's international regard, which extends far beyond Latin America itself, and innovative leadership have brought such attention to Brazil that in 2008 the nation was chosen to host the 2014 World Cup and in 2009 the International Olympic Committee announced that Rio would be the Host City for the XXXI Summer Olympic Games in 2016.

¹⁴ Welcome to the CIA Web Site — Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA - The World Factbook."

¹⁵ Rother, *Brazil on the Rise*, 139.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of State - Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, "Brazil."

The World Cup and Olympic Games

These massive international sporting events will only serve to further attract the world's eye to this up and coming nation. The 1964 Olympics Games in Tokyo, Japan, the 1988 Games in Seoul, Korea, and the 2008 Games in China were opportunities for each nation to highlight its history and achievements, especially each nation's recent economic gains, as well as to display the best of what these nations had to offer at one of the most watched events in the world. Likewise, the upcoming 2016 Olympics will be an opportunity for Brazil to underscore its successes and development to the world; a world that will be watching with utmost attention and scrutiny. As the city's Olympic website states, it is "passion and transformation of a city and an entire country, fuelled by the renovation of the Olympic spirit, [that will] project Brazil and Rio de Janeiro to the world."¹⁷ The World Cup will be held two years earlier and its matches, played throughout the country in a multitude of cities, will also serve to place Brazil in the international eye. Twelve Brazilian cities spread throughout the country will host the sixty-four matches with the finale scheduled to be played in Rio de Janeiro. The World Cup is the world's most prestigious soccer tournament and soccer is undeniably the most celebrated sport in the world.¹⁸ The

¹⁷ Home | Rio 2016, "Emblem Essence: Passion and Transformation," <http://www.rio2016.com/en/the-emblem/passion-and-transformation>.

¹⁸ FIFA.com - Fédération Internationale De Football Association (FIFA). "FIFA.com - Match Schedule for 2014 FIFA World Cup™ Unveiled." October 20, 2011. <http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/newsid=1529755/index.html>.

world will be watching Brazil; scrutinizing its planning and execution of sporting facilities, supporting infrastructure, entertainment, and behavior as hundreds of thousands of fans prepare to descend upon Rio de Janeiro in the rapidly approaching future. As with China and every other host country, there is a great deal of pressure on Brazil, and especially on Rio de Janeiro, to present the international community with a world class experience and to impart the best possible image of the city as it will translate upon the nation as a whole.

Due to this great demand for perfection, there has been mass mobilization to improve infrastructure, construct new stadiums and sporting faculties, and to improve Rio de Janeiro as a whole. Improvements in transportation infrastructure are being focused on ensuring that visitors can move quickly from one side of the city to another. Currently it can take up to two hours for residents to get to work so the Rapid Bus Transit (BRT) system has been implemented to provide more efficient services.¹⁹ An additional focal point for city officials has been as it is one of the most important considerations for international travelers; no one wants to invest their money in a trip to a place where they are potentially in danger. This is precisely the image that Rio must combat. As well as Rio is known for Carnival, natural beauty, scantily clad

¹⁹ To this effect Transcarioca, an express bus system linking Barra da Tijuca (a neighborhood to the south of the city) to the rest of the city and the international airport, Transoeste, an expressway linking Barra to the west zone of the city, and a fourth subway line that reaches Barra, also have all begun and will be completed before the start of the Olympic Games. Home | Rio 2016. "Get the Inside Scoop on the Olympic City: Check Out the Infrastructure Works of Rio de Janeiro." Last modified July 25, 2011. <http://www.rio2016.com>.

women, and the friendly attitudes of *cariocas* (citizens of Rio), the city is also known for its violence. For every travel magazine that splashes images of sun-drenched dream destinations and laughing *cariocas*, there is a news article written about the murders, drug deals, and crime occurring in the favelas (slums or shantytowns) of Rio de Janeiro. This is the other reality of Rio, the side that city officials are desperately attempting to alter before the world descends.

The international recognition awarded by hosting the Olympic Games has the potential to help aid in the nation's continued development.

The I.O.C. has a history of trying to effect change with its choices for bid cities. The committee awarded the 2008 Summer Games to Beijing, hoping to help open China to the world. In 1981, it gave the 1988 Summer Games to Seoul to help usher in a civilian government.²⁰ It cannot, and certainly should not, be assumed that the results from one event will be mirrored in another. Nonetheless, given the similarities they can serve to act as a predictor. The 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul, South Korea were a catalyst for democratization and the 2008 Games in Beijing, China were a chance to begin to address human rights issues. Similarly to Brazil these nations are late developing nations that in the years before their hosting experienced rapidly growing economies, significant urbanization, and a quickly growing middle class. Each has had, or will have, the intense scrutiny of the world upon them and their actions, accompanied by a

²⁰ Juliet Macur, "Rio de Janeiro Is Awarded 2016 Olympics - NYTimes.com," *The New York Times*, October 2, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/03/sports/03olympics.html?pagewanted=all>.

highly increased media presence.²¹ This kind of attention certainly places pressure upon governments and public officials to be on their best behavior and be sure to not respond to national events in a way that may be seen negatively by the international community or risk humiliation and less than positive responses. And while the President of the IOC, Jacques Rogge, has stated, “the IOC is not a political body. It is a sports organization, so we will not get involved in politics,”²² the Games are undeniably linked to political results. The IOC may not be directly involved, but the Games provide significant potential leverage for activists, force a nation to conduct itself to the highest standards, and thus are undeniably a catalyst for change.

In terms of Brazil, and more specifically Rio, the change that the IOC may be attempting to effect is two-fold; not only to encourage the continued development of the city and the nation, but also to bring attention to the problem of human rights within Brazil. As the host city, Rio’s record of dealing with favelas through repression and violence is certainly going to be in the international spotlight, hence a renewed resolve by public officials to address the problems of violence and crime surrounding the favelas has ensued. This resolve is not new; in 2004, before the city was about to host the Pan-American Games, violence levels were especially high and officials “proposed building a high, impenetrable wall around all the favelas - literally creating

²¹ David R. Black and Shona Bezanson, "The Olympic Games, Human Rights, and Democratization: Lessons from Seoul and Implications for Beijing," *Third World Quarterly* 25.7 (2004): 1252-1255.

²² Black and Bezanson, “The Olympic Games, Human Rights, and Democratization,” 1256.

a walled fortress within the city, to ‘protect’ the city.”²³ This is certainly not a new or unique attempt to clean up cities before high-profile international events; slum dwellers are “the “dirt” or “blight” that their governments prefer the world not to see.”²⁴ Olympic Games in Berlin, Mexico City, Athens, Barcelona, and Seoul were all preceded by urban renewals and evictions, and for the Beijing Games it was reported that 350,000 poor were evicted.²⁵ Rio is faced with the dual dilemma of having to present a modern, safe, and sophisticated city to the world while at the same time not creating this city in a manner that could be interpreted as a violation of human rights. Decreased crime will hopefully attract more spectators who will undoubtedly be comforted by a decrease in violent crime rates, but will also prove to the world that the city can be seen in terms other than the violence that has been sensationalized by the international media. The Favela Pacification Program represents the newest attempt by Rio’s municipal government to tame the violence that has come to characterize the city in light of the upcoming World Cup and the Olympic Games.

²³ Janice E. Perlman, *Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010), 171.

²⁴ Mike Davis, *Planet of Slums* (London: Verso, 2006), 104.

²⁵ Davis, *Planet of Slums*, 106.

Introduction to the Favelas

“He let his mind drift as he stared at the city, half slum, half paradise. How could a place be so ugly and violent, yet beautiful at the same time.” – Chris Abani²⁶

Brazil is, for many, an absolute paradise. Rio de Janeiro certainly follows its nation’s example; a beautiful city renowned around the world for its sites, its parties, and its attractive residents it seems ideal. What could be wrong with a lovely city by the sea in one of the world’s rapidly up and coming nations? Rio’s marvels mask a major portion of daily reality; one of the world’s highest rates of inequality and the resulting violence-stricken and media-sensationalized favelas.

Favelas are the shantytown or slum communities in Brazil. According to the United Nations agency UN-HABITAT a slum is a run down area of the city characterized by substandard housing and lacking in tenure security. Slums are often characterized by high rates of poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment and are often seen as the origin point for social problems such as crime and drugs.²⁷ They are “well-identified, bounded, and increasingly isolated territories viewed by both outsiders and insiders as social purgatories, urban hellholes where only the refuse of society would

²⁶ Davis, *Planet of Slums*, 20.

²⁷ "What Are Slums and Why Do They Exist?" *UN-HABITAT*, UN-HABITAT: Twenty-First Session of the Governing Council, April 16-20, 2007, www.unhabitat.com.

accept to dwell.”²⁸ Favelas in Rio de Janeiro began in 1898 when soldiers returning from the Canudos war settled on a hill in the center of Rio and thus created the first favela, Morro de Providencia.²⁹ As migration to Rio increased during the twentieth century, the numbers of impoverished rural migrants simply were unable to be incorporated into the existing city structure and began to build their own communities. Today it is estimated that there are between 900 and 1,000 favelas in the city of Rio housing approximately 1.5 to 2 million residents, which is a third of the city’s population.³⁰

Slum communities are certainly not unique to Rio de Janeiro or even to Brazil; every major city in Latin America has slums or shantytowns, the residents of which account for 31.9 percent of the population.³¹ However, the favelas of Rio de Janeiro have a uniquely defining quality in that they are not located on the outskirts of the city as most shantytowns traditionally are; rather they are scattered throughout the city.³² Favelas in Rio fail to follow the concentric zonal theory, which proposes that slums

²⁸ Loïc Wacquant, "The Rise of Advanced Marginality: Notes on Its Nature and Implications," *Acta Sociologica* 39.2 (1996), 125.

²⁹ Maria Helena Moreira Alves and Philip Evanson. *Living in the Crossfire: Favela Residents, Drug Dealers, and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro*. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), 22.

³⁰ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 13

³¹ "What Are Slums and Why Do They Exist?" *UN-HABITAT*, UN-HABITAT: Twenty-First Session of the Governing Council.

³² Elisabeth Eaves, "Two Billion Slum Dwellers," *Forbes.com*, June 11, 2007.
http://www.forbes.com/2007/06/11/third-world-slums-biz-cx_21cities_ee_0611slums.html.

are placed directly in the metropolitan core or around the periphery of the city.³³ This is one of many unique features that make the characterization of favelas in Rio difficult.³⁴ Among other locations, such as “along roads, railway lines and canals, on river flood plains, bay and lagoon shorelines,”³⁵ they have also formed along the unstable sides of the rock outcroppings that are a distinguishing feature of the city often placing these communities side by side with upper-middle class neighborhoods. In fact, the penthouses of chic apartments in Copacabana and other expensive neighborhoods can actually be located directly next to the favelas, exposing them to the noise and even the violence found within.³⁶

When examining the favelas of Rio de Janeiro the fact that there is a racial component to the inequality and lack of social inclusion is readily apparent. Race and racial discrimination has been a major feature within Latin America as a whole and especially for Brazil. Brazil was the last nation in the Western hemisphere to abolish slavery and during the existence of the slave trade it is estimated that 35 percent of all slaves involved in the Atlantic slave trade were sent to Brazil.³⁷ In the nineteenth

³³ Greg O'Hare, "Urban Renaissance: New Horizons for Rio's Favelas," *Geography* 86.1 (2001), 66.

³⁴ Davis, *Planet of Slums*, 30.

³⁵ Greg O'Hare and Michael Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," *GeoJournal* 56.3 (2002), 229.

³⁶ Patrick Neate and Damian Platt, *Culture Is Our Weapon: Making Music and Changing Lives in Rio de Janeiro*, (New York: Penguin, 2010), 3.

³⁷ Todd L. Edwards, *Brazil: A Global Studies Handbook*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2008), 209.

century Brazil attempted to dispute the idea that racism was prevalent in the nation by declaring that Brazil was a “racial democracy.” Most scholars agree that the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre began the idea³⁸ and those who subscribe assert that Brazil has been able to escape racism and racial discrimination and citizens do not maintain prejudices based on race.³⁹ Yet despite this the majority of Brazilians in the state of Rio de Janeiro recognize that racism plays a role in Brazilian society.⁴⁰ This classification of and the complex nature of racism and racial identity within Brazil as a whole demands highly detailed research in and of itself and as such racial components have not been assessed in my research. However, the issue of race, and the fact that the majority of favela residents are of Afro-Brazilian descent, are of such importance that they must be mentioned.

In Rio de Janeiro there exist a number of low-income housing settlements. Favelas are by far the most common of these and they are the exclusive focus of my research. There also exist *loteamentos* and *conjuntos*, which are government-constructed low-income housing structures. Originally many were used as housing for displaced favela residents during the period of favela removal. These housing options,

³⁸ See Alberto (2011) for an alternative proposal about the origins of the concept of racial democracy. Paulina Alberto, *Terms of Inclusion: Black Intellectuals in Twentieth-Century Brazil*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).

³⁹ George Reid Andrews, “Brazilian Racial Democracy, 1900-90: An American Counterpart,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 31.3 (1996), 483.

⁴⁰ Stanley R. Bailey, “Group Dominance and the Myth of Racial Democracy: Antiracism Attitudes in Brazil,” *American Sociological Review* 69.5 (2004), 728.

while still accommodating very low-income portions of the population differ from favelas in their legality. Residents legally rent their residences and the structures themselves have been constructed by government contractors on legal lands.⁴¹ This creates a major difference between the favelas and the *loteamentos* and *conjuntos* since a major defining factor of favelas is their illegal construction, the lack of ownership with which residents are faced, their lack of formal, legal recognition, and residents' status as squatters and non-citizens. The residents of these other structures are undeniably disadvantaged as well, despite the marked advantage of legality, and would benefit greatly from government intervention. However, they are not the focus of this research and thus have been excluded.

⁴¹ Perlman, *Favela*, 32-34.

THEORETICAL APPROACH

Literature Review

Favelas are among the most sensationalized shantytowns in the world.

Climbing up the forested hills of Rio de Janeiro, they present a startling contrast in a city known for its beautiful, welcoming people and stunning beaches. Rio calls to mind scenes of Carnaval, of beautiful men and women relaxing along picturesque beaches, of the Christ the Redeemer statue, and of parties and excitement. A city that provides postcard-perfect views from almost every vista is perceived to have one flaw; the favelas that cover the sides of the hills that protrude throughout the city. This is the other side of Rio; the Rio that is known for its extreme violence, that makes world headlines for drug deals and sensationalized murders, and that has been proclaimed a war zone. Regrettably, it is as two polar opposites that the world understands this city and even more lamentable is the fact that the city sees its own residents in these terms. The world of average *cariocas* is seen as entirely separate from that of the *moradores* (favela residents). The favela resident is stigmatized and marginalized, assumed to be a criminal and treated with almost inhuman disrespect, disregard, and hostility.

It is in this capacity that most of the literature and research on favelas has been composed, with an emphasis on the violence, crime, and bloodshed that has come to characterize them. Violence and crime catches the attention of the public and sells stories so it is to be expected that the media in Rio, aided by gun battles, wars between

drug factions, and shoot-outs with the police, began making the favelas a news sensation. This in turn has translated over to the research that has been produced regarding the favelas, the majority of which has been focused on the brutality and delinquency occurring within them. It has not been until recently that research has begun to focus less on difficult to determine statistics and sensational shoot-outs and more on the actual residents and their perceptions of their own communities. Still, violence dominates the body of work done on favelas and simply refuses to be ignored. Notably among the authors who focus on the violence of the favelas are, Enrique Desmond Arias and Corinne Davis Rodrigues who present the concept of personal security in light of gang disputes,⁴² Steffen Zdun who offers a critique on measuring and controlling homicides,⁴³ R. Ben Penglase whose research deals with trafficker induced violence,⁴⁴ and Maria Helena Moreira Alves and Philip Evanson whose investigations deal exclusively with daily violence in the favelas and its causes.⁴⁵ In regards to the Favela Pacification Program little work has been formally published since it has only been in existence since 2008; most information about the

⁴² Enrique Desmond Arias and Corinne Davis Rodrigues, "The Myth of Personal Security: Criminal Gangs, Dispute Resolution, and Identity in Rio de Janeiro's Favelas," *Latin American Politics and Society* 48.4 (2006).

⁴³ Steffen Zdun, "Difficulties Measuring and Controlling Homicide in Rio de Janeiro," *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 5.1 (2011).

⁴⁴ R. Ben Penglase, "The Shutdown of Rio de Janeiro: The Poetics of Drug Trafficker Violence," *Anthropology Today* 21.5 (2005).

⁴⁵ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*.

program and its immediate results must be examined through media articles which, as previously stressed, have a tendency to focus on violence and stories that include murder or the capture of wanted criminals. Thus finding information that has not been affected by the media bias presents a difficulty in researching this particular topic.

In contrast to the pervasive theme of violence, scholarship that focuses on the lives of favela residents is less prominent. However, this research offers essential insights into the daily experiences of favela residents, thus giving a voice to those who are usually controlled by the “law of silence.” In *Living in the Crossfire: Favela Residents, Drug Dealers, and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro*, Maria Helena Moreira Alves and Philip Evanson focus on the hypothesis that human rights and public security in Brazil cannot exist without one another; it asserts that the public security system in place can be modified to be an effective institution that can provide for all through democracy and respect for human rights.⁴⁶ It concludes that while Brazil has made incredible progress in poverty reduction and social rights, the nation has sacrificed human rights. They identify criminal groups and state agents as both being causes for the continued violence and strongly criticize the continuing public security policy of confrontation. Identifying the work of programs (like PRONASCI - a federal program that channels funds into state improvement programs), constitutional amendment as recommended by UN Special Rapporteur Philip Alston, and the enforcement of the already existing Constitution which protects human rights

⁴⁶ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 7.

as potential solutions to the problem, this book is a strong testament to the violence affecting Rio and the overwhelming need for a change in the daily reality faced by favela residents.⁴⁷ *Living in the Crossfire* focuses on extensive interviews with community residents and leaders as well as interviews with police officers and government officials. Not only has it allowed government officials to present their rationale and perspective behind what their nation is facing, but within the same work has given a voice to police officers who can be as silent as the favela residents that they are dealing with.

Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro by Janice Perlman is a continuation of her revolutionary work in various favelas in Rio. Not only has Perlman worked with these favelas for decades and provided a very personal, generational perspective on the lives, aspirations, and experiences of favela residents, but she also provides statistics and a highly detailed history of the favelas she has come to know intimately. It is very explicitly stated that Perlman's research has not been about places or things, but rather about the people that she has fostered deep connections with for the past 40 years. She asserts that without overcoming the phobia of the other and "mutually engag[ing] in the struggle against need, repression, disrespect, and violence, there will be no urban future for the rich or the poor."⁴⁸ Her work has followed the development of generations as they attempt to gain status and

⁴⁷Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 213-218.

⁴⁸ Perlman, *Favela*, 339.

improve their lives with a special focus on the achievement of recognition and respect. *Favela* has been able to do what few other works on the subject of favelas has done; to focus on the residents, the community, and their struggle to be seen as people instead of placing the main concentration on the violence and historical oppression that is stripping residents of their dignity. Similar to Perlman's work is that by Nancy Scheper-Hughes, *Death without Weeping*, which provides an intimate account of her ethnographic research in the North-East of Brazil that focuses on the lives of women and their children.⁴⁹ Donna M. Goldstein challenges the culture of poverty in her ethnography, *Laughter Out of Place*, while exploring the daily lives of women in the favelas.⁵⁰ All of this scholarship places the emphasis on members of the community and then uses this focus to further explore general issues affecting them; a human first approach.

The theories of stigmatization and marginalization are essential themes to explore in order to sufficiently assess if Pacification is in fact making any sort of impact with the favelas. While discussing the "theories of marginality" are less frequent in today's scholarship – with the terms of poverty and social exclusion having become more popular in the social scientist's lexicon – marginality was a more accurate fit for this research. Poverty and social exclusion are both discussed, but they

⁴⁹ Nancy Scheper-Hughes, *Death without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

⁵⁰ Donna M. Goldstein, *Laughter Out of Place: Race, Class, Violence, and Sexuality in a Rio Shantytown*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

are unable to completely encompass the experiences of favela residents in the way that marginality does. It was critical to find a way to define marginality in the context of the favelas and to make existing scholarship applicable to this theme. Marginalization is defined as “to relegate to an unimportant or powerless position within a society or group and to be excluded from or existing outside the mainstream of society or a group.”⁵¹ Stigmatize is “to characterize as disgraceful.”⁵² The theory of marginalization began to take off in the 1990s and much of the work can be applied to residents of favelas within Rio de Janeiro. The definitions of marginality apply directly to the daily situations faced by favela residents and how the rest of society treats them. In Loïc Wacquant’s work on advanced marginality he specifically highlights four points: social inequality, absolute surplus population, retrenchment of the welfare state, and spatial concentration and stigmatization.⁵³ Wacquant’s work paired with both of Janice Perlman’s texts, *Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro* and *Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro* establish a base in which to build upon. Camille Goirand’s article on citizenship and poverty focuses upon the links between poverty and the exclusion from democracy, and “Social Exclusion: Concepts, Findings, and Implications for the

⁵¹ "Marginal," *Merriam-Webster's Dictionary*, (Springfield: Merriam-Webster, 2004), 451.

⁵² "Stigmatize," *Merriam-Webster's Dictionary*, (Springfield: Merriam-Webster, 2004), 712.

⁵³ Wacquant, "The Rise of Advanced Marginality."

MDGs” by Nalia Kabeer expands upon poverty’s relation to social exclusion and how exclusion is then institutionalized. Bryan McCann takes a different approach in his analysis of recent works that all focus on social exclusion in relation to the drug traffic. “Construction the ‘Right to the City’ in Brazil” by Edésio Fernandes focuses upon urban development and how urbanization has brought social exclusion and spatial segregation. Scholarship by all these authors contribute to being able to define marginality and provide a way to evaluate what aspects in favela resident’s lives would need to be altered in order to judge if societal marginalization is in fact diminishing.

The concept of the “formal” versus the “informal” city is the other facet of the question that merits examination. A great deal has been published on the subject of the “formal” versus “informal” city especially as urban populations worldwide have become larger than rural populations and focus has thus been directed onto city dynamics. The formal city can be defined as the portion of the city that has been officially planned; it is the more permanent portion of the city, the one that is laid out on maps and through monuments, and presents itself through the spectacle of architecture.⁵⁴ The informal city is more kinetic and less temporal than the static formal city; this portion of the city is constantly in motion, recreating itself, and is defined by occupation patterns and the people within. Traditionally the informal city

⁵⁴ Rahul Mehrotra, Forward to *Rethinking the Informal City: Critical Perspectives from Latin America*, ed. Felipe Hernández et al. (New York City: Berghahn, 2010), xi.

has also been defined as the city of the poor and marginalized and its existence explained as “stem[ing] from the essential conditions of correcting or compensating for the unequal distribution of resources in an urban condition.”⁵⁵ This portion of the city is also one that has historically been ignored by governments who can neither keep pace with them nor respond meaningfully to the challenges faced or their growth. This has therefore resulted in mistrust and questions pertaining to citizenship and legality despite the fact that these communities are often an integral part of the urban economy; all issues that the favelas of Rio de Janeiro face. *Rethinking the Informal City: Critical Perspectives from Latin America* provides the support for the concept of the formal versus the informal. Scholarship by Greg O’Hare and his collaboration with Michael Barke elaborates on the history behind favela construction, and Edésio Fernandes expands upon the “rights” behind urban development.

As previously mentioned the recent nature of the Favela Pacification Program has dictated that much of the literary focus in this paper is directed towards the history of the favelas, the theme of marginality, and the concept of the formal and informal city. I used media sources to place the progress of Pacification into focus as well as my own research. Essential was the demand to position this research within the context of availability. However, a program as multidimensional and of such magnitude has not yet been attempted thus resulting in little available scholarship.

⁵⁵ Mehrotra, Forward to *Rethinking the Informal City: Critical Perspectives from Latin America*, xiii.

Research by David R. Black and Shona Bezanson made reference to ‘cleansing’ programs attempted in a number of nations in anticipation of hosting the Olympic Games.⁵⁶ However, these programs simply appear to have physically removed slums and shantytowns from the public view. So there exists very little information on any program that has the dual security phase and multifaceted social approach that the Favela Pacification Program possesses, thus lending a unique direction to researching the program and its possible effects.

Methodology

The original goals of this research were to investigate the causes, origins, and current state of pacified favelas in Rio de Janeiro. The theme of social marginalization has been a reoccurring feature that is the focus of my research.

Does the Favela Pacification Program have a chance of altering the history of societal marginalization surrounding the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and their residents? My research has included an exploration of the history of favelas; how they were formed, how they have historically interacted with the rest of the city, and public policy directed towards these communities. It is crucial to better understand the concept of marginality and define it in order to accurately assess if changes in perception of marginality are in fact occurring. The idea of the formal versus the informal city must then be examined as it is a critical element to comprehend how

⁵⁶ Black and Bezanson, “The Olympic Games, Human Rights, and Democratization.”

favela residents interact with the rest of the city and if marginality can be altered.

Lastly, the impacts of the Favela Pacification Program upon the pacified communities must be assessed.

Since the Favela Pacification Program was only conceptualized in 2008 and began to be implemented later that year there exists relatively little published literature on the subject. Although part of this research required that I conduct bibliographic research at the University of Delaware library, the short-term research I conducted in Rio de Janeiro in 2011 was necessary. While in Rio, I conducted short-term anthropological ethnographic research for three weeks. I visited the favelas of Dona Marta, Cantagalo, Complexo do Alemão, Vidigal, and Rocinha and was able to conduct participant observation in all of these locations. Participant observation is a research method allowing for cultural immersion that results in qualitative data collection. The guiding principle is to experience the lives of those who you are studying in order to collect data that you would find in a natural setting.⁵⁷ Following with this I spent at least a few hours every day in the favelas and photographed homes, streets, and infrastructural elements of the favelas; tried to develop conversations with residents while also behaving in a manner that would not distract from their daily routine; and took extensive notes on everything I saw or heard. In every community that I visited I made a point to find a guide that was from the community, either

⁵⁷ H. Russell Bernard, *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods*, 3rd ed. (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira, 2002), 324.

through asking residents myself or prior contacts who placed me in touch with willing guides. It was essential to have a guide in order to guarantee my own safety as an outsider, but also to help me begin conversations with residents and to navigate the favelas themselves. I offered every guide a compensation for their help although many refused the money. I conducted eighteen semi-structured interviews with residents of these favelas as well as with residents of the rest of city from both middle to upper class neighborhoods and from lower class areas, with tourists, and with members of the cultural group (and non-governmental organization) AfroReggae that operates in five favelas throughout the city. Nine of the interviews were with favelas residents, four were with members of AfroReggae (two who lived in favelas and two who did not), four were with residents of the city who did not live in favelas, and two were with tourists. In these semi-structured interviews I came prepared with approximately three to five guiding questions that I would ask participants after explaining my research and gaining their consent. The questions served to guide the conversations rather than dictate them as I aimed to allow conversation to flow freely and for participants to feel comfortable during the process. I truly wanted to hear resident's own opinions and to limit my influence in their response as much as possible. I utilized a non-stratified non-random sample, where a population is divided "into subpopulations, based in key independent variables,"⁵⁸ to select interview participants from a wide range of *cariocas*, from varied socio-economic positions and residences,

⁵⁸ Bernard, *Research Methods in Anthropology*, 148-149.

as well as non-residents of Rio. This was a sample population and not completely representative of the entire population, however, given my time restrictions, it was the most representative that I could achieve and the limitations on the sample are fully recognized.

One challenge I faced during my time in Rio was the direction that the results I was receiving were taking me. I began my time in Rio anticipating that pacification would in fact not be producing any positive changes in societal marginalization. However, my investigation proved to be the opposite of what I originally hypothesized; the majority of those that I interviewed and the information that I was able to gather through observation all pointed towards a markedly positive development of societal marginalization faced by residents of pacified favelas.

AS COMUNIDADES (THE COMMUNITIES)

Favelas, slums, shantytowns, *villas miserias*, ghettos, *pueblos jovenes*, *chawl*, *gecekondus*, squatter settlements exist all over the world. They have been referred to as the greatest problem of this century, as “the most ghastly human dwellings on the face of the earth,”⁵⁹ as a place where incorrigible and feral portions of society go to rot, and as dirty, immoral, and criminal. They have been broadly characterized by “overcrowding, poor or informal housing, inadequate access to water and sanitation, and insecurity of tenure...[as well as] economic and social marginality.”⁶⁰ Urban populations now outnumber rural populations for the first time in the history of the world. However it is this rapid urbanization and the inability of nations, especially of those in the developing world, to keep pace that has led to the proliferation of slums. On average formal housing markets can only provide approximately 20 percent of the necessary housing leading to the haphazard construction of informal, and frequently illegal, housing.⁶¹ It was envisioned that the cities of the future would be glass and steel. However as the twenty-first century begins the majority of our urban world is

⁵⁹ Davis, *Planet of Slums*, 22.

⁶⁰ Davis, *Planet of Slums*, 23.

⁶¹ Davis, *Planet of Slums*, 1-17.

constructed of scrap materials and is surrounded by squalor.⁶² In 2005 it was estimated that internationally there were over one billion slum dwellers who constitute a third of the urban population worldwide.⁶³ In Brazil *moradores* (favela, or slum, residents who are also referred to as *favelados* but this term carries a negative weight) represent 36.6 percent of the urban population and 51.7 million residents.⁶⁴

Year(s)	City	Number evicted
1950	Hong Kong	107,000
1965–74	Rio de Janeiro	139,000
1972–76	Dakar	90,000
1976	Mumbai	70,000
1986–92	Santo Domingo	180,000
1988	Seoul	800,000
1990	Lagos	300,000
1990	Nairobi	40,000
1995–96	Rangoon	1,000,000
1995	Beijing	100,000
2001–03	Jakarta	500,000
2005	Harare	750,000+

Figure 1 Slum eviction statistics.⁶⁵

⁶² Davis, *Planet of Slums*, 18.

⁶³ Davis, *Planet of Slums*, 23.

⁶⁴ Davis, *Planet of Slums*, 24.

Origins of Favelas in Rio de Janeiro

Favelas in Rio de Janeiro began at the end of the nineteenth century with the foundation of Morro de Providencia, but it was not until decades later that they began to truly grow. The mid-nineteenth century saw the formation of an industrial and commercial base that would continue to grow over the next century as well as an increase in migration into the city. By the early twentieth century 20 to 25 percent of the city's population lived in low-income housing.⁶⁶ (See figures 1-3) In response to the continued migration, the increased value of land in the city center and the resulting displacement from urban housing, and overcrowding impoverished families with no other options began to build their own homes and by 1920 there were twenty-six favelas in Rio. When the first official urban plan, *Plano Agache*, was undertaken in the early 1930s it was noted that there were approximately 58,000 "rustic habitations" within the city.⁶⁷ It was in this time that the government first labeled favelas as "an aberration" and with the 1937 *Código de Obras* (Building Code) forbid the expansion or improvement of existing favelas, the construction of new favelas, and the use of permanent materials. The city clearly detested the image of the favelas and wanted them removed, but had restricted any methods of improvement.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Davis, *Planet of Slums*, 24.

⁶⁶ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 232.

⁶⁷ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 232-234.

⁶⁸ Perlman, *Favela*, 27.




Figure 2 Progressive favela settlement in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.⁶⁹




Figure 3 Favela and population growth in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 232-234.

The 1930s also marked the next stage in favela development. This was the first major wave of rural to urban migration, which led to a prompt increase in the size and number of favelas in Rio. To this point the few existing favelas had been scattered relatively close to the urban center and boasted only small populations; in 1920 Morro de Providencia had only 839 dwellings.⁷¹ The international depression had sparked the promotion of domestic manufacturing hence the further development of industry in the *Zona Norte* (North Zone) of Rio. This coupled with a drop in agricultural prices prompted the wave of migration that resulted in the development of new favelas in *Centro* (the city center) as well as *Zona Norte*, where workers would be closer to their industrial jobs.⁷²

The drive for industrialization was continued in the 1940s under the leadership of Getulio Vargas. Vargas governed Brazil from 1930 to 1945 as a repressive dictator and then was elected President in 1950. While Vargas was a dominating and censoring figure in Brazilian history, the labor laws and the *Estado Novo* (New State) that he instituted helped modernize the nation and provided progressive labor benefits to workers.⁷³ Among the industrialization projects undertaken under the *Estado Novo*

⁷⁰ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 233.

⁷¹ Janice E. Perlman, *The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro*, (Berkeley: University of California, 1976), 13.

⁷² O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 234.

⁷³ Rother, *Brazil on the Rise*, 23.

was the construction of multiple new railway lines in the *Zona Norte* that only served to further increase rural to urban migration and resulted in favelas becoming the major form of housing for the poor. By 1948 the *Zona Norte* had 20 percent of the city's favelas and, with 58 settlements, had over half of the squatter communities citywide, whereas districts to the south had only 32 settlements.⁷⁴

Brazil experienced rapid constant economic growth and industrialization from 1945 until the early 1980s. From 1950 to 1980 Brazil's GNP (gross national product) index grew at a stable average rate of 4.3 percent annually. This growth was coupled with the transformation of Brazil from a rural to an urban society where the labor force was transformed from the rural sector to industrial and service sectors.⁷⁵ In particular this industrial sector was centered in the southeast of the nation where Rio de Janeiro is located and while industry was growing rapidly, it was "impossible to incorporate all workers into the formal labor market."⁷⁶ Thus the massive numbers of migrants to Rio who were seeking opportunities through this labor transformation were unable to be integrated. From 1950 until 1970 these high levels of migration helped to increase Rio's population from 2.3 million to 4.25 million and increased favelas from 200 with

⁷⁴ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 234.

⁷⁵ Estanislao Gacitúa-Mario and Michael Woolcock, eds., *Social Exclusion and Mobility in Brazil*. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2008), 81-82.

⁷⁶ Gacitúa-Mario and Woolcock, eds, *Social Exclusion and Mobility in Brazil*, 83.

approximately 169,305 occupants in 1950 to 335,063 occupants in 1960 to 384 favelas in 1970.⁷⁷ (See figures 2 and 3)

Then beginning in the 1980s the economic growth that had so characterized the previous generations began to stagnate. A severe economic recession coupled with hyper-inflation and external debt gripped the nation and led to a significant decline in urban migration rates. During this decade the city experienced the lowest growth rates of the nation's largest cities at only 0.7 percent increase. A huge increase in the urban poor, contributed to by the drastically reduced incomes of the middle class, caused a massive growth in favelas. From 1980 to 1991 the city only experienced a 7.7 percent growth while the favelas grew by 34 percent; 105 communities were developed for a total of 564.⁷⁸ "The 1990s were marked by the introduction of economic reforms that led to the opening of markets, the privatization of public services and national companies, and many other policies designed to attract international private capital."⁷⁹ These reforms led to increased economic stability, but also to "deindustrialization" (the reduction of industrial capacity), a 48 percent decline from 1990 to 1999, and the growth of the unprotected service and commerce sectors.⁸⁰ Massive layoffs from industrial giants who had begun to move their locations, like General Electric,

⁷⁷ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 235.

⁷⁸ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 237.

⁷⁹ Gacitúa-Mario and Woolock, eds, *Social Exclusion and Mobility in Brazil*, 83.

⁸⁰ Gacitúa-Mario and Woolock, eds, *Social Exclusion and Mobility in Brazil*, 83.

drastically affected favela residents by further denying them access to the formal market.⁸¹ The growth of the informal sector, where wages are frequently less than the legal minimum, did little to help alleviate the poverty that was particularly affecting the increasing number of migrants that continued to pour into Rio de Janeiro.

Throughout favela development not only were the urban poor faced with less than minimum wage jobs in the informal sector, where currently 33.5 percent of the city's workforce is located,⁸² if they were fortunate enough to find work, but they were also faced with the city's inability to house them. The failure of Rio de Janeiro's infrastructure to incorporate these migrants led to the rapid spread of favelas. The poor would simply construct their own communities where they could find space using scrap materials that they could salvage and in the process often inadvertently became neighbors with the wealthy elites. Brazil is not a poor nation; rather it has one of the "highest indices of income and wealth inequality ever measured."⁸³ Approximately 26 percent of the population lives below the poverty line and the Gini-coefficient, which measures inequality, is 0.58-0.60.⁸⁴ In Rio the highest 20 percent of households earn

⁸¹ João H. C. Vargas, "When a Favela Dared to Become a Gated Condominium: The Politics of Race and Urban Space in Rio de Janeiro," *Latin American Perspectives* 33.4 (2006), 62.

⁸² O'Hare, "Urban Renaissance: New Horizons for Rio's Favelas," 65.

⁸³ Gacitúa-Mario and Woolock, eds, *Social Exclusion and Mobility in Brazil*, 82.

⁸⁴ Perlman, *Favela*, 158.

approximately 20.34 times that of the lowest 20 percent.⁸⁵ There are immense gaps between social groups, which is perfectly evidenced in the impoverished and marginalized favelas that have grown up directly against wealthy neighborhoods.

Characterizing the Favelas


Attempting to characterize the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and to create sweeping generalizations for them presents a great deal of difficulty, as there exists substantial variation between the communities. There is “physical, environmental, socio-economic and cultural differences...[as well as] marked contrasts in housing and quality of life conditions [even] within the same settlement.”⁸⁶ They certainly cannot simply be labeled as communities of poverty; not all poor live in the favelas, not all residents are impoverished, and in general there is a great deal of socio-economic variation within the communities.⁸⁷ A standard defining feature of the favelas is their illegal occupation of land, as is the fact that the communities have no formal urban planning and the structures have been self-built by members of the community, although the builders themselves may no longer occupy them. Other accurate generalizations are that infrastructural, medical, education, and transportation services are seriously lacking albeit in varying degrees. Historical exclusion from the formal

⁸⁵ O’Hare, "Urban Renaissance: New Horizons for Rio's Favelas," 65.

⁸⁶ O’Hare, "Urban Renaissance: New Horizons for Rio's Favelas," 61.

⁸⁷ Perlman, *Favela*, 30.

labor market and from civic and political participation can also be cited for all favelas, although the degree has varied from community to community. The older and frequently more densely populated favelas tend to be located in the *Centro* area while favelas in the high status areas of the city like the *Zona Sul* (South Zone) are less dense. Older and more centrally located favelas also have greater tendencies towards self-improvement and tend to have higher quality of life or socio-economic levels.⁸⁸ Most importantly though it is the unique feature of favelas in that physically they are part of the city and they take up a portion of the city's real space, but they are simultaneously isolated from the city itself to the extent that they have become an "other."⁸⁹



⁸⁸ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 229.

⁸⁹ O'Hare, "Urban Renaissance: New Horizons for Rio's Favelas," 62-63.

Figure 4 The variety of favela demographics.⁹⁰




Figure 5 Rio de Janeiro's planning zones.⁹¹

In the eyes of Rio de Janeiro the favelas are not places, but rather spaces.

“‘Places’ are ‘full’ and ‘fixed’, ‘stable arenas’ whereas ‘spaces’ are ‘potential voids’, ‘possible threats’, areas that have to be feared, secured or fled.”⁹² They are the informal city; a kinetic city that constantly modifies and reinvents itself. A palimpsest

⁹⁰ O'Hare, "Urban Renaissance: New Horizons for Rio's Favelas," 68.

⁹¹ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 227.

⁹² Wacquant, "The Rise of Advanced Marginality," 126.

that is constantly being thought out, constructed, rethought, and reconstructed; it's only permanency being its constant state of development.⁹³ And while much of local culture can be seen as being derived from this informal world, the formal two-dimensional city, the city that can be found on maps, seeks to remove, erase, and rewrite the informal. Favelas do not have a place within the formal city of Rio; rather they occupy a space that hangs in an uncertain balance. Space ultimately "is produced by and reproduces social relations."⁹⁴ In Rio de Janeiro the space that favelas occupy maintains a relationship with the rest of the city that represents a lack of integration; exclusion, subordination, and domination are all defining features. Favelas have grown out of the unequal distribution of resources, out of the government's inability to keep pace with them and to respond meaningfully to them, and out of the need and determination to survive.⁹⁵

As a nation Brazil has suffered from a history of relatively unsuccessful urban planning. The degrees of informality of planning are associated with social vulnerability and the extent to which a population is marginalized; the favelas are a perfect example of the highest level of informal planning. They have been illegally built on land deemed unworthy of development, often because of the dangerous

⁹³ Jorge Mario Jáuregui. "Urban and Social Articulation: Megacities, Exclusion and Urbanity." In *Rethinking the Informal City: Critical Perspectives from Latin America*, ed Felipe Hernández, et al, (New York City: Berghahn, 2010), 216.

⁹⁴ Vargas, "When a Favela Dared to Become a Gated Condominium," 59.

⁹⁵ Mehrotra, Forward to *Rethinking the Informal City: Critical Perspectives from Latin America*, xiii.

gradient, and grown in an organic manner.⁹⁶ Initially residents began to construct their homes out of scrap materials such as wood, corrugated tin, and even cardboard. However, in recent years brick and concrete tend to be more common. Those with knowledge of construction pass information and help to other community members and basic, but solid homes are constructed. “Spatial organization in favelas does not exist outside of pragmatic solutions that result from constructing with limited means.”⁹⁷ The communities constantly develop and form themselves around what materials they have and where they can build; the organic nature, chaos, and formless appearance of these informal cities actually do have a pattern – a pattern that merges need with possibility.

Looking onto the favelas they seem to be just what Caetano Veloso described them as, “*aqui tudo parece que ainda é construção e já é ruína* –here everything seems still under construction and already a ruin.”⁹⁸ Winding, narrow footpaths, steep stairs that snake up hillsides, few actual roads that can permit vehicle access, concrete houses that sometimes extend for four to five stories, exposed and jumbled networks of electrical lines, open sewage, and a seemingly endless sprawl of roofs. This is what a favela looks like from the outside. Inside they are not just informally constructed

⁹⁶ Fernando Luiz Lara, "The Form of the Informal: Investigating Brazilian Self-Built Housing Solutions," In *Rethinking the Informal City: Critical Perspectives from Latin America*, ed. Felipe Hernández et al. (New York City: Berghahn, 2010), 27.

⁹⁷ Lara, "The Form of the Informal: Investigating Brazilian Self-Built Housing Solutions," 35.

⁹⁸ Lara, "The Form of the Informal: Investigating Brazilian Self-Built Housing Solutions," 25.

expanses with substandard infrastructure nor are they dens of criminals, immorality, and despair, rather they are communities full of life. They are tightly knit and have relied on collective work in the absence of outside help for decades, they are independent and proud, and they are *cariocas* (residents of Rio). The festive, outgoing, happy nature of *cariocas* certainly does not stop where a favela begins. Life continues on with in the favelas; while the outbreaks of violence do confine residents to their homes for the most part the streets are filled with men and women going to work, running their business within the communities, shopping and socializing, or eating a meal and grabbing a drink at a local cafe. After school children run through the streets flying *pipas* (kites) or playing games, their laughter mingling with the latest *funk* (Brazilian hip-hop style music that sometimes highlights favela life and the drug traffic – *funk proibidão*⁹⁹) beats or a favorite samba. When possible, houses are painted in bright colors that bring brightness into the community. These are not dark, dank, silent expanses of brooding criminals, but rather they are vivacious communities.

Moradores (residents of favelas) have not selected their areas of residence out of desire to live in these locations, but rather out of necessity and lack of other options. The populations are primarily poor working-class who are employed in the informal sector. They have some of the lowest education levels with the majority of residents having left school during their primary years and certainly before reaching the high

⁹⁹ Neate, *Culture Is Our Weapon*, 58-59.

school level.¹⁰⁰ Many favelas do not even have secondary schools and many teachers only teach part-time as they are frightened away by the reputation for violence within the favelas.¹⁰¹ Conditions surrounding schools are so dire that students in the Complexo do Alemão have been compared to those in the Gaza Strip and Iraq.¹⁰² Their limited education combined with the stigma attached to living in the favelas, often to the extent that favela residents have their job applications turned down because of where they live,¹⁰³ severely restricts their employment options. Thus they are trapped in the cycle of low paying, unskilled jobs, which then prevent them from gaining the income to move or even improve their living conditions past a minimal extent. The inhabitants of these illegally settled communities cannot afford life in the formal city and have only “limited and substandard” access to basic urban services.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ Robert Gay, *Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: A Tale of Two Favelas*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 13-14.

¹⁰¹ Personal Interview, A.D, June 2011.

¹⁰² Perlman, *Favela*, 194.

¹⁰³ Perlman, *Favela*, 229.

¹⁰⁴ Gay, *Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro*, 2.

Table 4. Eight favelas of varying age: some basic characteristics.

Favela	Date of origin	Population 1998	% Rio born 1998	% employed in Urban Quality formal sector ^(a)	index, 1997
Serrinha	1921	3243	80.3	53.8	0.391
Morro Uniao	1931	7204	75.8	63.8	0.555
Morro da Fe	1936	2777	71.1	55.3	0.511
Ladeira/S.Sebastao	1931-51	3111	60.8	72.4	0.500/0.525
Chacara del Castilho	1951	2430	64.0	79.1	0.506
Fernao Cardim	1951	2886	66.2	65.8	0.515
Caminho do Job	1966	2520	73.5	60.8	0.507
Parque Royal	1973	5208	55.2	56.0	0.436

Source: Iplan-Rio (1997); Secretaria Espacial de Trabalho (1998)

^(a)with work permit

Table 5. Services and other socio-economic indicators for favelas and City of Rio de Janeiro.

	All city	All favelas	Top 10 favelas	Bottom 10 favelas
% inadequate water	3.9	15.4	2.6	58.3
% inadequate sewerage	8.9	36.7	6.8	91.8
% inadequate rubbish collection	4.3	21.3	1.6	88.1
Mean no rooms/household	4.8	4.1	5.4	3.2
Mean no persons/household	3.5	4.0	3.8	4.1
% HoH with <4 years study	17.2	20.6	14.7	26.8
%HoH with 15+ years study	16.7	1.1	6.6	0.5
% illiteracy over 15 years	6.1	15.4	6.8	28.0
% HH at up to 2 min salary	35.5	72.3	48.6	88.2
% HoH at 10 or > min salary	15.1	0.6	6.7	0.1
HoH mean income (min salary)	5.84	1.7	3.9	1.1

Source: Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro (1997)

Figure 6 Favela characteristics.¹⁰⁵

Even though most of the favelas in Rio have had some type of an urbanization project present in their communities, these ventures have done little in the long run.

Moradores have limited access to anything other than the most basic of medical and educational facilities and have inadequate access to the city's water, sewage, and trash

¹⁰⁵ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 238.

collection systems.¹⁰⁶ They are removed from commercial centers, especially those outside of Zona Sul, have poor transportation, and for the most part are not attended to by the police force. Compared to those living outside of the favela, on the *asfalto* (city proper),¹⁰⁷ favela residents

Have significantly lower incomes, higher rates of unemployment, lower education levels, less access to human services, fewer urban amenities, and less household spaces per person...[and] more likely to work in manual labor (if they are working).¹⁰⁸

Residents are *marginais* (marginal) who have been socially excluded. Their relative poverty, resulting from a society that prevents their adequate access to education and to the formal job market, which could begin to break the cycle, has been viewed as “deviant behavior, moral turpitude, or just plain laziness.”¹⁰⁹ Their impoverishment is seen as an impediment to progress and the betterment of society, thus denying them a place in civic society.¹¹⁰ During the 1940s and 50s the favelas were referenced to as sores on the body of a beautiful woman and were denigrated.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶ Gay, *Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro*, 12.

¹⁰⁷ Neate, *Culture Is Our Weapon*, 2.

¹⁰⁸ Perlman, *Favela*, 233.

¹⁰⁹ Perlman, *Favela*, 266.

¹¹⁰ Davis, *Planet of Slums*, 98.

¹¹¹ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 18.

In 1968 a statement summing up the widespread views regarding favelas was published by the official agency responsible for favela oversight in Rio.

Families arrive from the interior pure and united...in stable unions. The disintegration begins in the favela as a consequence of the promiscuity, the bad examples and the financial difficulties there...young girls are seduced and abandoned; they get pregnant but don't feel any shame...liquor and drugs serve to dull the disappointments, humiliations and food deficiency...The nights belong to the criminals...one can hear the screams for help. But no one dares to interfere lest they will be next....Policeman rarely penetrate the favela and only then in groups.¹¹²

Favelas are seen as corrupting social problems and their residents as marginals.

However, Vargas contends, "even though the people of the favelas have been historically marginalized and their humanity and citizenship negated, they have hardly been invisible."¹¹³ They, as he also states, are integral to the city and make up the significant informal economy and maintain a presence in the formal economy as well as being a necessity to city dynamics. This is certainly true, but the rest of the city does not see this. Rather *moradores* are marginalized, overlooked, barely seen as people, or seen as a threat to the social system that created them.¹¹⁴ Residents are not seen for what they have actually accomplished; that they are well organized, make use of the resources available to them, contribute culturally to the rest of society, and aim to improve their lives and the lives of the future generations. They have taken on some

¹¹² Perlman, *Favela*, 149.

¹¹³ Vargas, "When a Favela Dared to Become a Gated Condominium," 60.

¹¹⁴ Perlman, *Favela*, 148.

of the worst jobs in society with the worst conditions and least job security for the lowest pay, contributed as consumers, and built their own communities from homes to infrastructure.¹¹⁵ To top it all off they have little hope of mobility, as Brazil is a rigidly exclusionary nation.¹¹⁶ More than anything else the residents of the favelas simply want to have employment; “the opportunity to earn fair pay for decent work.” To be able to say that someone is a hard worker is the ultimate sign of respect and residents become somebody when they are workers. Favela residents have been forced to cope with the hardest of circumstances and the harshest of realities for generations, but if all the energy they have been forced to put into survival could be channeled into opportunities to have decent employment self-defeating beliefs, negative impressions, and the rational behind marginality could begin to be broken.¹¹⁷

The favelas have often been referred to as a separate city, as part of a broken or divided city, or as a dual city. In reality Rio de Janeiro is one intertwined city; interdependent and connected. The favelas provide the labor force that has made the growth of all of Rio possible; they are the overlooked and underpaid workforce that has made Rio what it is.¹¹⁸ The favelas, even though they are officially unrecognized

¹¹⁵ Perlman, *Favela*, 149.

¹¹⁶ Perlman, *Favela*, 224.

¹¹⁷ Perlman, *Favela*, 264-265.

¹¹⁸ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 14-15.

and illegal¹¹⁹, make Rio de Janeiro ever more *carioca*.¹²⁰ Yet at the same time their residents are the refuse of society and have become invisible; they are marginalized, mistreated, and denied their dignity.

Legacies of Removal

As previously discussed the majority of favelas initially developed in *Centro* and the *Zona Norte* allowing residents improved access to the industry that was centered to the north of the city. However, a significant portion of favelas also developed in the *Zona Sul*, the wealthier middle to upper class suburban area of the city. These favelas spread up the granite hillsides that are so characteristic of the city and bordered wealthier communities. The middle class area provided residents with work in construction and domestic labor as well as a generally higher standard of living than in the favelas to the north. As the *Zona Sul* neighborhoods experienced increased urbanization by the elite during the 1950s, the favelas responded by also growing in numbers, however while these richer areas provided work they also increased the threat of removal.¹²¹

In the 1950s into the 1960s favelas were seen as increasingly problematic. Ever since the construction of the first favela, these communities have been faced with

¹¹⁹ Julio Cesar Pino, "Sources on the History of Favelas in Rio de Janeiro," *Latin American Research Review* 32.3 (1997), 111.

¹²⁰ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 20.

¹²¹ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 234.

rejection from the formal city and with destruction or removal. The city of the elite and wealthy saw the unauthorized constructions as a threat to their control and made several early attempts to evict the “leprous sores” from their city.¹²² In 1942 the *Parques Proletários*, three public housing projects, were constructed in an attempt to accommodate, isolate, and control the urban poor and while they were ultimately unsuccessful, they did reveal the intentions of Rio de Janeiro’s elite.¹²³ In 1947 the Squatter Settlement Extinction Commission was established to intervene and remove the favelas. Yet, until the 1950s, their attempts met with relative failure.¹²⁴

Fueled by the mentality that favelas were a threat to the city and their residents were immoral criminals it had been, and would be until 1985, a focus of public policy to rid the city of their “cancer.”¹²⁵ In the 1950s came the added fear that favelas would be the breeding grounds for revolutionary communists, which coupled with increased urbanization and rising real estate prices, prompted the large-scale removals that would become the norm for decades.

In 1964 the *Banco Nacional de Habitação* (National Housing Bank) was created to finance low-income housing. However, the focus on obtaining cheap land meant workers were too far from their jobs and few could afford the housing. The

¹²² Perlman, *Favela*, 26.

¹²³ Gay, *Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro*, 17.

¹²⁴ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 234.

¹²⁵ Perlman, *Favela*, 266-267.

Coordenação da Habitação de Interesse Social de Área Metropolitana (CHISAM) was begun in 1968 and until its end in 1975 the federal program attempted to rid Rio of the favelas. Focusing first on the *Zona Sul* and then the *Zona Norte* the program displaced a half million people, removing over 100 favelas and destroying over 100,000 residences. The *Companhia de Habitação Popular do Estado da Guanabara* (COHAB-GB) assisted CHISAM in the removal process. In 1975 the *Companhia de Habitação Popular do Rio de Janeiro* (CEHAB-RJ) was created out of a fusion of the two programs and carried on their policies of favela removal.¹²⁶ From 1962 until 1974 approximately 80 favelas were removed, often violently, and 175,800 residents who were “contaminating” the spaces of the elite, were displaced to the far off suburbs in the largest cleansing project the city has ever seen.¹²⁷ In the example of Praia do Pinto, a favela that until 1969 was located in desirable Leblon neighborhood in the *Zona Sul*, residents were informed that their community would be removed and when they protested and subsequently refused to leave the police returned at night and burned the favela to the ground forcing residents to comply with the relocation.¹²⁸ However, by 1975 removal policies stopped and a new period in favela history began.

¹²⁶ Perlman, *Favela*, 268-271.

¹²⁷ Roberto Serge, "Formal-Informal Connections in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: The Favela-Bairro Programme," In *Rethinking the Informal City: Critical Perspectives from Latin America*, ed. Felipe Hernández, et al. (New York City: Berghahn, 2010), 166.

¹²⁸ Perlman, *Favela*, 75.

Removal had not only cost the government a vast amount of money, but their plans to relocate favela residents into government built housing also could not meet the high level of demand nor were living conditions improved. Most importantly, the causes of favela growth had not been addressed at all. By the time democracy was restored in 1985, the authorities realized that with one third of the voting population living in favelas, eradication programs would no longer be realistic. So instead the focus turned to favela upgrading.¹²⁹ The *Companh ia de Desenvolvimento Comunit rio* (CODESCO – Company for Community Development) begun in 1968, was actually the first attempt at on-site favela upgrading. However, it did not last past 1969 “despite its popular success and promise of a low-cost, long term solution to the integration of Rio’s favelas.”¹³⁰ Public policy returned to these ideas with intentions to open favelas to access from emergency vehicles, pave and light roads, build concrete stairs, install electric, water, garbage collection, and sanitation systems, dredge sewage buildup in streams or canals, and improve transportation within the favelas.¹³¹ Project Rio, in 1980, was the first attempt to begin upgrading the communities.¹³² Leonel Brizola, elected governor in 1982, also made great strides in favela upgrades through

¹²⁹ Perlman, *Favela*, 273.

¹³⁰ Perlman, *Favela*, 269.

¹³¹ Perlman, *Favela*, 267.

¹³² O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 237.

his refusal to identify favelas as a problem.¹³³ *Projeto Mutirão*, 1983-84, focused on sanitation infrastructure, road, and community center construction in 15 communities while compensating residents for their participation in upgrades. *Cada Família Um Lote*, in 1983, was the state's effort that resulted in 23,000 title deeds and two favela upgrades even though it fell short of its goal of providing land ownership, water, and sewage to one million poor. The Five-Year Plan was proposed in 1985, and while it never left planning, intended to fully incorporate all favelas; offering formal recognition of their existence, paving and lighting for streets, mail delivery, and garbage collection.¹³⁴ These upgrading programs were ultimately unsuccessful, short-term, and did not have the wide scale effects that policy makers hoped, but they do represent an important transition towards the idea of favela incorporation for the first time in favela history.

The 1990s saw a continuation of the inclusion of favelas with the *Plano Diretor* (Master Plan), the *Rio-Cidade* Program, and *Favela-Bairro*, the most important project in favela integration. Begun in 1994, with funding from the Inter-American Development Bank, the three-part program sought to directly improve and integrate favelas directly. *Morar Favela* granted credit at low interest rates, *Morar Sem Risco* resettled those in high-risk environments, and *Favela-Bairro* focused on on-site improvement. The idea was that through this program the favelas and all their

¹³³ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 15.

¹³⁴ Perlman, *Favela*, 274.

inhabitants would be more integrated within their own communities and the city at large.¹³⁵ The program's innovation laid in the individualized approach it took to each community; it was a response to specific conditions that resulted in a range of solutions that all emphasized each community's differing needs.¹³⁶ Other essential points of the program were to make the environments accessible to all citizens, to increase connectivity between the communities and the *asfalto*, to create transportation access points, to avoid severing existing social links, and produce cohesion. *Favela-Bairro* also found it vital to include the community by - for perhaps one of the first times - listening to and taking into consideration the community's needs and preferences before acting.¹³⁷ This approach focused on changing the image of these areas in such a drastic way that residents' own perceptions began to transform. By the early 2000s investment in *Favela-Bairro* ceased due to political conflict and the rise of violence, but not before reaching more than 150 communities and benefiting a half million people.¹³⁸ The *Favela-Bairro* program attained such importance in favela history because it listened to the people, tried to break the distinction between formal and informal spaces, and most of all, it directly aimed to eliminate the "ghetto" image

¹³⁵ O'Hare, "Urban Renaissance: New Horizons for Rio's Favelas," 71-72.

¹³⁶ Serge, "Formal-Informal Connections in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro," 170.

¹³⁷ O'Hare, "Urban Renaissance: New Horizons for Rio's Favelas," 72.

¹³⁸ Serge, "Formal-Informal Connections in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro," 170-171.

that is the dominant lens through which to view favelas.¹³⁹ In spite of its successes, such as the fact that it did improve the quality of life in the favelas affected and residents did feel recognized, *Favela-Bairro* still did not achieve lasting success. It reached more than 150 communities, except that is only 16.5 percent of the 1,020 favelas that exist in Rio (as of 2009), it received little media coverage, and in the years that followed residents felt no ownership towards the improvements which frequently began to deteriorate to their earlier conditions.¹⁴⁰

Even though upgrading programs have allowed favelas to be seen in a more positive light, the end of *Favela-Bairro* marked an end to the support for social and community difficulties of the favelas. From the inception of favelas to today they have been ignored by the elites who, when finally taking notice, only did so in an attempt to evict residents. When that failed they turned to half-hearted efforts to improve the quality of life for residents, but none of these programs managed to last long enough to make any real advances and none of the endeavors made an effort to deal with the causes of poverty and societal marginalization that had ultimately led to the deep-rooted existence of the favelas.

¹³⁹ Serge, "Formal-Informal Connections in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro," 174.

¹⁴⁰ Perlman, *Favela*, 278-280.

O Tráfico

At the same time that democracy was developing in Brazil, the policies of removal were being replaced with attempts at community upgrading, and industries were experiencing a marked decline, a new transformation in favela life was simultaneously emerging – the arrival of cocaine. Prior to the 1980s drug and criminal activities in the favelas mostly consisted of the *jogo do bicho* (numbers game, gambling) and a relatively minor drug traffic in marijuana.¹⁴¹ Those involved in the distribution and sale of marijuana were for the most part lightly armed, and while violence certainly still occurred it was on a much smaller scale and territory was not won or lost in bloody wars.¹⁴² By the mid-1980s things were changing drastically; Rio had become a “transshipment hub for Andean cocaine en route to Europe and North America.”¹⁴³ The favelas are not production points for cocaine and the profits from sales do not remain in the favelas; rather, the favelas provide a source of labor, easily protected territory, and a point of sale.¹⁴⁴ As the amount of cocaine increased so did competition over its control pushing dealers to form increasingly powerful gangs, to fight for territorial control, and to obtain heavier arms. As industry was conducting massive job layoffs, the growing drug trade provided opportunities for income. The

¹⁴¹ Arias, “The Myth of Personal Security,” 61.

¹⁴² *Cidade De Deus*. Dir. Fernando Meirelles. Perf. Alexandre Rodrigues, Matheus Nachergaele, Leandro Firmino. 2002.

¹⁴³ Arias, “The Myth of Personal Security,” 61.

¹⁴⁴ Vargas, “When a Favela Dared to Become a Gated Condominium,” 62.

favelas were already considered “degraded, amoral, and violent communities” and the growing drug trade did little to help that perception.¹⁴⁵

Over the past decades several drug factions have come to dominate the drug trade, also referred to as *o tráfico* or *o movimento*,¹⁴⁶ in Rio de Janeiro. *Comando Vermelho* (CV), *Terceiro Commando* (TC), and *Amigos dos Amigos* (ADA) are the dominating factions today.¹⁴⁷ The CV, which formed in the Ilha Grande prison during the military regime,¹⁴⁸ is the largest, most belligerent, and confrontational of all the factions. Educated opponents of the regime were jailed alongside criminals and eventually the two groups fused, merging solidarity and ideology with criminal enterprise to create a criminal organization with structure.¹⁴⁹ Favelas under CV command have higher rates of violent shootouts with the police and, most distinctively, the CV maintains a strict militaristic hierarchy. There is a chain of command, code of conduct, and there are organized meetings between the leadership. The crime of informing can result in beheading, all of one’s limbs being cut off, or being “microwaved” (placed inside a stack of tires and burned alive).¹⁵⁰ Precise rules,

¹⁴⁵ Vargas, “When a Favela Dared to Become a Gated Condominium,” 63.

¹⁴⁶ Neate, *Culture Is Our Weapon*, 109.

¹⁴⁷ Personal Interview, A.R, June 2011.

¹⁴⁸ Arias, “The Myth of Personal Security,” 61.

¹⁴⁹ Neate, *Culture Is Our Weapon*, 86.

¹⁵⁰ Personal Interview. S.P, June 2011.

internal bureaucracy, and death for leaving the faction are other features of the strictly controlled CV.¹⁵¹ In sharp contrast the ADA, formed in 1996 by former CV members, has a far better relationship with the police, enough to be considered a “working relationship,” has also formed alliances with the TC, and operates more like a franchise. The TC, founded in the 1980s to combat the CV, also operates in this method. Favelas controlled by this faction have similar ideals and support each other if needed, but do not interfere in other favelas’ activities. The TC is also defined by its hatred and history of conflict with the CV. Ultimately each favela depends upon the choices that its *dono* (top level of the drug trade, head trafficker) makes.¹⁵² Their choices, and the whole traffic, are ultimately built upon the demand financed by those from the *asfalto*, not the favela. The focus is never on the middle-class consumption of drugs; Hélio Luz, former head of the Civil Police, said that if the drug trade were to actually be fought then the *usuários* (users) should “*para de cheirar em Ipanema* (stop sniffing in Ipanema).”¹⁵³

“Less than 1 percent of favelas populations are actively involved in *o tráfico* [the traffic]. Nonetheless, the trafficker’s presence is used to justify the criminalization of whole communities.”¹⁵⁴ Inside the favelas reigns a different reality; few residents

¹⁵¹ Neate, *Culture Is Our Weapon*, 91.

¹⁵² Neate, *Culture Is Our Weapon*, 84-85,

¹⁵³ Neate, *Culture Is Our Weapon*, 87.

¹⁵⁴ Neate, *Culture Is Our Weapon*, 81.

are actually involved in the traffic, but this is not to say that the factions that control the favelas do not make their presence, and control, known. In a society where the local gangs must protect their fellow residents against police actions and the government has forgotten the people, a new hierarchy has developed. The factions dominate social order and control in the favela, having replaced the former Resident Associations (local leadership groups formed by government mandate) with themselves, and in exchange for this order the loyalty and silence of the residents is required.¹⁵⁵ A complex relationship has formed between *o tráfico* and the *moradores*. Residents are resentful of the violence and death that *o tráfico* has brought to their communities, but having no other options and benefitting from the services that factions have provided, are resigned to their presence. Society has neglected them to the point that it does not even see them; they are invisible. However, give an invisible youth a gun and suddenly they can make society react to them, they are seen, they become a person.¹⁵⁶ This is a powerful draw for youth and young adults who struggle to find their identities in an invisible world. Ask a child in the favelas about their future and they say they will be either a *tráficoante* (trafficker) or *trabalhador* (worker). While having a job is respectable and allows for a legal status, they often cannot name a specific career interest. Conversely, when they prefer to become a *tráficoante* they know that this path will give them money, prominence within their community, and a

¹⁵⁵ Arias, "The Myth of Personal Security," 61.

¹⁵⁶ *Bus 174*. Dir. José Padilha and Felipe Lacerda. 2002.

sense of belonging to something bigger than them.¹⁵⁷ To those who do belong to the *movimento* (another name for the traffic) it is about security, values, and self-worth.¹⁵⁸ Yet ultimately those involved with *o tráfico* are constructing themselves out of desperation.

“Signifying pollution and imminent threat that must be preemptively repressed, favelas and their people are often depicted as corrupt and subhuman.”¹⁵⁹ Rio sees the favelas solely as areas of crime; they are portrayed as territories that are occupied only by *bandidos* (criminals) or *traficantes* (traffickers). Society sees the rise of crime and the increase in violence as the characteristics of the favelas and their residents.¹⁶⁰ The intensified criminalization of poverty and the assumption that all residents are criminals accompanied by an increasingly militarized police force has led to a constant state of fear for favela residents.¹⁶¹ So while only one percent of favela populations are directly involved with the traffic, all residents have been affected. They are stereotyped either as criminals and *traficantes* or as passive victims who have simply allowed the current state of affairs to develop without a protest.¹⁶² They are faced with

¹⁵⁷ Neate, *Culture Is Our Weapon*, 151.

¹⁵⁸ Neate, *Culture Is Our Weapon*, 92.

¹⁵⁹ Vargas, "When a Favela Dared to Become a Gated Condominium," 63.

¹⁶⁰ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 6.

¹⁶¹ Perlman, *Favela*, 166-169.

¹⁶² Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 20.

an incredible amount of violence every day due to inter-gang conflict as well as from the war between the traffic and the police and from general police repression. Due to the consistent absence of the state in providing any sort of basic resources for the communities, residents are resigned to their dependency upon the aid of *o tráfico* for basic services and the perception of protection.

Rio de Janeiro has some of the highest rates of violence in the world and some of the highest international homicide rates due to the war between the police and the drug traffickers. For every cop that is killed, 41 residents are murdered by the police; a statistic that is 4 times higher than the international average.¹⁶³ From 1978 to 2000 approximately 50,000 people have died violently in Rio de Janeiro.¹⁶⁴ Within the city there were never less than 5,741 (1998) homicides or more than 8,438 (1994) homicides a year from 1991 until 2007.¹⁶⁵ The violence that so profoundly affects this beautiful city is comparable to homicide rates in war-torn nations; the fact that one city alone is analogous to nations ravaged by war is shocking. Janice Perlman highlights ten factors that have created this culture of violence;

(1) Stigmatized territories excluded from state protection; (2) inequality levels among the highest in the world; (3) a high priced illegal commodity [– cocaine]; (4) well-organized, well connected drug gangs and networks; (5) easy access to sophisticated weaponry; (6) an

¹⁶³ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 118.

¹⁶⁴ Perlman, *Favela*, 171.

¹⁶⁵ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 31.

underpaid, understaffed, unaccountable police force; (7) a weak government indifferent to “the rule of law”; (8) independent militias and vigilante groups who can kill at will; (9) a powerless population of over 3 million people in poverty; (10) a sensationalist mass media empire.¹⁶⁶

The favelas are out of the control of the state and the state’s inability to control them has led to the indifference of government. A blind eye is turned towards the favelas and, while the violence has only increased instead of disappearing, it appears that society hopes it will vanish if they simply do not pay attention. Militias - autonomous vigilantes who violently take over favelas from the traffic, but then force residents to pay for the protection they offer - are one of the latest threats to peace in the favelas.¹⁶⁷ Add to this existing mixture a decline in profits from drug sales, due to increased transportation costs and violence scaring away potential buyers, and a situation has emerged that has provoked *facções* (the factions) to become increasingly territorial and to turn to kidnapping and robbery.¹⁶⁸ There also seems to be a shift in trafficker attitudes within the favelas. Traditionally, *o tráfico* has filled the void created by the absence of the state, although it has not become another state in itself, and provided some basic resources for residents while also providing conflict resolution and codes of conduct for the favelas. At times dealers would grant funds for individuals to purchase needed medicines, provide for a private school education,

¹⁶⁶ Perlman, *Favela*, 174.

¹⁶⁷ Personal Interview, A.R, June 2011.

¹⁶⁸ Neate, *Culture Is Our Weapon*, 85.

organize a *baile* (dance) for the community, or other favors on a whim.¹⁶⁹ In exchange for these services and respect for the community as a whole, residents offer the needed support for the traffic and tolerated their presence. However in recent years there has been a decreasing concern in maintaining order and lessening provision of services largely due to the emergence of *donos* who have limited connections to the communities. The *bandidos* used to know and respect leaders and *trabalhadores* (workers) of their communities, but now the *bandidos* come from other places and disregard and disrespect what a resident has done for his or her community.¹⁷⁰ Favelas are traditionally “tightly knit, closed, and closely related communities”¹⁷¹ and the control by those who are not from the community is eroding this as well as minimizing any concern that a *dono* might have for their favela. Residents are no longer long-time neighbors, family members, or friends, but merely expendable, potential *soldados* (soldiers) to be used in the wars for territory and control. It is nothing to torture or murder a suspected informant or resident who disobeys; *o tráfico* is no longer the providers for the community.

However, even while traditional connections are diminished and the favelas exist in a state of violence that the traffic has only served to foster and continue, residents maintain a complex relationship with traffickers. *Moradores* are trapped

¹⁶⁹ Perlman, *Favela*, 188.

¹⁷⁰ Perlman, *Favela*, 198.

¹⁷¹ Arias, “The Myth of Personal Security,” 62.

between *o tráfico* and the police; neither party helps and both are harming the communities more than they do any good.¹⁷²

TABLE 7.2 *Who commits more acts of violence against the community?*

<i>New Random Sample (2003)</i>	
	<i>Percent</i>
Police	22
Traffickers	11
Both	48
None	12
Don't Know	7
Total	100.0

Figure 7 Violence against the community.¹⁷³

The favela is seen as a place of refuge by residents who in some ways view the traffic as a source of security, albeit unreliable, due to the absence of any other options.¹⁷⁴ In the desperate attempt for residents to create a sense of normalcy and safety they have come to see the traffic as a potential security provider while still fully recognizing its shortcomings. Often residents would rather ask a *tráfico* from their community for

¹⁷² Perlman, *Favela*, 188.

¹⁷³ Perlman, *Favela*, 189.

¹⁷⁴ Arias, "The Myth of Personal Security," 60.

aid than ask the police.¹⁷⁵ This is largely due to the fact that the police enter the communities full of hostility, mistreating residents and using indiscriminate displays of violence whereas the traffickers want the community on their side, so they treat the community better. Favela activist Rumba Gabriel asserts, “we are caught between the cross and the sword, perplexed and impotent in the face of a state that only appears in the form of violence and humiliation, and a parallel power that, paradoxically, on certain occasions even protects us.”¹⁷⁶ Yet the balance between *o tráfico* and residents is breaking down; residents are on the losing end and are forfeiting any sense of peace that they once had, freedom, their individuality, and often their lives. The traffic has “both built upon and destroyed the bases of the communal structures that governed favela social life.”¹⁷⁷ The community itself is diminishing as public spaces are no longer safe for community use, Resident’s Associations are disappearing, and urban program providers are now afraid to enter the favelas. Fear and distrust are limiting social interactions that have bound the communities together in the past and the *mutirão* (mutual aid) is vanishing.¹⁷⁸ Residents lead a life of constant stress and anxiety caused by not knowing when the next gunshots will ring out, if it will be safe to go to work that day, if their children will be safe at school, or if they will live until

¹⁷⁵ Perlman, *Favela*, 198.

¹⁷⁶ Penglase, “The Shutdown of Rio de Janeiro,” 5.

¹⁷⁷ Arias, “The Myth of Personal Security,” 60.

¹⁷⁸ Perlman, *Favela*, 187-194.

tomorrow. The days when *traficantes* respected the communities and followed their codes are fading; today dealers sell in the streets and openly carry weapons and in response the police no longer make a distinction between resident and *bandido*. The days when the government chose to ignore the existence of the drug traffic are gone; now the *traficantes* are heavily armed and far more confrontational so gunfights are the routine.¹⁷⁹ The mentality that “I’m only going to survive today” has become the norm for favela residents.¹⁸⁰

What is the root of all of the violence? What has caused the continuance of such high levels of violence for decades? The answer to that is simple – fear and the perpetuation of fear. *Moradores*, inhabitants of the *asfalto*, and the police are scared; everyone is afraid of something in the war zone that Rio’s favelas have become. Fear has led to increased oppression, which in turn creates alienation and this only leads to the amplification of fear, and the cycle continues.¹⁸¹ The *asfalto* dreads the idea that the violence of the favelas will spill over into the streets of the city and seeks to protect themselves by supporting ever escalating displays of police brutality. Favela residents are then criminalized and classified as the “other” which serves to dehumanize and justify police violence as well as deepens the lack of understanding. Inherent to human nature is the fear of what is not understood and as Rio moves

¹⁷⁹ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 51-52.

¹⁸⁰ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 44.

¹⁸¹ Neate, *Culture Is Our Weapon*, 148.

further and further away from understanding the favelas and the forces that have contributed to their current state of existence, the fear of the favelas will only continue to manifest itself in displays of brutal violence.

“Criminal violence – in particular that connected to drug trafficking...- is not intrinsic to the favelas; it is a part of the social dynamic of the city and its political and police structures.”¹⁸² Marginality has allowed fear and terror to take control. While the communities have been ignored by the state and now are living in the shadow of *o tráfico*, they have not yet surrendered or given in to despair. Instead they are still aspiring to improve and do better by themselves in the face of overwhelming odds.¹⁸³ Favelas are not merely slums, they are not the forgotten and desolate wastelands inhabited by surplus humanity. The favelas are communities; vibrant neighborhoods that are full of life and have survived due to their amazing ability to work together to build themselves out what little they have. The creativity, resourcefulness, and traditions of the residents is what makes them more than people perceive and what makes them communities.

¹⁸² Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 20.

¹⁸³ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 17.

A PACIFICAÇÃO (PACIFICATION)

Origins

As Brazil, and specifically Rio de Janeiro, approaches the major world sporting events - the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016 – which signal to the world Brazil's arrival as an economic, political, and cultural power, a new public security policy has been implemented. The Favela Pacification Program was developed in 2008 by the governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro, Sérgio Cabral (a member of the *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*), and his Secretary of Security, José Mariano Beltrame. It is intended to be a method for reducing homicide rates and improving human rights in response to the inevitable international scrutiny and as a way to make the city safer for tourists and residents. In late 2008 UPPs (*Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* - Police Pacification Units) began to appear; these Military Police units “were created to occupy select favelas and expel drug gangs. For the authorities, the goals were to retake territory lost to drug-trafficking gangs and impose peace in targeted communities.”¹⁸⁴

Pacification is defined as “the act of forcibly suppressing or eliminating a population considered to be hostile.”¹⁸⁵ The first phase in the process of Pacification

¹⁸⁴ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 130.

¹⁸⁵ "Pacification," *Merriam-Webster's Dictionary*, (Springfield: Merriam-Webster, 2004), 529.

begins with the “Shock of Peace”¹⁸⁶ operation; the feared armored vehicle, the *caveirão* (big skull), elite police units known as the BOPE (*Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais* - Special Operations Police Battalion), and other military forces enter the favela early in the morning to secure the area, drive out the drug dealers, and make the necessary arrests to remove any criminal presence from the community. When the favela has been secured the UPPs can move in and establish bases within the favela itself, the second phase of the process.¹⁸⁷ These units are made up of specially trained Military Police officers who remain in the favelas themselves as a presence to discourage the return of the drug-traffickers. As a gesture by the state to the residents of these pacified favelas, basic services that the state has long neglected to provide such as trash collection, sanitation, and electrical and water services are offered.

Since the beginning of the Favela Pacification Program in late 2008 19 favelas have been pacified beginning with the *Zona Sul* favela of Dona Marta in Botafogo and most recently with the initiation of the pacification of Rocinha, the largest favela in Rio, on November 13, 2011.¹⁸⁸ The goal is to establish twenty-three pacified communities by the time the World Cup begins in 2014, which Governor Cabral has

¹⁸⁶ Bradley Brooks, "3,000 Police Seize Rio's Biggest Slum," *The Guardian*, November 13, 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9945316>.

¹⁸⁷ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 130.

¹⁸⁸ Laura Bonilla, "AFP: Rio to Pacify More Favelas Ahead of World Cup," *Google*, November 14, 2011. <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jQwoD8zVKnhJUQ1qbql55eQGm9vQ?docId=CNG.5068009c85774a90d8eb88798c03ae78.01>.

stated is not only possible, but also achievable.¹⁸⁹ Pacification is an innovative method for dealing with favelas as it combines past public security policies of confrontation with theories of community policing, “in which police become a permanent presence in a community and work closely with residents to build trust and reduce crime,”¹⁹⁰ and integrates social and cultural projects as well. It has been declared to be “one more step towards establishing democracy in the favelas by liberating them from the power of the *bandidos*,”¹⁹¹ a way to break the historical control that drug-traffickers have over the city as well as a way to bring dignity and incorporation to their residents. The Favela Pacification Program represents an unmistakable opportunity in which to affect a transformation of the societal marginalization surrounding favela residents. However, the potential to generate a positive impact through the process of Pacification, which could occur during the second phase, is reduced by the brutality of the initial phase.

Rationale and Policies

“The police may enter favelas and fight gun battles, but they do not stay to win the war.”¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ Bonilla, "AFP: Rio to Pacify More Favelas Ahead of World Cup."

¹⁹⁰ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 123.

¹⁹¹ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 131.

¹⁹² Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 19.

The UPPs (*Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* - Police Pacification Units) were formally introduced in early 2009 by Governor Sérgio Cabral and his Secretary of Security José Mariano Beltrame. The UPPs represent the newest attempt by the state to meet the demand to repossess territory that the drug traffic had taken from the state; in this policy the UPPs would occupy favelas with the purpose of expelling the drug traffickers and “reconquering” the areas.¹⁹³ Prior to this there was a standing state policy of armed invasion to repress the drug traffic. Police were, and still are, authorized to enter the favelas, arrest and seize any weapons or drugs found, in the name of suppression and maintenance of order while containing the conflict within favela boundaries so that wealthier neighborhoods are not disrupted.¹⁹⁴

Governor Cabral has supported a strong public security policy of violent confrontation since 2007 in regards to crime in the favelas and has characterized the conflict facing Rio de Janeiro as a war. This policy is well supported by the elites of Rio who fear that the violence and criminality of the favelas will spill over and enter their own posh neighborhoods. They have encouraged the policy of confrontation by increasingly calling for protection from the state; this has ultimately translated into violent repression at the hands of the police.¹⁹⁵ Many residents of favelas see this

¹⁹³ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 27.

¹⁹⁴ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 26.

¹⁹⁵ Enrique Desmond Arias, "Faith in Our Neighbors: Networks and Social Order in Three Brazilian Favelas." *Latin American Politics and Society* 46.1 (2004): 4.

policy as a policy of extermination, especially when statements like the following are made: “The womb of a favela woman is a factory for making drug traffickers.”¹⁹⁶ Security Secretary Beltrame also made a statement, at a public security forum in 2008, asserting that, “infants in favelas emerge from the womb already criminals due to the environment around them, in which *bandidos* brandish automatic weapons as routinely as other people handle cell phones.”¹⁹⁷ The favelas have been blamed for the rise in violence and their residents are universally seen as violent criminals who are all involved with the drug traffic by the state administration. Beltrame is quoted as saying that it is the drug traffickers who have caused the war over territory conflicts and “these were the people [traffickers] who introduced the automatic rifle here, introduced the 762 assault weapon, and now are introducing a group of explosives and 30 caliber machine guns and tracer bullets that are used in war.”¹⁹⁸ Only recently, through the influence of the federal government, have police forces been prohibited from using AR-15 assault rifles and FAL assault weapons, which are weapons of war. Instead they now have been authorized to only carry carbines that increase gunfire control and 40 caliber pistols that have bullets that stop on impact thus reducing innocent deaths.¹⁹⁹ However, police protest that the traffic maintains better weapons

¹⁹⁶ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 103.

¹⁹⁷ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 26.

¹⁹⁸ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 117.

¹⁹⁹ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 154-155.

then they do, consequently increasing their personal risk every time they enter the favelas. This is the justification for increasing the police arsenal, for using the *caveirão*, for monitoring the favelas from armed helicopters, and for taking increasingly violent measures against the favelas.

Historically the state has used public security policy simply to deal with short-term crises that have emerged and have dealt with them through extrajudicial violence to appease the middle and upper-class voters.²⁰⁰ The lives of countless “morally defective” favela residents are taken in an attempt to demonstrate that security policy is functioning; they are faceless individuals whose deaths are never recognized, but somehow reassure the elite that they are protected. The Military Police have been praised as “the best available social insecticide.”²⁰¹ Society and the state have legitimized the brutality of the police and have never truly addressed the factors behind the development of favelas – poverty and inequality - which, out of all the options attempted, has the greatest potential to resolve the “problem” of favela existence. Instead police violence is seen as the cure to the favelas, thus the militarization of the police forces and police actions continues and now is justified and supported by the acceptance of the rising death tolls by the elites who cry out for increased protection. Violence is increasingly normalized by these classes, who, if the deaths of unarmed moradores are even reported, react with indifference or with a

²⁰⁰ Perlman, *Favela*, 182.

²⁰¹ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 125.

mentality of “one less to worry about.”²⁰² This has resulted in a state where police officers are held accountable to no-one, certainly not to civilians; where little to nothing is done to meet the ever increasing security needs of the favelas and where they are honored with promotions and salaries when “acts of bravery” are committed²⁰³, usually in the form of violence against “non-citizens.”

Of all *cariocas*, the residents of the favelas are faced with daily violence and brutality at the hands of the drug traffic and the police as well as discrimination from the rest of the city, yet they receive the least from public security policy. The brutality of police actions directed towards the favelas, authorized by state policy, is astounding. Police apply arbitrary violence to the favelas; failing to distinguish between honest workers and those involved in the traffic, they see only *bandidos*. In 2003 the national rate of deaths by a firearm were 19.4 per 100,000 versus 43 per 100,000 in Rio. However when looking at the wealthy *Zona Sul* neighborhood of Leblon compared to the working class neighborhood of Benifica the murder rates for men 12 to 34 were 12.7 per 100,000 to 214 per 100,000.²⁰⁴ In 1997 an inquiry by the *Assembléia Legislativa* (Legislative Assembly) found that 64 percent of civilians

²⁰² Zdun, "Difficulties Measuring and Controlling Homicide in Rio de Janeiro," 196.

²⁰³ Jorge Da Silva, "The Favelados in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil," *Policing and Society* 10.1 (2000): 127-128.

²⁰⁴ Penglase, "The Shutdown of Rio de Janeiro," 4.

killed were shot in the head or from behind.²⁰⁵ Those who are killed while “resisting arrest” are most commonly shot in disadvantaged areas and these numbers have only been increasing. Interestingly, while these numbers have continued to grow, the numbers of police killed have decreased. In 2007 the ratio between murdered cops and civilians murdered by the police was 1 to 28.²⁰⁶ Bodies from recent conflict in Complexo do Alemão were disinterred and it was discovered that the majority had been shot at the back of the head and at a downward angle and the entrance wounds were marked by gun-powered scorching, indicating being shot at point blank range – all signs that these were victims who were shot execution style on their knees, not as “death in combat” victims as police reports indicated.²⁰⁷

For the most part, the majority of *cariocas* remain unaware of the immense levels of violence in their marvelous city since crime is not only poorly recorded, but crime involving the favelas and the deaths of favela residents are rarely reported in the media. Only occasionally are police actions reported and if they are the reports usually surround the sensationalized capture of suspected traffickers. In 2008 three year old João Roberto Soares was fatally shot by police when they mistook the car his mother was driving as stolen; the media played out this tragedy for days whereas when a father in the *Zona Norte* favela of Acari received no media coverage when he tried to

²⁰⁵ Da Silva, "The Favelados in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil," 129.

²⁰⁶ Zdun, "Difficulties Measuring and Controlling Homicide in Rio de Janeiro," 193.

²⁰⁷ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 198 – 199.

protest the murder of his two-year old son which was recorded as an “act of resistance.”²⁰⁸

There is a war between the police and the drug traffickers; a war that is playing out throughout the city of Rio de Janeiro. Some claim, “Many interventions in the favelas are explicitly designed to kill gang members without any intention of arresting them.”²⁰⁹ They have a license to kill so to speak; as long as the killing in the streets only affect favela residents then the extrajudicial violence displayed goes undisputed.

Police Policy

The police force in Rio de Janeiro is a major contributing component in the success of the Pacification program. The police serve as the representatives of government policy and their actions serve to reflect upon state authority as a whole. The 1988 Constitution, implemented after the end of the military regime, explicitly states in article 144 that public security is the duty of the state, and while it is the responsibility of all, a hierarchy of police forces will execute it.²¹⁰

The police force in Rio de Janeiro, and in Brazil, has a complex history that has culminated in their existence and reputation today. To begin the complexity, the police in Rio de Janeiro are fractured and fall under a number of different categories.

²⁰⁸ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 186 – 187.

²⁰⁹ Zdun, "Difficulties Measuring and Controlling Homicide in Rio de Janeiro," 192.

²¹⁰ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 117.

The Federal Police are at the head of the hierarchy of forces and then responsibilities are divided between the Military and Civil Police. The Military Police (MP) are the uniformed officers patrolling the streets and arresting criminals while the Civil Police (CP) are those who investigate the crimes.²¹¹ Together they are a part of the Public Security forces (*Segurança Pública*) who report to the governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro.²¹² Both forces are disliked and both are highly underfunded and lack much needed resources. For both the mission is the same; to maintain order, but little consideration is given to the enforcement of laws or the needs or rights of the communities that they are supposed to serve.²¹³

The BOPE (*Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais*) are the famous elite squadron of the Military Police. The Civil Police have their own special group, CORE (*Coordenadoria de Recursos Especiais*), however it plays far less of a public role than the BOPE does. Internationally sensationalized in the film *Tropa de Elite*, the BOPE are a small group of carefully selected police who are then vigorously trained and maintain the reputation of being the best trained, least corrupt, and most lethal force in Rio. Residents often refer to the BOPE, who wear all black and bear an emblem of a skull that has been pierced by a knife in front of crossed pistols, as *matadores* (killers). The BOPE often take control from MP to accomplish a mission or drug bust since

²¹¹ Arias, "Faith in Our Neighbors," 3.

²¹² Perlman, *Favela*, 167.

²¹³ Da Silva, "The Favelados in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil," 126.

their reputation for their lack of corruption is often crucial for success, but favela residents see their arrival as a sure sign that there will be deaths. While the MP bring their fair share of extrajudicial violence, in the end they come to a favela to arrest, take drugs, and while some shooting will often occur, the BOPE simply come to kill.²¹⁴

The military regime that lasted from 1964 until 1985 had a significant effect on forming the current mentality of the police forces of Rio. During the regime it was police responsibility to take care of anyone who was marked as an internal enemy due to their opposition to the state or the military; this was the focus of security policy.²¹⁵ The MP were incorporated into the armed forces in 1969 and their sole duties became to suppress opposition to the regime, not to protect or serve the people. National security intelligence, counter guerilla activities, and riot control were among the focal points in police training which was based on a model provided by the army.²¹⁶ After the end of the regime and the return to democracy police reform was overlooked. It was not a focal point to emphasize the rule of law or the protection of civilian rights; rather, officers were urged to see the drug traffic as the new version of the “internal enemy.” In a society that already actively made distinctions between citizens and marginals, defining favela residents - those on the periphery - as the “enemy” was

²¹⁴ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 61-62.

²¹⁵ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 114.

²¹⁶ Da Silva, “The Favelados in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,” 126.

simple.²¹⁷ The MP possesses the values, mentality, training, and leadership that would be a better fit with an army than with a police force that should maintain the goal to protect civilian populations. While officers are trained to search for, arrest or destroy enemies, and remove their weapons, the strict hierarchy of command coupled with internal tensions, corruption, and the lack of resources most often results instead in increased corruption and the widespread use of violence. Strict hierarchy supposedly keeps the lower ranks of officers more effectively controlled. However in reality the high ranking, better paid, and university educated officers have little control over their subordinates who often resent them. These lower-ranking officers are poorly educated, poorly trained, poorly armed, poorly paid, and forced to enter into the most dangerous situations on a regular basis. Police training only takes a brief 6 months and, due to the expense of ammunition, trainees are only allowed to practice shooting techniques with a mere half dozen rounds²¹⁸; it is with this inadequate training that they are sent out to do their real learning on the streets. They are governed by a police code that dictates more serious punishment for a uniform violation or failing to salute a superior officer than for committing human rights violations. There is little structure in place to hold any police officer accountable for his, or her, actions.²¹⁹ As members of the police force they are prohibited from taking on off-duty work. However, the extremely low

²¹⁷ Da Silva, "The Favelados in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil," 126.

²¹⁸ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 157.

²¹⁹ Da Silva, "The Favelados in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil," 127.

pay that they receive with pushes many into taking alternate jobs or becoming involved with militias or with the drug traffic itself.²²⁰ The astoundingly low wages that are paid to police officers, only US\$440 – 500 a month (approximately US\$5,250 – 6,000 a year), are not enough to support them nor their families.²²¹

Corruption and the police force of Rio de Janeiro fit hand in hand with one another. The Military Police are the uniformed police on the streets, supposedly discouraging and confronting crime when necessary and thus more often referred to when “the police” are mentioned. Nonetheless the Civil Police, who are the crime solvers, lack just as many resources and are just as plagued by corruption.²²² Civil Police chief Hélio Luz approximates that in Rio 80 percent of police officers are accomplices of crime.²²³ Bribery and impunity are traditionally ingrained into the Brazilian judicial system, but in recent years police corruption has plummeted to new lows. It comes as no surprise that they then turn to whatever means are available to earn enough to live. Working frequently in the favelas and with members of the drug traffic it is easy enough to start engaging in criminal behavior for cash. Police administration does little to curb the corruption and, as shown in the film *Tropa de Elite* (Elite Squad), much of the higher level of the police force is involved in

²²⁰Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 119-121.

²²¹ Perlman, *Favela*, 181.

²²² Arias, “Faith in Our Neighbors,” 3.

²²³ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 153.

corruption schemes. In this environment, it becomes customary break into homes, steal, sell weapons to the traffic, and extort traffickers for the right to sell in certain territories.²²⁴ Oftentimes when a crooked cop arrests a *bandido* his guns and drugs will be taken, but then resold to him along with his freedom.²²⁵ In other situations cops have been reported to kidnap traffickers and hold them for ransom; a young man, who used to be involved with the traffic, was kidnapped multiple times and only held for the equivalent of a few hundred dollars.²²⁶ From this point moving murdered victims bodies into different police jurisdictions seems to be nothing.²²⁷ Once a cop has entered this world, it is the next logical step to simply stop enforcing the law when one desires, to inform trafficker contacts on police activities, and conduct operations in locations where they will not disrupt their contact's drug business, all in exchange for bribes.²²⁸ The police who were involved with the Vigário Geral massacre in 1993 were in this exact type of scheme; in return for allowing the local traffic's operations to continue they were regularly paid bribes.²²⁹ This all is made possible by the strong culture of impunity surrounding the police forces. When officers know their actions

²²⁴ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 121.

²²⁵ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 154.

²²⁶ Personal Interview, S.M, June 2011.

²²⁷ *Tropa De Elite*. Dir. José Padilha. Perf. Wagner Moura, André Romiro, Caio Junqueira. 2007.

²²⁸ Arias, "Faith in Our Neighbors," 3.

²²⁹ Arias, "Faith in Our Neighbors," 13.

will go unpunished since their words as a cop will always count more than of a favela resident, honest worker or drug trafficker and their superior officers will not want any investigations because it risks revealing their own schemes, then the corruption will continue. In 1998, Brazil's highest court (the *Supremo Tribunal de Justiça*) acquitted eleven of the cops accused in the Vigário Geral massacre and two more, who were previously convicted, were released.²³⁰ In fact, the government often turns to those police known to have criminal connections when they are desperate to solve a case; they know an average officer will be unable to solve the crime and in the end solving a case and maintaining the government's image is more important than combatting crime.²³¹ In 1997 Human Rights Watch published a survey that found that "76 percent of Rio's population thought police were involved in death squads, 65 percent thought they used torture to get confessions, and only 12 percent of those who had been robbed or assaulted said they had bothered reporting it to police."²³² This holds true throughout the social classes; middle class residents who are not faced with the violence of the favelas and are not treated as marginals state that, "the last person I would call when I had a problem would be a police officer."²³³ Everyone in Rio, from the favelas to the wealthy neighborhoods in Barra, knows that the police can easily be

²³⁰ Arias, "Faith in Our Neighbors," 18.

²³¹ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 158.

²³² Perlman, *Favela*, 182.

²³³ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 121.

paid off and thus there is little respect for police officers.²³⁴ There exists little to no faith in the police in Rio.

Faced with the obvious facts of police corruption and violence and lacking the confidence of the majority of the public it is easy to see the police as a faceless wall of exploitation and brutal depravity. However, it would be remiss to categorize them as such, just as it is thoughtless to declare all favela residents to be drug traffickers. The police are men and women who are trying to survive in the war-zone of Rio de Janeiro just as favela residents are. Much of the police force is from the favelas themselves; to become a police officer one must be desperate for a job as many favela residents are. In this case, not only does a new police recruit from the favelas enter into one of the most dangerous professions in the city, but they are now in danger in their homes. If anyone from their community were to discover their profession they would become a murder target. Those that are from favelas have grown up in an environment surrounded by violence and are not trained enough to differentiate themselves from their past or the culture of violence.²³⁵ The public security police of confrontation sends police officers who, for the most part are poorly trained and have inadequate weaponry compared to the traffickers, into life or death situations on a regular basis.²³⁶ They are faced with massive deficits in both their training, physically and

²³⁴ Personal Interview, A.R, June 2011.

²³⁵ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 157.

²³⁶ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 122.

psychologically, and their equipment whereas *o tráfico* maintains superior weapons. When entering potentially violent situations they are instructed to not use excessive violence, but excessive is never defined.²³⁷ The “shoot or be shot” policy does not just apply to the traffickers, but also to the cops who have taken on the “shoot first, ask later” mentality as their only sure method for survival. Every year since 2000 over 100 police officers in Rio have died violently, the suicide rate is 4 times higher than that of the rest of the city’s population, and there is little psychological help made available.²³⁸ It is a high stress environment for an individual in and one that causes a great deal of fear. It is terrifying to face hostility in unknown territory where one is out-armed, often out numbered, and can trust no one because the community itself fears them.²³⁹ Every day brings a situation that causes officers to fear for their lives and to remain in a constant state of anxiety and alertness. While this fear does not justify the violence that has been committed at the hand of the police it is important to recognize that the police themselves are an ill-treated portion of the population and that in the end they are also humans trying to survive.

²³⁷ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 120.

²³⁸ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 122.

²³⁹ *Tropa De Elite*, Dir. José Padilha.

The Development of the Favela Pacification Program

When the Favela Pacification Program was officially introduced in early 2009 the aims of the program were that 9 favelas would be occupied by the end of the year and that by the end of the following year 300,000 favela residents would be living under UPP occupation forces.²⁴⁰

Sérgio Cabral, the Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro, has staunchly supported a public security policy that advocates the confrontation of crime and of the *bandidos*. However, he also has publically recognized the need for more than just violence combatting violence and it is this realization that can be seen in the Favela Pacification Program. In a 2008 interview with the authors of *Living in the Crossfire* he expressed how he sees the favelas as areas of land that are now in such a disordered condition because lenient state officials did not do their duty to provide the rules of civilization and the control that was needed hence now the favelas are now in disarray and have grown to “irresponsible” sizes.²⁴¹ He argues that these failings have allowed for the “culture of poverty” to develop there and for drugs and organized crime to expand. Cabral is keenly aware of the need to embark into a new era for the city; one that promotes responsible growth with adequate infrastructure for all of the city, thus allowing for favelas to become open to police access as well as to postal services,

²⁴⁰ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 27.

²⁴¹ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 203.

firefighters, trash collection, and to truly begin to join the rest of the city. However for this to happen it is crucial to re-take and occupy the favelas.

Cabral is insistent that the traffic is not laying low and will fight to maintain their position, which is why it is necessary to enter the communities with displays of force. He still insists that advanced weaponry is acceptable for use in these operations, that the use of the *caveirão* (big skull) and armored helicopters are acceptable, and the “firm, decisive action” of confrontation will weaken the drug traffic. Only then will be possible to begin the logistical transformation of the favelas; to bring improvements to streets, public spaces, libraries, schools, health clinics, and methods of transportation as well as to begin workshop-training programs that hopefully will result in more favela workers being hired into the formal workforce. He also advocates improvements in police training as well as offering them courses through the PRONASCI program (federally funded state improvement programs) and an increase in salary. Cabral, and his Security Secretary Beltrame, insists that in the future “police operations in the favelas will be organized and planned. All police who enter favelas separate from these operations will be punished.”²⁴² Rapid care clinics have already been installed in seven favelas and there are talks of new training for teachers as well as salary increases that will hopefully multiply the numbers of teachers working the favelas. Cabral does recognize the necessity of a multi-dimensional approach to combatting what he refers to as “this evil...this disease” that plagues the “most

²⁴² Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 211.

humble members of our society.”²⁴³ He advocates a program that will address police violence, social problems, and infrastructural problems in order to target the vast array of issues facing favela residents’ integration into society. Governor Cabral recognizes the need to revive a new Rio; a city that fits into the twenty-first century, that will be the face of the World Cup and the Olympic Games, and that respects the dignity of its residents. However he does caution to not expect miracles and still maintains that violence is the only way to reach a position where peace and dignity can be achieved.

The GPAE program (Police Group in Special Areas) is a forerunner to the Favela Pacification Program and an example that Pacification should hope to emulate. Conducted in the favelas of Cantagalo and Pavão-Pavãozinho in the *Zona Sul* from 2000 until 2002 it was a police program that focused on the traditions of community policing, a policy supported by the Minister of Justice and the National Secretary for Public Security among other officials. It represented a complete shift in police mentality from the military ideal that still prevails heavily in the police forces towards the idea of community policing which, for most police officers, is considered to be social work that is beneath them. To spend time talking to people and attempting to solve disputes is considered women’s work while a real police officer is trained to kill as the most elite units are.²⁴⁴ Community policing advocates that the police act as a mediator between the community and the government, as a sort of mayor in regards to

²⁴³ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 209.

²⁴⁴ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 158.

community conflicts, and as an example for all. There is no toleration of illegal activities and weapons are not permitted in respect of the community's right to come and go freely and in an attempt to preserve lives.²⁴⁵ The assumption is that through the participation of the entire community problems will be resolved and that security policy does not mean having to maintain the presence of high-risk weaponry that puts the entire community at risk. The GPAE also provided computer courses as well as classes in English and Spanish for the youth in the community. The program's greatest strength lay in the idea that once an idea of citizenship and personal rights are constructed, the perspectives of a community can develop and change into an empowered consciousness. However the program was discredited after only a couple of years as it was perceived as threat, despite the fact that during its two years in operation no violent deaths occurred, since the traffic was allowed to continue; the institutional culture of confrontation prevailed.²⁴⁶ Additionally, a program like this not only required more police than confrontation does, but also a tremendous effort for those police to maintain a different outlook on favela residents; this will be one of the greatest hurdles for the police involved in Pacification.

The residents of the favelas must be convinced that the police have changed and that they will no longer respond in such a brutal and indiscriminate fashion. Otherwise no program will have any success. While residents see *bandidos* acting with

²⁴⁵ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 160.

²⁴⁶ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 160.

some degree of respect, greeting them on the street and acknowledging their existence as humans,²⁴⁷ they will not support a police force that ransacks homes without warrants, who threatens and tortures residents, who sprays their communities with stray bullets, and who cannot even connect on a basic level with the community residents. There must be a cleansing of police and a major adjustment in attitude on their part. *Moradores* have no choice but to live with the violence and when confronted with a choice between *o tráfico*, who know the community, and the police, who are aggressive and kill residents without any respect for life, they will chose the traffic – the least of all evils.²⁴⁸ Favela residents want the respect of the police and are aware of the high level of violence that faces officers when they enter into a territory controlled by the traffic. If police arms and equipment were used for the protection of police officers rather than the arbitrary killing of innocent residents, if police entered communities with less violence, and if they could leave behind the mentality of being on the offensive then great strides towards changing residents' attitudes towards them. Most importantly, if police could enter the favelas and return to the residents their right to move around the community safely and without fear then residents' support would shift.²⁴⁹ Not all residents are *bandidos* nor do all residents vilify the police. If police officers were to become a part of the community, provide services, and made an

²⁴⁷ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 72.

²⁴⁸ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 100.

²⁴⁹ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 100.

effort to develop relationships with residents then, with time, they will begin to win the confidence of residents and open means to move past their former reputation. If mutual respect is gained then the community can commence to develop a relationship with the police that could be one of support.²⁵⁰

This new generation of policing must be accompanied by the improvement in the lives of residents or the Favela Pacification Program will fail completely. The history of violent police behavior, of corruption, of poor security policy is an old debate, but one that must be adequately addressed by Pacification. It will lower rates of violence if police are professionally trained, are able to use intelligence reports responsibly, and are community oriented and close to the people who they are protecting. Rio de Janeiro has already committed to enrolling more police officers in the All Police in University program sponsored by PRONASCI in order to improve education and training, which now includes community policing techniques. The city has also promised new cars and uniforms, improved security cameras, more internal support for police officers, and the consideration of raises in salaries.²⁵¹ Even with improvements to the police force without education, possibilities for employment, and infrastructural improvements for favela residents, the idea of Pacification and the reduction of societal marginalization is impossible. There must be a multi-dimensional

²⁵⁰ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 110.

²⁵¹ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 137 – 141.

approach in place to begin to make what has the potential to be lasting change.

Nothing is short term.

Both Beltrame and Cabral are insistent that while community policing is the ideal program, police cannot be placed in such an inflamed and uncertain situation. In their eyes the favelas must be pacified before community policing can occur and social benefits be provided. *O tráfico* must be removed so that police can begin to work with communities without the fear of being exposed to violence, but the *bandidos* must also be neutralized for the community itself to feel safe and comfortable coming to the police for help without the threat of *o tráfico*.²⁵²

Current State

As 2012 begins the Favela Pacification Program has reached its three-year anniversary. UPPs appeared in late 2008 out of a need for public security in Rio de Janeiro to reduce crime and the threat of violence due to the two major international sporting events that the city will be hosting in a few short years. Consequently, the city is under international scrutiny to reduce homicides as well as crime levels and to do so in a manner that is not in violation of human rights. Pacification, a term traditionally linked to the control and extermination of groups, is now being applied as “a strategy to control an enemy with strong community support.”²⁵³ The instructions to the UPPs,

²⁵² Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 141.

²⁵³ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 130.

which are composed of Military Police officers, are to occupy selected favelas, to repossess the territories lost to the drug traffic, and to impose peace.

Within the language of the program there is the lingering ideology of militarization, of confrontation, of the ‘us versus them’ mentality that has plagued not only public security policy, but also all of the state’s interaction with the favelas since their inception. ‘Pacification,’ ‘control of an enemy,’ ‘repossession,’ and ‘impose’ are not attitudes that correspond with peace and the reincorporation of neighborhoods and to the respectful treatment of residents.

The process, which represents an attempt at a “clear and hold” technique, begins with intelligence collected on the favela and then proceeds with the entrance of the BOPE into the selected community. The arrival of the BOPE has been referred to as the “Shock of Peace;” a wave of specialized units that enter the community by force and purge it of any “criminal elements.”²⁵⁴ During the pacification of Rocinha, home to an estimated 80,000 to 150,000 residents, 3,000 armed forces moved into the community accompanied by military helicopters, tanks, and snipers.²⁵⁵ One resident of the *asfalto* defended the use of the BOPE because the situation in the favelas is so

²⁵⁴ Adam Isacson, “Rio de Janeiro’s Pacification Program,” Washington Office on Latin America, January 5, 2011, http://www.wola.org/rio_de_janeiro_s_pacification_program.

²⁵⁵ Simon Romero, “Rio Slum Is ‘Pacified’ in Advance of Games,” *The New York Times*, November 13, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/world/americas/authorities-take-control-of-rios-largest-slum.html>.

out of control that no regular police force could have fought it.²⁵⁶ Once this initial phase has been accomplished the UPPs enter to replace the BOPE, who have once again fulfilled their roles as *matadores* (killers), and remain within the communities acting as the link between the community and the government. Their presence also serves to initiate the delivery of basic services to the communities; as part of Pacification the state has promised residents that infrastructural services and social assistance will be provided. Large UPP stations are constructed to overlook the communities and technological centers are to be constructed for community use as well. The Pacification Program dictates that those police selected to be a part of UPP operations are to be new recruits. The UPP commander, Colonel Jose Carvalho, stated, “We need fresh, strong minds, not a Rambo...The older generation of cops is more oriented to kicking down doors and shooting people.”²⁵⁷ Officers in the UPPs receive extra training in human rights, community outreach, and specifics on their assigned communities. Additionally there are supposed to be frequent undercover operations to make sure officers are not abusing the communities.

Within the first year four communities - Cidade de Deus, Jardim do Batan, Dona Marta (often referred to as Santa Marta), and Chapeu Mangueira/Babylonia – were pacified and all of these communities continue to maintain a UPP presence, a

²⁵⁶ Personal Interview, J.M., June 2011.

²⁵⁷ Isacson, “Rio de Janeiro’s Pacification Program.”

force with 500 officers at the present time.²⁵⁸ Secretary Beltrame stated, “having a policeman with a rifle at the entrance to a favela will not make things safe if things are not working inside the community. It’s time for social investments.”²⁵⁹ Yet the state, while viewing the security aspect of the program as a success, appears to be struggling to provide services to the communities after decades of neglect. Some improvements have been made in the communities; roads have been repaved, community centers, vocational training sites, and recreational facilities like soccer fields have been constructed, cable cars and trams have been built to improve accessibility, electricity is being provided, and UPP officers make frequent daily rounds to discourage criminal activity. Not all the communities are receiving equal benefits and many residents, and the reforming Resident Associations (local leadership groups), are concerned if the money for their communities is being spent in a responsible way. Another crucial aspect of Pacification is that favela residents are expected to observe their civic responsibilities of paying for services and taxes now that the state is becoming involved in the communities.²⁶⁰ However this presents a problem for many favela residents who are accustomed to illegally receiving services such as electricity through

²⁵⁸ Isacson, “Rio de Janeiro’s Pacification Program.”

²⁵⁹ Beth McLoughlin, "Will Crime Crackdown Transform Rio's Shantytowns?" *BBC News - Latin America & Caribbean*, August 20, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-14442518>.

²⁶⁰ *Counter-Insurgency Doctrine Comes to Rio's Favelas*. Confidential Cable Report from Rio de Janeiro Consulate to US Secretary of State. Rio De Janeiro: Consulate, 2009.

free or low cost methods and who are often unable to pay for the services at the formal rate or to pay taxes.

To date there are approximately nineteen pacified favelas in Rio de Janeiro; nineteen communities that are supposedly closer to democracy and liberated from the influence of the traffic. The original four have been joined by numerous others that appear to have been selected due to their proximity to major tourist areas throughout the city, such as Mangueira which is close to Maracana stadium where the World Cup final will be played²⁶¹, as well as for their notoriety. Later in 2010 the sprawling Complexo do Alemão, located near the highway linking the international airport to the city, was pacified. Very recently, in November of 2011, the famed Rocinha was subjected to Pacification, thus completing the pacification of the favelas surrounding the Olympic areas. The hope is that by 2014 at least twenty-three favelas will be pacified.²⁶² The process is inherently expensive and requires an immense increase in manpower in order to function therefore only the favelas that are dominated by the traffic and have extreme levels of violence will be targeted. The program represents the potential for a significant economic boost for the city if favela residents are charged for electricity, water, and other infrastructural services and if they begin to

²⁶¹ "Brazil Police Occupy Rio Favela in World Cup Operation," *BBC News - Latin America & Caribbean*, June 19, 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13833037>.

²⁶² McLoughlin, "Will Crime Crackdown Transform Rio's Shantytowns?"

pay taxes, which would help to offset the costs incurred.²⁶³ Since the inception of the program the progression of action, especially the “Shock of Peace,” has become increasingly hazardous to favela residents, whose injuries and deaths are often downplayed in media reports that attempt to maintain support for the program.²⁶⁴ In the Pacification of Dona Marta one resident I interviewed stated that while only 15 to 20 injuries and deaths were officially reported to have occurred, upwards of 50 residents were killed. She also mentioned that it was common for the incoming police forces to remove money and guns that they found in the *bocas* (drug sales points) in body bags to hide the fact that they were stealing them.²⁶⁵ Homicide rates have decreased in pacified communities, after the initial wave of BOPE violence, which in Alemão official reports maintain that thirty residents were killed from, but reports from residents of these communities are not entirely positive. In addition to the continued irregularity of the provision of basic services, favela residents report abuse and mistreatment at the hands of UPP officers to whom respecting the rights of residents and to upholding the ideals of community policing does not yet seem to be a priority.²⁶⁶ Residents still fall silent when groups of UPP officers pass by on their

²⁶³ *Counter-Insurgency Doctrine Comes to Rio's Favelas*. Confidential Cable Report from Rio de Janeiro Consulate to US Secretary of State. Rio De Janeiro: Consulate, 2009.

²⁶⁴ Personal Interview, D.M, June 2011.

²⁶⁵ Personal Interview, D.M, June 2011.

²⁶⁶ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 130.

rounds of the communities and are skeptical if any aspect of Pacification will last or, if like previous attempts to aid the favelas, it will all disappear in a few years. However, Congress is in the process of passing a law that will mandate UPPs to remain in the communities for a minimum of 25 years and police officers are reportedly pledging their dedication to the process.²⁶⁷

Media reports tend to focus on the pacification of the *Zona Sul* favelas and have been overwhelmingly positive in their reports. The reports stress the presence of children in the streets, residents coming and going with ease, and the apartments that face the pacified communities being able to remove bulletproof coverings. The media stresses the work of the UPPs to free residents from the drug gangs and to provide economic revival, to return dignity and territory.²⁶⁸ “Little to no” resistance is reported when the police enter communities; however, *cariocas* are quick to mention that this is what the newspapers say and that they have heard of numerous deaths occurring that escape reports.²⁶⁹ Less forthcoming is the mention that the drug traffic has not been completely removed from some communities, like Alemão, or lack of sustainable projects that are being brought to the communities or that the new cable cars that have improved access in Alemão have been built at the expense of destroying

²⁶⁷ McLoughlin, "Will Crime Crackdown Transform Rio's Shantytowns?"

²⁶⁸ Brooks, "3,000 Police Seize Rio's Biggest Slum."

²⁶⁹ Personal Interview. June 2011.

residents homes.²⁷⁰ Residents reports of abuse and mistreatment often appear as a minor, one sentence afterthought at the end of an article as if they are nothing of concern. It is clear that not everything with Pacification can be seen through the rose-tinted lenses of the media, but progress is being made.

The Favela Pacification Program is a unique approach to the favelas; it promotes a more traditional police approach with the use of violence to remove *o tráfico*; however, it also supports police forces remaining in the communities along with the provision of services previously withheld from the favelas. Yet residents remain relatively unsure of what to expect from Pacification. A resident of Rocinha stated, “Lord knows if there will be war or peace, or even if things will get better if police take this slum. We’ve heard that they’ve been abusive to slum residents in other places they’ve taken.”²⁷¹ It will take residents recognizing the legitimacy of the program and that its benefits outweigh the considerable costs of the violence, taxes, and abuses in order for it to prove sustainable in the long-term, but if favela residents decide to turn against the program it will be hard to maintain any success. Some see it as a chance to prove to the world that residents are not criminals, but rather hard working civilians while others remain wary about the police presence doubting if history can be changed so quickly. Nonetheless there is the pervasive presence of hope throughout the communities; hope that this will be a new chapter in the history of the

²⁷⁰ McLoughlin, "Will Crime Crackdown Transform Rio's Shantytowns?"

²⁷¹ Brooks, "3,000 Police Seize Rio's Biggest Slum."

favelas, hope that history will in fact change its course, hope that the state will continue to follow through on its promises, hope that the favelas and their residents will not continue to be marginalized.

Case Study – Cantagalo

I conducted participant observation in the favela of Cantagalo. I spent a week visiting this favela. The observations and data accumulated in the study of one favela cannot be assumed to apply to the formulation of generalizations about all favelas in Rio de Janeiro. The simple fact is that within one city the hundreds of favelas are far too diverse; location, population size, demographics, and age of the communities are all factors that contribute to the range that can be found within the favelas of Rio. However, research conducted in one community can be used to develop a base of knowledge about many favelas within the city; it can be used to relate to other favelas of similar demographics; and it can be used to study and model the effects of state programs on the communities – such as Pacification.

Cantagalo is a favela located in the affluent *Zona Sul* (South Zone). Situated between the neighborhoods of Copacabana and Ipanema it looks out over some of the wealthiest and best-known areas in the city. It was one of the earliest recipients of the Favela Pacification Program and also benefits from having a number of NGOs working with the community. The well-known NGO, AfroReggae, maintains a large presence in the community. Cantagalo benefited from the work of these NGOs even before Pacification arrived. The community is marked by the presence of a large and

newly constructed elevator that whisks residents from the streets below up several stories onto an observation deck with access into the community.

Walking off the elevator residents pass through a building that was originally built as a casino and now is occupied by the NGOs that operate within the community. Artwork lines the walls and children, who are no longer trapped inside by the threat of gunfire, run by laughing with one another. Leaving the building and entering into the community one finds oneself walking up the main road. Filled with residents, store fronts, and small commercial stands it is not so far removed from the streets below. A newly constructed UPP station looms over the street casting a watchful shadow over the community. Leaving the main road and entering deeper into the community takes one into a series of winding alleyways and staircases. Unlike many of the other favelas, the majority of the pathways have been smoothly paved over and railings appear on some staircases. However, next to the alleyways one can still see a great deal of trash and small streams of sewage as trash collection and improved sewage lines have yet to be fully implemented within the community. Exposed electrical lines that clump in precarious bunches and tangle together emerge from homes, that seem to cling to the hillside, further evidence that the promise improvements have not all arrived yet. One change that has reached the community and is making its presence known are the UPP; within the span of five minutes three groups of UPP officers, with five or more men and women, pass by. Seemingly in no hurry they stroll throughout the community monitoring some unseen threat. A number of residents can be seen sitting outside of their homes and on front steps and while they fall silent as the UPP

pass by and neither party exchanges greetings, I was told that it was progress that residents were not trapped inside out of fear of gunfire between the police and *o tráfico* (the drug traffic). In response to my own presence I received a number of friendly greetings and a few offers to sell me *funke* (a form of Brazilian hiphop) cds along with a number of guarded glances. It is a testament to Pacification that I, an outsider and a foreigner, can walk around the community at all. I never once felt any hostility or that I was at risk, whereas in more recently pacified and non-pacified communities a sense of quiet tension was definitely present. Recent conflict meant that UPP officers in these communities were heavily armed and on alert, which made my local guide hesitant to allow me out of the van we rode in. In the non-pacified communities armed, masked traffickers were on alert as a recent police confrontation had occurred and my guide of this particular community cautioned me to not leave his side.

Residents seem to still be uncertain about what to make of Pacification or of the UPPs who monitor their community, but were surprisingly open and willing to discuss the situation with a stranger, although I am sure the presence of my outgoing local guides helped a great deal. Again and again I had heard in my interviews that the police were not to be trusted, that at heart they were all killers and had no respect for the communities, and on numerous occasions concerned residents warned me to not trust a police officer. Nonetheless here in Cantagalo there was a surprising consensus;

*“agora vai ser melhor - now it is going to be better.”*²⁷² Residents recognize that the promised reforms have been slow to materialize, but at least they are coming whereas before residents would have never expected that the government would be providing for the community. Many also never expected to see peace within their communities and are grateful that there is a sense of safety. One mother told me how she “never imagined that [she] could be safe here” and how grateful she was that the drugs are being removed and that her sons would be exposed to other more positive influences. Her hope is that her sons will grow up not knowing the violence of the past and therefore the next generation will not accept a return to the way things once were.²⁷³ Residents were also quick to point out that police abuse has not ended and that UPP officers are still using excessive force and are often disrespectful and violent towards residents. Here in Cantagalo the UPP officers are only lightly armed whereas in more recently pacified communities like the Complexo do Alemão tense officers are armed and in full combat gear. The captain stationed in Cantagalo is, by all reports, very good with community relations and the gunfire that once played a part in daily life has ceased, now all that is left of that legacy are the occasional pockmarks on walls; scars of a violent past. Life is improving for residents who mention that they are being treated more cordially and that their children can play outside for the first time in their lives. Also, outsiders seem to be less frightened by the favelas that have been pacified.

²⁷² Personal Interview, A.R, June 2011.

²⁷³ Personal Interview, C.H, June 2011.

One resident of Rio even mentioned that he would consider going to a *funke* dance party now and felt ok to be walking close by to the favelas at night.²⁷⁴ Another young man, who had recently moved to Rio, is even considering moving to a pacified favela in the hope that he could save money on rent; a move that would have been completely unheard of even a year ago.²⁷⁵ However, these improvements do not come without a cost; residents frequently mentioned the rising cost of living within Cantagalo because of Pacification and the services that are now being offered; a price that many residents cannot afford and are unsure of how they will manage. As one of my guides frankly pointed out, “now life is gonna be expensive so maybe I am gonna move to another favela...one without the UPPs.”²⁷⁶

Another recurrent sentiment that I found throughout the favelas that I visited and that has taken on strength in Cantagalo is pride towards residents’ homes. They are proud of their communities and many insisted that they preferred the use of “community” to that of “favela.” Again and again I was told that favelas are the heart of the city and it is their residents who make the city beat. I was proudly shown painstakingly clean and neat homes, shops, restaurants, and favorite places within Cantagalo by residents who were clearly delighted that I was interested in seeing what they have accomplished personally and for the community. I was constantly aware that

²⁷⁴ Personal Interview, V.C, June 2011.

²⁷⁵ Personal Interview, N.L, June 2011.

²⁷⁶ Personal Interview, S.P, June 2011.

this is what residents have managed to achieve for themselves without any government aid and in the face of crushing odds yet residents only humbly acknowledge their work. The only testament to their hard work comes through the often-repeated sentiment that there is another side to the favelas other than violence and crime. To this effect residents are highly conscious of the fact that there is a desperate need for cultural and educational development within the community. Residents are quick to state that it is through culture and education that lasting change will be brought to the favelas; police patrols and basic services will only go so far. It is the education of residents and the development of ways for residents to express themselves and to build a sense of self-respect and self-worth that will keep the peace. As one young man explained to me, it is the government that has provided the opportunity, but it is the favela that now must motivate itself to change minds through its actions.²⁷⁷ Despite the sentiment that the situation will get better, residents were not shy about sharing their fears that Pacification, the UPP, and the current government attention will disappear once the Olympics Games end in 2016. Residents have become accustomed to, if they live in a community fortunate enough to receive any NGOs or development programs, that aid disappears within a few years so the hope that is present is guarded and residents are determined to make the most of programs before they fade away. Everyone in Rio is aware of the contradictory, dysfunctional, and inherently corrupt nature of Brazilian politics thus only increasing

²⁷⁷ Personal Interview, L.G, June 2011.

the need to make the most of what is offered as it may only be temporary.²⁷⁸ One community leader made the point that the government has offered a form of motivation for favela residents through Pacification to change their situations and that all residents must seize it. He was adamant that both those inside the favelas and those outside could change their perceptions, especially with the help of improved education programs, but that all must participate.²⁷⁹ “*Agora é o momento* – now is the moment” was an often-repeated sentiment by residents who are resolved to take advantage of what is being offered by Pacification.

In addition to the presence of Pacification, Cantagalo hosts one of the most influential NGOs operating in Rio de Janeiro – AfroReggae. AfroReggae is a different kind of NGO; it emerged from inside the favelas and out of the wake of a tragedy. It does not fight police brutality nor is it composed of solely volunteers; rather, it presents itself as a permanent force within the communities and seeks to bring tangible change into the lives of residents while also giving residents a way to develop self-respect and to demand the respect of others. It acknowledges and seeks to display the enormous wealth of talent that can be found within the favelas.

After the 1993 police massacre in Vigário Geral, José Junior (the founder of AfroReggae) began what would grow into an organization that today spans five favelas and maintains an international presence. AfroReggae is an organization that

²⁷⁸ Personal Interview, C.A, June 2011.

²⁷⁹ Personal Interview, S.M, June 2011.

aims to change the lives of favela residents and to cross worlds. It brings the favela into the rest of the city and the city to the favelas as well as sponsoring musical performances worldwide. After the 1993 massacre AfroReggae began to expand from just the four-page newsletter, *AfroReggae Noticias*, into a community presence. It had always been Junior's idea to offer the children in favelas an alternative to crime and the aftermath of the Vigário Geral massacre offered the opportunity to do so. By 1994 the first *Núcleo Comunitário de Cultura* (Community Nucleus for Culture) was operational and classes were offered in percussion and dance as well as recycling. Everything was done in an attempt to provide an alternative to entering the drug traffic. From there AfroReggae has had enormous accomplishments and has been able to successfully enter four other communities, an unmatched feat, continuing to promote music and cultural expression as alternatives to entering *o tráfico*. Every community receives a community center and a number of cultural programs and performance groups tailored to meet the needs of each community. The main Afroreggae group has been joined by a samba school, dance and theater groups, percussion bands, and a circus troupe in Cantagalo. In addition computer classes are offered in some communities. AfroReggae has gained such regard within the communities and with the drug traffic that Junior has been able to safely negotiate approximately 1,400 members of the traffic out and either into legal jobs or into AfroReggae itself.²⁸⁰ One former *traficante* and current member phrased his

²⁸⁰ Personal Interview, A.R, June 2011.

appreciation for the work that AfroReggae has accomplished as such, “We live in the jungle. We were born in the cradle of crime. If AfroReggae hadn’t been there? I’ll be honest with you: None of us would be alive right now. That’s just realistic.”²⁸¹

Pacification has provided AfroReggae with a time for expansion; potential economic growth and decreasing stigma surrounding the communities will enable AfroReggae to expand its presence throughout the favelas themselves and its message throughout Rio. This also holds true for the other NGOs already operating in the favelas. Pacification has provided an opportunity for the NGOs to act; they seem to be neither in open support nor denouncement of the program, but rather attempting to use the relative calm for their benefit. With their close connections to the communities and the necessity for community support to maintain their presence, NGOs must walk a fine line. They must gage community responses to Pacification or otherwise risk their existence by showing open support for Pacification too early on. Perceptions of the favelas are beginning to change as the success of programs like AfroReggae can be seen and as the new lack of violence allows for increased flow between these informal cities and the formal city itself. An AfroReggae representative with whom I spoke stressed that Pacification is seen as highly important and necessary because it has the potential to better the lives of residents, but that the program must go beyond police involvement and instead must be a response to social needs.²⁸² Residents are intensely

²⁸¹ Neate, *Culture Is Our Weapon*, 17.

²⁸² Personal Interview, A.R., June 2011.

aware that their situation cannot be improved solely through the police aspect of Pacification; while this aspect creates a needed calm in the communities, the social aspect of the program is crucial to its success. Quality social improvements, through education and culture as well as the provision of basic services, are what will begin to chip away at marginalization.

TREATMENT OF RESIDENTS

Marginality

Marginality is truly a difficult topic to identify formally and completely as it varies in every situation. As stated earlier, marginalization is defined as “to relegate to an unimportant or powerless position within a society or group and to be excluded from or existing outside the mainstream of society or a group.”²⁸³ Since the 1990s academics have discussed marginality in relation to the conditions of the chronic poor, arguing that it “reflects the current stage of global capitalism, in which a large portion of the urban population is simply irrelevant and excluded from the rest of the city.”²⁸⁴ It is an “institutionalized form of inequality, the failure of society to extend to all sections of its population the economic resources and social recognition which they need to participate fully in the collective life of the community.”²⁸⁵

²⁸³ "Marginal," *Merriam-Webster's Dictionary*, 451.

²⁸⁴ Perlman, *Favela*, 158.

Other authors working with marginality: Camille Goirand - "Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil," 2003; Nalia Kabeer - *Social Exclusion: Concepts, Findings, and Implications for the MDGs*; Bryan McCann - "The Political Evolution of Rio de Janeiro's Favelas: Recent Works," 2006; Loïc Wacquant - "The Rise of Advanced Marginality: Notes on Its Nature and Implications," 1996; and Edésio Fernandes - "Constructing the 'Right To the City' in Brazil," 2007.

²⁸⁵ Nalia Kabeer, *Social Exclusion: Concepts, Findings, and Implications for the MDGs*, Institute of Development Studies (Brighton: University of Sussex), 4.

In applying the study of marginality to the favelas it is the seminal works of Janice Perlman that begin any investigation. In Perlman's *Favela: Four Decade of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro*, the author makes the claim that "favela residents are not marginal at all but inextricably bound into society, albeit in a manner detrimental to their own interests."²⁸⁶ However this is simply not the case; in her determination to disprove that favela residents are not marginal she contradicts herself; an incongruity that will be explored further.

Favelas are viewed as a "social problem" and this perception is reinforced on a daily basis "as those who live there are treated as a threat to the social system" that created them.²⁸⁷ Residents are in fact bound to society, as they are the most basic level of the workforce driving the informal sector; they are bus and cab drivers, construction workers, trash collectors, maids, and nannies. They are not economically distant and neither do they fail to make an impact culturally as many of the cultural figures by which Brazil is often defined; the *capoeira* participants (Brazilian martial arts), soccer players, musicians, and samba dancers, are frequently from favelas. At one point popular culture even made a point to praise the culture that was emerging from the favelas through musical and artistic expression, but times have changed.²⁸⁸ Just as Perlman states, favela residents "do not benefit from the goods and services of the

²⁸⁶ Perlman, *Favela*, 150.

²⁸⁷ Perlman, *Favela*, 148.

²⁸⁸ Neate, *Culture Is Our Weapon*, xiii.

system...they are exploited, manipulated, and repressed...they are stigmatized and excluded from a closed class system.”²⁸⁹ This is complete marginalization; relegated to a non-powerful position and excluded favela residents are most certainly marginalized.

Loïc Wacquant highlights four conditions that characterize advanced marginality and can be applied directly to the situation in Rio de Janeiro; social inequality, absolute surplus population, retrenchment of the welfare state, and spatial concentration and stigmatization.²⁹⁰ Wacquant hypothesizes that “social inequality persists and deepens within a context of overall economic prosperity.”²⁹¹ Brazil is a nation with one of the largest gaps between the rich and the underprivileged with poorest 50 percent earning less than the richest one percent, a Gini coefficient of income inequality (0.58-0.60) that has remained fairly consistent, and a tendency for those in poverty to remain stuck in poverty.²⁹² Additionally, Brazil is only ranked 84th on the Human Development Index; a low ranking for a nation with the level of economic growth that Brazil has achieved.²⁹³ While Rio itself has fallen behind in

²⁸⁹ Perlman, *Favela*, 150.

²⁹⁰ Wacquant, “The Rise of Advanced Marginality.”

²⁹¹ Perlman, *Favela*, 158.

²⁹² Gacitúa-Mario and Woolock, eds, *Social Exclusion and Mobility in Brazil*, 3.

²⁹³ Human Development Reports – International Human Development Indicators, “Brazil – Country Profile,” Last modified 2011, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BRA.html>.

economic growth in past years, the presence of the World Cup and Olympics are sure to provide a boost in economic prosperity and Brazil as a nation has been achieving amazingly consistent levels of economic growth, with a 7.5 percent growth rate in 2010,²⁹⁴ thus supporting Wacquant's first characteristic. Secondly, absolute surplus population states "that a significant portion of the workforce is redundant...and that many of the unemployed will never work again."²⁹⁵ Brazil historically has had an immense problem with persistent unemployment that has only increased since the 1980s. In the 1990s there was a dramatic increase in the informal sector, with 50 percent of the population engaged in it by 2001, but these workers have few benefits and tend to earn less than minimum wage.²⁹⁶ Favela residents are also often turned away from jobs simply based on their place of residence making it even harder to find employment. It may not be completely accurate to say that a portion of the favela workforce will never work again, but current unemployment conditions and stigmas are preventing favela residents from being truly active in the formal labor force. This characteristic of marginality is followed by retrenchment of the welfare state; "service cutbacks in social programs and – in some cases – turning such programs into

²⁹⁴ U.S. Department of State - Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, "Brazil."

²⁹⁵ Perlman, *Favela*, 159.

²⁹⁶ Gacitúa-Mario and Woolock, eds, *Social Exclusion and Mobility in Brazil*, 13-14.

instruments of surveillance and control.”²⁹⁷ Brazil has never had a well-developed welfare state, but in recent years under the presidencies of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula, various welfare programs, such as conditional cash transfers (CCTs) and *Bolsa Família* (Family Stipend) targeted towards the low-income portion of the population have been created.²⁹⁸ Nevertheless, programs such as these, and Pacification, can be seen as programs that aim to monitor and control the favelas. Finally, the attribute of spatial concentration and stigmatization are “physically expressed in hard-core areas of outcasts, territorial stigma and prejudice, and a diminishing sense of community life.”²⁹⁹ Favelas are in fact physical places that are stigmatized and their residents are social outcasts. While the favelas are spread throughout Rio their territorial boundaries are quite distinct and *cariocas* are keenly aware of where the favelas begin and end. Perlman tries to make the point, which does not serve to help her disprove this characteristic, that “living in a favela [does not] mean you are poor or an outlaw”³⁰⁰ yet the impoverished contribute greatly to favela populations and the majority of the city assumes that all favela residents are connected to the drug trade in effect making all favela residents *bandidos*. In conclusion,

²⁹⁷ Perlman, *Favela*, 159.

²⁹⁸ Perlman, *Favela*, 160.

²⁹⁹ Perlman, *Favela*, 160.

³⁰⁰ Perlman, *Favela*, 160.

according to Wacquant's conditions of advanced marginality it is clear the residents of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro are in fact marginalized.

Perlman highlights a number of reasons behind why marginality has been able to persist in the long-term and to further entrench itself into popular consciousness. Marginality justifies extreme inequality even as it conceals the fact that the government has been unable to provide appropriate living conditions for a huge portion of the population. In addition, marginality protects legitimacy; it provides a "scape-goat" for social problems and preserves norms of dominance; it allows the other portion of society to feel pure while claiming "marginals" are the source of all social problems; it shapes identity to the point that residents believe and internalize the label, and lastly it divides the poor making it difficult to form a unified front.³⁰¹ However in the context of the Favela Pacification Program there is the ability to break through this perseverance of social marginalization and affect positive change; progress that has been unable to occur for decades, but in the pacified communities' constructive evolution has the potential to begin.

Marginality is not simply poverty nor is it inequality in assets or education nor is it completely covered by Wacquant's four characteristics although these are all factors. This who are considered marginals labor in the most horrible jobs in the worst conditions at the lowest wages, have persistent patron-client relationships, and

³⁰¹ Perlman, *Favela*, 150.

frequently resort to criminal or illegal activities to survive.³⁰² In Rio de Janeiro favela residents most frequently are employed in the informal sector, which consists of one-third of the workforce³⁰³; they do not have a formal *carteira assinada* (work papers), they do not have job security, and commonly are refused from receiving improved positions due to their area of residency. *Moradores* are often stereotyped as lazy or as criminals; employers would rather hire workers who will consistently arrive at work and who will not be delayed by a gang war. Without access to formal sector employment, which is proven to reduce the rates of poverty, the majority of favela residents cannot hope to break the cycle of poverty or to improve their quality of life.³⁰⁴ "Poverty is a rightless, marginalized, criminalized, uncivic sphere"³⁰⁵ and one that is not easily broken free of. Compounding poverty are the existing patron-client relationships that can most clearly be seen in the favelas in the exchange between drug gangs or militias and favela residents. Favelas have evolved without the state or local governments being a significant force within the communities and instead have formed circumstantial relationships with the drug gangs or militias that occupy the favela. These groups have offered the residents a semi-balance of security in exchange

³⁰² Kabeer, *Social Exclusion*, 6.

³⁰³ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 226.

³⁰⁴ Kabeer, *Social Exclusion*, 14.

³⁰⁵ Camille Goirand, "Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil," *Latin American Perspectives* 30.2 (2003): 230.

for their loyalty. Often basic services are offered as well and residents have formed bonds with the only authority figures that have bothered with the communities. And yes, it is clear that a portion, not all, of favela residents have resorted to illegal or criminal activities to ensure their survival, but at the lack of any other viable alternatives.

Marginality occurs when individuals or groups of individuals are culturally devalued; when their identity is so discriminated upon that they cannot participate in society to their full capacity and when they have been constructed by society as people of less value.³⁰⁶ They are not seen as true citizens, let alone people at times. Social identity is an important portion of self-identity and it is devastating to one's identity and self worth when for their entire lives, and for the generations preceding them, they have been told that they are no one. In the documentary film *Bus 174*, street children were interviewed and repeatedly professed that they are invisible, that society simply does not care about them, and merely wants them out of the way. Thus marginality has resulted into a persistent "us versus them" mentality that has lasted for decades. Nalia Kabeer defines this as an "immutable identity," an identity that has evolved over time and does not easily change.³⁰⁷ This certainly holds true for favela residents.

In these terms, if the Favela Pacification Program is to have any true effect on the marginalization of favela residents it will need to address the vast number of forces

³⁰⁶ Kabeer, *Social Exclusion*, 3.

³⁰⁷ Kabeer, *Social Exclusion*, 6.

that have coalesced to create the marginality faced by *moradores*. Among other factors, it is necessary that the program addresses the structural violence that pervades Rio de Janeiro. Structural violence references the large-scale social forces such as poverty that can translate into individual suffering especially for those at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Individuals in this position are harmed because they are deprived of their basic needs by the structure of society.³⁰⁸ The shame and discrimination that results from being in these social positions constrains their capacity to act as individuals as well as causes such stress that they are crippled by their own suffering. Historical and economic forces have created this form of suffering and allow for its persistence.³⁰⁹ Structural violence also has contributed to creating the environment of physical violence that plagues the favelas. Brazil is well-known for its non-egalitarian society that allows little room for social movement, thus Rio will have to combat the ingrained elitism and classism that has allowed for structural violence to become a part of the marginalization of favela residents.

Favelas are not completely isolated or cut off, rather they live in cities within a city; connected through thin lines of economics and culture, but still separate entities. If Pacification is to reverse this immutable identity of marginality that *moradores* have born for decades a number of aspects must be reversed. There must be a marked

³⁰⁸ Paul Farmer, "On Suffering and Structural Violence: A View from Below," *Daedalus* 125.1 (1996): 262-263.

³⁰⁹ Farmer, "On Suffering and Structural Violence," 263.

improvement in education and access to public resources. Poverty, which is not found at a consistent level throughout all of the favelas, must be decriminalized; an achievement that will be made evident through decreased violence within the communities. An increased commitment to citizenship must be demonstrated. Residents of favelas must become involved as true, participating citizens and the government must positively respond to their involvement. Finally, changes to the tradition of cultural devaluation are an absolute necessity and the most essential component to reversing marginality. Residents must be given an opportunity to explore their worth to society as a whole and society in turn must begin to see *moradores* as productive members of society; there can no longer be an entire segment of the city's population that is practically invisible or, when they are noticed, seen as subhuman. This will also be the most difficult and slowest of all transformations as changing mentalities from both sides will be the most complex and it will take time, potentially spanning generations. Improvements in job availability and capability, a break with patron-client relationships, and a removal of the need to resort to criminal and illegal activities will go a long way toward helping to change minds.

The Role of Government

Minha cara autoridade já não sei o que fazer

Com tanta violência eu fico medo de viver

Pois moro na favela e sou muito desrespeitado

A tristeza e a alegria que caminha lado a lado

Eu faço uma oração para uma santa protetora

Mas sou interrompido a tiros de metralhadora

Enquanto os ricos moram numa casa grande e bela

O pobre e humilhado esculachado na favela...

*Só peço autoridades um pouco mais de competência - Cidinho e Doce*³¹⁰

The role that government has played, or rather the lack there of, in the history of favela development is a crucial component of the social exclusion of residents. Historically *moradores* have been defined as non-citizens and little has been done to alter that definition. To be a true citizen of a nation one must have more than the ability to vote and simply be given rights. A citizen must possess common values, duties, and commitment to the state. To be considered a citizen one must acknowledge belonging to a political community; accept common civic rules, recognize shared ethical and political values, and tolerate conflict and differing opinions. Citizenship is a continual responsibility in which the civic sense and virtues are constantly being constructed; it is an active role.³¹¹

During the 1930's *Estado Novo* established under Getulio Vargas, citizenship in Brazil was defined by one's place in the formal system of production. This clearly

³¹⁰ "My dear policeman, I am at my wits end/With so much violence, I have no reason to live/Since I live in the favela I am very disrespected/Sadness and happiness walk side by side/I say a prayer to my patron Saint/But even then I was interrupted by machine gun fire/While the rich live in big, beautiful homes/The poor are pushed aside in humiliation/I only ask the authorities for a little more competency." Cidinho and Doce, "Rap Da Felicidade."

³¹¹ Goirand, "Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil," 228.

posed a problem for the majority of favela residents, who were often recent migrants with little education, skill, or ability to obtain a position in the formal job market thus eliminating their access to the *carteira assinada* (work card) that would have given them citizenship and the rights that accompanied it.³¹² This lack of formal employment was not seen as a malfunction within the system that could have been rectified with basic skills training; the hard work that residents contributed to the informal market was not recognized, but rather it was viewed rather as a testament to the laziness and immorality of favela residents. This definition of citizenship by formal workforce participation, which begun during the populist *Estado Novo*, “[is] thus partly at the root of identification of the poor as non-citizens.”³¹³

Another influencing factor on citizenship is Brazil’s tradition as a paternalistic society. There has always been the tendency to ignore popular organization and instead focus on the actions of the political elite.³¹⁴ Fostered during the early Republic and its frequently authoritarian policies, the impoverished learned to wait for rights and handouts to be given to them in exchange for their few votes and support.³¹⁵ This laissez-faire approach to political participation was continued with the clientelist policies of the populist state and has become the norm with residents merely waiting

³¹² Goirand, “Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil,” 230.

³¹³ Goirand, “Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil,” 230.

³¹⁴ Gay, *Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro*, 5.

³¹⁵ Goirand, “Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil,” 229.

to receive whatever might be passed their way in exchange for their support instead of taking an active role and petitioning government for what their communities need.

“Social citizenship has ended up depoliticizing the poorest, who are more inclined to wait for rights to be given to them than to “claim them *viva voce*”.”³¹⁶

Favelas certainly have the numbers to make themselves heard if they were able to look beyond the desire for immediate benefits and successfully organize themselves to play an active role in politics rather than the passive one that they have adopted over the decades. Favela residents, as is typical of many residents of international slums, have the right to vote, but are not exercising it in a manner that produces “significant redistribution of expenditures or tax resources.”³¹⁷ Only in the early 1940s were residents encouraged to participate politically and only in the hope that their votes could be used to aid the local elite; this participation encouraged political organization in favela neighborhoods. However with time fear arose that residents would support the Communist party hence the encouragement for politically active favelas dwindled.³¹⁸ During the military regime begun in 1964 favelas experienced another surge in political involvement with the emergence of Resident Associations. There were local leadership groups that the government mandated that each favela establish in order to have a single entity representing them. These associations

³¹⁶ Goirand, “Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil,” 230.

³¹⁷ Davis, *Planet of Slums*, 68.

³¹⁸ Gay, *Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro*, 17.

maintained a fair degree of local power and bargaining ability. In the 1960s the Resident Associations mobilized to triumphantly defeat policies of eradication and directed all their attention to the goal of permanency.³¹⁹ In the next decades the Associations were a way into politics and a method for taking advantage of the existing clientelist system until the mid-1980s when drug traffickers essentially high-jacked their influence thus drastically altering their former authority and participation and leaving the people without a method to voice their opinions.³²⁰ “By the mid-1990s, most had come to see their associations as ineffectual or corrupt, or at best as a mere ‘supervisor of public work’,”³²¹ consequently eliminating the best method favela residents had for engaging politically. Brazil claims to be a “participant democracy;” a democracy that encourages the voice of its entire people and wants them to play an active role in democracy, yet favela residents are without a voice and simply receive policy.³²² So while this passive role is not completely their fault, it could be reversed by active citizenship. “Access to citizenship comes from the participation in collective action that fosters the development of collective consciousness.”³²³

³¹⁹ Bryan McCann, "The Political Evolution of Rio de Janeiro's Favelas: Recent Works," *Latin American Research Review* 41.3 (2006), 152.

³²⁰ Perlman, *Favela*, 27 – 28.

³²¹ McCann, “The Political Evolution of Rio de Janeiro's Favelas,” 153.

³²² Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 6.

³²³ Goirand, “Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil,” 231.

Favela residents, who have become accustomed to their continual disenfranchisement due to their deprivation of basic services, exclusion from the social system, and the denial of basic rights, have begun to construct their own citizenships. They have not completely rejected the national civic spirit, but rather have become fragmented and separated from it. Their sense of belonging is limited to within their own communities where common civic rules have emerged and the condemnation of injustices accompanied by the call for dignity and collective marginality have become uniting factors in the construction of local citizenships.³²⁴

Neighborhood associations make very concrete requests that usually encompass only their own area and also amount to identifying themselves as the bottom of the social ladder. Mobilization is a way of bringing timely and limited improvements to a specific neighborhood, but the demand for “rights,” far from reducing inequalities, is rarely based on universal principles.³²⁵

However, while mobilization has begun to occur, this developing sense of communal citizenship is not strong enough nor organized enough to produce results that could alter the status quo.

A number of possible actions serve to contribute to a state that could result in favela residents gaining true citizenship and removing one of the numerous obstacles in the process of ending marginality. If residents were able to move beyond the mold of looking for immediate aid and instead organized their demands around long-term

³²⁴ Goirand, “Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil,” 233.

³²⁵ Goirand, “Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil,” 234.

goals they could begin to make the progress they desire. If they were able to begin to identify with the political community at large, even with society at large, then a greater commitment to that civic identity and increased political participation could occur. If they were able to move beyond the understanding that “since you have deprived us of rights for so long, we expect from you a simple compensation for injustice, but we have no duties towards you.”³²⁶ If society was able to respect and encourage their participation in politics and the civic community then *moradores* would be more likely to participate. If Brazil was able to act as if it were the “participant democracy” that it claims to be and allow favela residents a voice to participate in the making of policy.³²⁷ If favela residents were treated as human beings then the first steps towards their development as active citizens could begin; if not then their marginality will only serve to strengthen their alternative citizenship and disconnect. If citizenship is truly an obligation then both parties are obliged to act accordingly.³²⁸

Inability to Integrate

Favelas developed as virtual cities within a city due to their basic inability to integrate both spatially and socially, which has only helped to continue the occurrence

³²⁶ Goirand, “Citizenship and Poverty in Brazil,” 236.

³²⁷ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 6.

³²⁸ Edésio Fernandes, “Constructing the ‘Right To the City’ in Brazil,” *Social & Legal Studies* 16.2 (2007): 207.

of marginality. Exclusion arrived and remained due to “speculative land markets, clientelist political systems, elitist urban planning practices, and exclusionary legal regimes.”³²⁹ Informal urban development is the norm and has resulted in millions of Brazilians resorting to illegal practices to access land and housing. This form of development has only compounded social exclusion and spatial segregation.³³⁰ *Moradores* occupy physically deprived spaces with poor infrastructure, difficult terrain, and have a reduced access to markets.³³¹ Favelas are unofficially recognized territory and therefore illegal;³³² their territorial exclusion has led to an unequal share in resource distribution and to becoming a separate entity altogether. Residents of the favelas thus find themselves lacking the ‘right to the city;’ “right of all city dwellers to fully enjoy urban life with all of its services and advantages – the right to habitation – as well as taking direct part in the management of cities – the right to participation.”³³³ This right to participation encompasses *moradores*’ exclusion from society; they are marginalized entities unable to fully participate in cultural, economic, and political developments in Rio de Janeiro.

³²⁹ Fernandes, "Constructing the 'Right To the City' in Brazil," 203.

³³⁰ Fernandes, "Constructing the 'Right To the City' in Brazil," 203.

³³¹ Kabeer, *Social Exclusion*, 12.

³³² Pino, "Sources on the History of Favelas in Rio de Janeiro," 111.

³³³ Fernandes, "Constructing the 'Right To the City' in Brazil," 208.

It has been made clear that in order for marginality to begin to be alleviated the aspect of social exclusion must be addressed. Residents must be recognized for their complete social worth rather than just as invisibles or as stereotyped criminals, immoral, or lazy. They must be seen for their capacity to become participating citizens, as hard-working individuals who do contribute to the economic functions of Rio de Janeiro; they must be seen as true people. However a crucial, and often overlooked aspect of this is that favelas must become more spatially incorporated. The exclusionary pattern of urban development that has existed up until this point must cease.

It can be difficult to establish collectively what must be done to incorporate favelas into the city of Rio de Janeiro at large as favelas are independent, dynamic, and constantly changing; qualities that prove very difficult for creating generalizations and universal recommendations. Favelas are the main type of informal sector housing, however each community presents a unique combination of social, economic, political, and spatial links that have allowed them to develop in an array of ways.³³⁴ Approximately half of Rio's favelas are located in the northeast of the city and there they tend to have the highest population densities, whereas the favelas located more centrally or more towards the high status residential areas of Copacabana or Ipanema tend to have a lower population density and a slightly higher socio-economic

³³⁴ Fernandes, "Constructing the 'Right To the City' in Brazil," 225.

ranking.³³⁵ Some favelas occupy flat regions to the north or west of the city, some are situated along marshy canals, and some climb precariously up the sides of granite outcroppings throughout the center of the city. In addition each community possesses different population numbers, different identities, and certainly demonstrate a “wide variety of socio-economic characteristics.”³³⁶ Despite these differences marginality provides one consistent feature.

Marginality tends to concentrate in well-identified, bounded, and increasingly isolated territories viewed by both outsiders and insiders as social purgatories, urban hellholes where only the refuse of society would accept to dwell. A stigma of place thus superimposes itself on the already pervasive stigma of poverty...as these ‘penalized spaces’ are, or threaten to become, permanent fixtures of the city and as discourses of vilification proliferate about them.³³⁷

In the history of favela development the trend emerges that policies of removal have proved unsuccessful and ultimately unpopular while policies that promote favela upgrades have allowed the affected favelas to be seen in a more positive light, although - for the most part - they still have failed to make marked, widespread, or lasting achievements.³³⁸

As noted earlier, in 1994 the government launched a truly impressive three-part program with significant aid from international organizations that was designed to

³³⁵ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 227-229.

³³⁶ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 239.

³³⁷ Wacquant, "The Rise of Advanced Marginality," 125.

³³⁸ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 237.

directly improve squatter settlements. *Morar Favela* granted credit at low interest rates to favelados, *Morar Sem Risco* aimed to resettle people out of high risk environments, and *Favela-Bairro*, the most renowned aspect, which focused upon on-site community improvement.³³⁹ The objective behind the program was that these marginalized settlements could in fact be turned into integral portions of the formal city. Previous projects focused on actual housing, which turned out to be too broad of an undertaking so *Favela-Bairro* focused on improving the collective environment; public spaces that could be used by all and could break with the traditional image of poverty while reuniting communities.³⁴⁰ Competitions were held to individualize the projects to each community's needs while maintaining a focus on improving accessibility for all, connecting the communities to the city, opening the communities to the formal city, and producing cohesion all while respecting the community, focusing on their needs and requirements, and on a positive change in perception.³⁴¹ In 2000 investment in the program ceased and the projects halted, but 150 communities had been reached and a half million people had been affected.³⁴² While this program ultimately did not achieve the longevity that would have been necessary to create a larger and more lasting impact, the legacy and positive results that come from responding to specific

³³⁹ O'Hare and Barke, "The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis," 238.

³⁴⁰ Serge, "Formal-Informal Connections in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro," 169.

³⁴¹ Serge, "Formal-Informal Connections in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro," 170 -171.

³⁴² Serge, "Formal-Informal Connections in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro," 170 – 173.

conditions and working with residents and their needs is undeniable. By addressing spatial development this way the dominant image of favelas as dangerous ghettos can be eliminated and they can be better understood.

So while the favelas present an astounding display in diversity and thus will require Pacification to adopt a complex and uniquely developed methodology for addressing them, it seems that the promotion of favela upgrades will not only help them to physically approach the standards of life enjoyed by the residents of the rest of the city, but also begin to reduce spatial exclusion.

Another contributing factor to the failure for the favelas to integrate into the city and society of Rio de Janeiro is the unwillingness of residents to belong to a system that has done little for them.³⁴³ The tradition of socio-political exclusion that has faced favela residents for decades has ultimately resulted in the rejection of a system that is seen as uncaring and useless. The government has done little to help provide for residents, allow them to improve their standards of living, protect their rights, or even show the slightest concern over residents' wellbeing and basic needs. Favela residents have developed a distrust of the government, which in addition to doing little for residents, also has engaged in policies of favela removal over the decades and has allowed for public security policies that are combative and have raised levels of violence within the communities. There is little respect or loyalty to the government or to authorities, which mirrors the lack of respect that has been given

³⁴³ Fernandes, "Constructing the 'Right To the City' in Brazil," 243.

to residents. Thus residents have turned to the only force that can and has, in some senses, provided for them – the drug gangs and militias. It should not come as any surprise that residents have formed allegiances with the dealers who often provide the basic services residents need, are present in the communities, and are the only hope for protection against police violence. In this regard, the inability of residents to integrate is only fostered by their disdain for government authority, which has not developed without just rationale, and aversion to participation in a system that has consistently failed them.

It will require a sincere effort by both favela residents and the rest of Rio de Janeiro, residents and politicians alike, to reestablish the trust and respect that has been disintegrating for decades. With favela residents making a concentrated effort to engage in society, political and civic involvement, and becoming willing to leave the past violence, neglect, and mistreatment behind while the rest of Rio welcomes them without traces of past violence, misgivings, and distrust, then there is hope that favela residents could become more willing integrated. This, however, will be a delicate process requiring the best intentions of both parties involved. After such a history of abuse favela residents have every right to be wary and withdrawn. The rest of Rio must show them that history can be changed and new behaviors can be learned while acknowledging that rebuilding trust and fostering a willingness to integrate will take time.

Development of Violence

“Peace does not prevail and people do not have the opportunity to recover from the conflict.”³⁴⁴

It is no secret that violence and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro are inextricably linked. Nonetheless, it is this violence that contributes to the continuation and strengthening of the marginalization of favela residents. The current state of violence has emerged in response to the social dynamics of Rio. Violence in the favelas experienced a drastic change in the 1980s with the arrival of drugs. Prior to the 80s marijuana sales had been present in many favelas. However, the arrival of cocaine prompted a dramatic shift in favela life. Favelas became favored packaging and distribution sites for cocaine due to their territorial advantages; isolated, absent police presence, and twisting alleyways that facilitated concealment.³⁴⁵ Drug trafficking quickly moved beyond small-scale marijuana distribution and became a business controlled by “well-connected, heavily armed gangsters violently taking over key territory in order to sell cocaine.”³⁴⁶ The 80s were a time when unemployment rates in Rio were high and *moradores* had increasingly few options and joining the traffic was a lucrative, albeit dangerous choice.³⁴⁷

³⁴⁴ Zdun, “Difficulties Measuring and Controlling Homicide in Rio de Janeiro,” 195.

³⁴⁵ McCann, “The Political Evolution of Rio de Janeiro's Favelas,” 156.

³⁴⁶ McCann, “The Political Evolution of Rio de Janeiro's Favelas,” 156.

³⁴⁷ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 16.

The rapid influx of drugs and high-powered weapons into the favelas since the 1980s has drastically altered favela structure and social structuring. Favelas have been forced to depend on themselves in the absence of state intervention since their inception; community life and communal interdependence are defining characteristics of favelas and a point of pride for many residents. Since their inception until the 1980s local Resident Associations resolved internal conflicts, bargained with the state government, and organized *mutirão* (mutual aid, communal labor projects) that gave infrastructure developments to the communities. The arrival of drugs, competing gangs, and increasingly powerful traffickers began to replace local leaders, built their own ties to politicians, and replaced the Resident Associations. Local *facções* (factions) dominate the favelas demanding loyalty and respect from residents while also providing some basic services like occasional financial assistance, water and transportation services, and the maintenance of order.³⁴⁸ The traffic has become the law and order within the favelas.

It took a several years for the affluent residents of Rio de Janeiro to realize the conflicts that were brewing within the favelas due to the rise of cocaine, however when it was realized the response was violence. The Santa Marta “war” in 1987 was a seven-day struggle for the control of this territory, located in a middle-class area of the *Zona Sul*. This war brought the dangers of cocaine to the attention of the city for

³⁴⁸ Arias, “The Myth of Personal Security,” 61-62.

possibly the first time.³⁴⁹ After this police violence, which was not unknown to favelas, increased and has magnified to the astounding point that it is today. The years 1994 through 1996 are considered especially violent when the conflict spread across the city, but since 2007 violence rates have once again been on the rise.³⁵⁰ On July 23, 1993 the military police murdered eight street children sleeping in front of Candelária Church, located in the center of the city.³⁵¹ On August 29, 1993 off-duty police massacred twenty-one innocent and unarmed residents of the favela Vigário Geral in retaliation for the murder of four police officers the day before by the head of the traffic in Vigário. All of the slaughtered residents were uninvolved; clearly to the police and authorities “the community and the drug traffickers from the community had become one and the same thing.”³⁵²

The national death rate for Brazil in 2011 was 6.36 deaths per 1,000 residents.³⁵³ However, in Rio de Janeiro the rates are far higher. A UN report on summary and extrajudicial executions reported that Brazil has one of the highest homicide rates in the world and Rio had the worst record. In 2008 the Center for the Study of Public Safety and Citizenship (CESeC) released a study based on figures

³⁴⁹ McCann, “The Political Evolution of Rio de Janeiro's Favelas,” 156.

³⁵⁰ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 34.

³⁵¹ Neate, *Culture Is Our Weapon*, 22.

³⁵² Neate, *Culture Is Our Weapon*, 21-22.

³⁵³ Welcome to the CIA Web Site — Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA - The World Factbook.”

from the Civil Police that stated that from 1991 to 2007 there were never less than 5,741 (1998) homicides or more than 8,438 (1994) homicides a year.³⁵⁴ From 1978 to 2000 approximately 50,000 people have died violently. In 2002 the rate was 62.8 per 100,000 and in 2006 the homicide rate was 37.7 per 100,000. In 2007 the city had a homicide rate of 80 victims a week.³⁵⁵ These annual homicide rates are similar to those in war-torn Yugoslavia in the 1990s and those in Iraq since the US invasion in 2003.³⁵⁶ Also notable is the fact that “the concentration of homicides in favelas contributes to homicide rates eight times higher in the western and northern zones of the city (where most favelas are located) than in the wealth southern zone.”³⁵⁷ Crucial to consider is that determining exact figures for the homicide rates in Rio de Janeiro is inherently difficult since cases are listed in multiple categories that can make establishing an accurate figure problematic and as a result homicide rates are “heavily underestimated” thus creating a certain amount of variation in reports.³⁵⁸ The discoveries of corpses or bones can be placed into separate categories and often are not counted towards official rates resulting in an omission of approximately 1,000 cases. Missing persons who were later discovered to have been killed or who are

³⁵⁴ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 31.

³⁵⁵ Perlman, *Favela*, 171.

³⁵⁶ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 31.

³⁵⁷ Arias, “The Myth of Personal Security,” 57.

³⁵⁸ Zdun, “Difficulties Measuring and Controlling Homicide in Rio de Janeiro,” 191.

expected to have died often do not make it into official statistics. Most significant are the murders of those who are labeled as “resisting death;” the police claim that these individuals were shot in self-defense. However, research has frequently reported that deaths in this category are usually the result of police shootouts in favelas where the police have no intention of arresting suspects.³⁵⁹ Notable is the fact that “while the number of “resisting arrest” cases have grown steadily, the number of police killed has not increased” which does not correspond to police insistence that these killings are done in self-defense.³⁶⁰ In 2007 41 civilians were killed per murdered police officer, which is four times the international average.³⁶¹ The label of “resisting death” merely serves to give police impunity for their violence and keeps an estimated 10,000 murders a year out of the official homicide rates.³⁶²

Beginning during the military regime, 1964-1985, police were trained in a militaristic fashion with a focus “on ‘national security’ intelligence, counter-guerilla activities, [and] riot control.”³⁶³ Brazilian society was distinguishing citizens from marginals while police action defined society into ‘friends’ versus ‘enemies;’ it is not

³⁵⁹ Zdun, "Difficulties Measuring and Controlling Homicide in Rio de Janeiro," 191-192.

³⁶⁰ Zdun, "Difficulties Measuring and Controlling Homicide in Rio de Janeiro," 193.

³⁶¹ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 16.

³⁶² Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 31.

³⁶³ Da Silva, "The Favelados in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil," 126.

surprising then that favela residents were cast as enemies.³⁶⁴ Army officers have a tradition of directing public safety and leading the police and “tanks, canons, helicopters, and other instruments of conventional war” have all been unleashed on the favelas.³⁶⁵ Little control is exercised over police actions and they face few consequences for their violence; on the contrary, their actions are tolerated and occasionally rewarded with promotions and raises, therefore only encouraging their use of violence. Police have been told to “shoot first, ask questions later” which has only increased police brutality. In 1997 an investigation determined that “64 percent of the civilians killed were shot either in the head or from behind.”³⁶⁶

The traffic has become the law and order within the favelas, but in a twisted way it has also become the protectors of their communities. The levels of violence that can be seen in Rio de Janeiro certainly can be attributed to the rise of the drug traffic in the city and the desire for drug factions to take control of precious territories that results in violence. The police, almost understandably, have responded to the threat posed by the traffic with violence, but in recent years the conflict has spiraled out of control. Police are entering virtual war zones, which are only confirmed by the governor of Rio’s public security policy of confrontation. This policy has authorized the state to carry out a strategy of armed invasion with the intent to repress the traffic.

³⁶⁴ Da Silva, "The Favelados in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil," 126.

³⁶⁵ Da Silva, "The Favelados in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil," 127.

³⁶⁶ Da Silva, "The Favelados in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil," 129.

Police are authorized to enter favelas to arrest and seize weapons and drugs and are trained that all residents are potential accomplices and that whatever methods needed to suppress and maintain order while preventing the spread of disorder into the wealthier neighborhoods.³⁶⁷ Governor Sérgio Cabral developed this security policy with his Secretary of Security José Mariano Beltrame who declared in an interview in 2007 that “sacrifices were required, and that although the proposition was difficult to accept, lives would be “decimated” to end the *bandidos* firepower.” This position is not promising for developing less violent and conflict-ridden methods for addressing the issue of drug trafficking and finding positive solutions for the future.

Police brutality and the increasingly violent methods of dealing with favelas are in essence a response to the increased need for a sense of personal security. The upper classes demand increased police action, support repressive police policies, and hide behind security walls in an attempt to enhance their sense of personal security. Residents of favelas essentially want the same thing; to feel personally secure. However, they do not have the same means in which to do so. In absence of any other options, due to an inability to access their rights, and discrimination from police who will not help them, favela residents must turn to their authorities, the traffic, to provide them with protection.³⁶⁸ This relationship is reinforcing the bonds between the traffic and the communities that they are based within and, while it strengthens community

³⁶⁷ Alves, *Living in the Crossfire*, 26.

³⁶⁸ Arias, “The Myth of Personal Security,” 77.

bonds, it simultaneously serves to increase resident's marginality. Violence does not solve violence and the brutal aggression shown against the favelas and the drug traffic that resides within is in effect only serving to continue the divide between favelas and the rest of Rio de Janeiro and the stigma of marginality.

CONCLUSIONS: BECOMING *GENTE*

“Like a hummingbird trying to put out a forest fire.” – AfroReggae

It is only within the Marvelous City that such a layered and complex situation could have possibly been conceived and matured into the state that it is today. The intertwined relations between the formal and informal city, the state of exclusion and marginality beside necessity and inclusion, development juxtaposed with decay, chaos side by side with order, and the intricate dance between violence and hope are the reoccurring realities of Rio de Janeiro. It was an objective of this paper to approach the many facets of this reality and to attempt to form a model through which to examine the Favela Pacification Program and its effects on societal marginalization of favela residents. As the program is still young and will be in effect at least until the 2016 Olympic Games it is too early to attempt to provide a set conclusion as to how the Pacification will continue to affect the residents of favelas and their status as marginals. The immense diversity and vast numbers of favelas within Rio also provide another difficulty to presenting a set conclusion, but rather offers the opportunity to use this research as a guide for the future.

The Favela Pacification Program represents a unique attempt at the dawn of the twenty-first century towards addressing slum development and improvement. The program marks a new and innovative method for approaching slum communities;

while it has the elements of old approaches such as the use of initial force, the multidimensional nature of the program that aims to improve the standard of living for residents is unfamiliar as is the pairing of the two methods. These elements are what other nations can examine and customize to fit the needs surrounding their own slums when it comes to addressing them, which is inevitable within this century. Cities already hold the majority of the human population and slums will only continue to grow as inequality roots itself even deeper. Other nations of the developing world should see the Favela Pacification Program as a model that they can learn from; it is an innovation into actually working with the residents of communities rather than attempting to remove and further exacerbate the existence of slums. Through the examination of favela history and an awareness of the many aspects that have created the present day condition in addition to evaluating Pacification to date, the future years of the program will hopefully continue upon the progress that has been made and conceptualize improvements that can be made for the future. It also provides the developing world with a working model in which to approach their own slum and shantytown communities in a more positive and effective manner for residents' sake.

Another crucial aspect in evaluating the Favela Pacification Program and formulating a model through it is to consider if top-down programs can create legitimate change within communities and even be effective or is it essential that change be grassroots. Grassroots activism has the benefit that it comes from within the communities thus intimately knowing what the community requires and what will work best while being motivated by direct need. Crucially, residents are far more

likely to accept and legitimize programs if they feel that they played a part in their creation and participate in them. If top-down programs, such as the Favela Pacification Program, hope to achieve lasting success they must find a way to connect with the communities themselves in order to assess and meet unique needs as well as to incorporate community members. Without the commitment of residents no outside program will be able to maintain itself for an extended period of time. Nor can government level programs simply treat every favela the same; they must coordinate with residents to discover the specific needs and cater to them in order to be effective. In the case of Pacification the use of the UPPs in the context of community policing will help to foster intimate connections and thus allow for the government to accommodate community needs. In this context, the government has forgotten the residents of favelas for generations and if Pacification is to succeed they must be able to prove to residents that this is no longer the case. In a broader application, governments must be able to connect with communities and prove that they can listen to residents in order for programs to prosper.

The factors of marginality that are facing the favelas - violence, political exclusion, and the inability to integrate - must all begin to shift. The dependence upon violence as a mechanism to deal with the favelas is tethering them to their weight of marginality. Violence plays a crucial role not only in defining marginality, but also in continuing to create and maintain marginality. As long as the use of violence is seen as an acceptable method for interactions with the favelas and their residents are treated with brutality and disrespect they will not be able to completely remove themselves

from the status of marginals. It will not matter what else is done in the communities or how much community members distance themselves from their previous circumstances, the continued use of violence in response to the favelas is a blatant symbol of disrespect and the lack of consideration of residents by the rest of society. Violent methods are not used against those who are respected and treated as equals. While violence has historical roots that stem from the military regime as well as from prior periods of oppression, in many ways it is dependent on the changing perception of the upper and middle classes to recognize the developments and humanity within the favelas and to stop calling for the use of repression to provide them with a sense of security. Police need to be responsibly trained to see favela residents as more than criminals and learn to treat *moradores* as citizens who also need their services and protection. Coupled with this is the inclusion of residents into the political sphere so that they have the opportunity to become true citizens as well as the inclusion of the favelas into the formal city. *Moradores* must be welcomed into the political culture of the city as a whole so that they can begin to become active participants in democracy. In turn society must be willing to support and encourage their developing political involvement. Residents must be willing to move beyond their comfort zone of participating only within the communities. It is essential that the strong civic development within the communities be channeled into a broader scope. Residents must also develop a willingness to participate in a society that has long excluded them – a difficult task for policy makers to approach. Lastly, favelas must begin to become integrated within the city as a whole. For decades the favelas have operated as cities

within a city and it is time for them to become fully a part of the city. The extension of basic services to the communities through Pacification is the beginning of this, but much will have to be done to work with each individual community in order to integrate that community and its specific needs into the city as whole. A great deal can be learned from the experiences of *Favela-Bairro* and the GPAE and policy makers should look towards these past lessons to find a way to foster legitimacy and ownership of projects as well as to individually incorporate the favelas from “spaces” to a “places”.

All of these processes have the potential to come out of pacified favelas, but depend on both favela residents and residents of the city as a whole to contribute to this undertaking. As the drug-induced violence is removed from the communities it allows their energy to be redirected into community improvements and into enhancements of self; educational, vocational, and cultural opportunities will have the possibility to emerge and strengthen themselves while the communities can begin to focus on development and combating structural violence rather than the daily struggle to survive in a war zone. It is critical that the city as a whole recognizes this and be able to develop their attitudes about favela residents in turn, in order to be able to see the positive within the community now that the cloud of drug trafficking has been removed. It will require the delicate establishment of trust and goodwill as both sides move towards a more positive future that will remove favela residents from their status as marginalized individuals and allow them to become *gente* (people). Rio de Janeiro

will only be further brought to life as such a vibrant portion of its population is able to fully participate within society.

It is important to bear in mind that nothing involved with the Favela Pacification Program, nor any conclusions drawn from its effects, can be seen in black and white, as good or bad, or as functioning or failing. Rather, when small successes are made they must be recognized as signs of progress while simultaneously remaining cognizant of the shortcomings that are still in accompaniment. Pacification is a program that needs to address a widely diverse situation; the number of factors that have combined to create the present day condition of the favelas and how they interact with the rest of Rio de Janeiro cannot be underestimated nor simplified. Such a complex and multidimensional issue by nature requires a multi-faceted solution that is not only flexible, but also able to endure through the inevitable setbacks that will occur and in order to survive in the long-term. Success is dependent upon a multitude of factors; the continued supply of basic resources, spatial redefinition, social perception, police action and mentality, and resident participation and investment. The Favela Pacification Program can begin to open the door for change if these factors are addressed and it would be remiss to not see the potential within the program even as it struggles with the persistence of violence, both physical and structural, in dealing with the favelas.

In this thesis I have emphasized the potential of the Favela Pacification Program to produce the beginnings of forces that will contribute to the altering of traditional patterns of societal marginalization regarding favela residents. The program

struggles with removing the presence of violence from within itself; however, this struggle is entirely worthwhile if it allows for a number of other aspects of the program to shine through. The fact that the communities are now in the position to receive basic services from the government for the first time since their inception is a much needed and impressive first step. Water, electricity, garbage collection, and proper sewage installments may sound like simple improvements to be made, but the enhancements to the quality of life in communities who will receive these services cannot be underestimated. The government has been slow in bringing these services to the pacified communities and it is an aspect of pacification that must be maintained if residents are to see these services as a gesture of goodwill and respect towards the communities. Other public amenities such as school and educational improvements will be crucial towards the success of pacification as well. Currently there are immense deficits in the educational system in place within the favelas; many residents only attend primary school, many communities lack secondary schools, teachers are often frightened away by the violence, and schools are often targets in the outbursts of violence. If improvements to education can be made they will not only produce a significant portion of Rio de Janeiro's population that is more educated, but educational enhancements also serve to generate youth who are more involved in the political and civic spheres as well as a population who can enter the formal employment market thus further contributing to the city's economy. As the position of a hard and honest worker is reason for respect within communities, employment is essential for discovering feelings of self-worth and also a major concern for residents.

Formal employment will also aid in the negation of the cycle of poverty and allow for residents to pay taxes and finance further improvements to their own communities.

Pacification is far more likely to be accepted in the long-term as a legitimate program and thus incur lasting progress if the provision of basic resources are continued and consistently improved upon.

Basic services in addition to providing an improved state of living also bestow on the favelas the recognition as true communities, and remove from them the state of ignored illegal settlements, which is a powerful thing for the favelas. Due to their illegal and stigmatized nature favelas have never been a part of the formal city or a formal place, but rather they exist in the informal city as a space. This classification is both a physical and a social construct and hence will need to be addressed on both levels. The provision of services to the communities not only incorporates them physically as water and electrical lines and the public amenities of garbage collection, mail distribution, and police attention will serve to link the favelas to the *asfalto*, but also in the social consciousness. They are no longer illegal spaces, but are beginning to transform into places connected to the rest of the city and society as a whole will have to begin to recognize them as such.

Social perception is a critical component to the success of the Favela Pacification Program as both the perception of favelas by the city as a whole and by residents themselves must begin to alter. For generations the “legitimate” city has seen the favelas as a source of social problems like crime and drugs and viewed residents as criminal elements who contributed little to the rest of the city. These perceptions have

begun to crack with the emergence and popularity of NGOs like AfroReggae, which highlights the artistic potential of favela residents; pacification has the opportunity to expand upon this. By providing peace in the communities, an improved course for residents to receive an education and formal employment, and removing the physical barriers between the formal and informal city outsiders now have the opportunity to see residents for themselves, not for the haze of stigmatization and prejudice. Favela residents themselves must also begin to change their perceptions as they begin to receive improved educations and obtain legitimate employment. The clinging lack of recognition of self-worth and value has been a dominant feature to favela history as residents have been so marginalized and so convinced of their lack of societal value to the point that they often profess to be invisible. The drug traffic is one of the few ways residents gain acknowledgement within their communities and by the city as a whole. Pacification affords the opportunity for residents to begin to distance themselves from the traditional patron-client relationship that were established with the traffic and to place themselves in a position to gain recognition through legal and legitimate means while distancing themselves from the stigma of crime. By taking advantage of provided educational opportunities and the chance to enter the formal employment sector residents are placed in a position where they can begin to rewrite how they perceive themselves and their communities, hopefully in a more positive light. Provisions through the Favela Pacification Program offer the fundamental building blocks to adjust social perceptions of the favelas from all sides; adjustments that are critical for the alteration of societal marginality. Without changing the mentalities

there is no way for marginalization to become a feature of the past, but rather it will always reoccur despite any and all other efforts.

Coupled with the change in societal perception is the need for a transformation in police perception. Police violence and brutality towards the favelas in reaction to the threat of the drug traffic and the overwhelming insistence from the upper and middle classes to counter with confrontation in order to create a sense of security is a defining feature of the favela. Daily life is met with violence that barely discriminates between *traficante* and *trabalhador* leaving residents trapped in a war that does not end. The Favela Pacification Program promises a shift in public security policy in that it seeks to return to the traditional model of community policing and offers the assurance that those officers who will be placed in the UPPs will be accountable and trained to be responsive to residents rather than maintaining the traditional militaristic mentality. Police protection can no longer be seen as a service that only the elites receive. It is this transformation that cannot be stressed enough; the shift in police perception has the potential to eliminate the source of the vast majority of violence that has plagued favelas and thus allow them to move past marginality.

Finally, it is key that favela residents participate and invest in the Favela Pacification Program in order to ensure that the program can in fact bring societal changes to the communities. Understandably creating the will to invest and participate in a program that initially treats residents in such a violent and disrespectful manner is a difficult task. Pacification does not begin in a way that will endear residents to its presence as they are terrorized and regarded as criminals during a massive invasion of

their homes by the feared BOPE. Nor does the history of government involvement in the favelas lend itself to acquiring the trust of residents who display caution in investing in a program that many expect to disappear once the Olympic Games end. After all, programs do not tend to last long in the favelas nor does the government stick to its promises. However it falls on the shoulders of the Favela Pacification Program to set new standard and to, with time, prove to residents that this is a program that will last. UPP officers will have to prove to residents that they can be respectful and involved in the community in peaceful ways. And the government will have to maintain the provision of basic services to the communities and be careful to consult consistently with the communities in order to engage residents. If residents can see that they are being treated with respect, that this program is determined to be a success, and that their needs and concerns are being taken into account they are far more likely to engage in the program thus legitimizing it. It is only with legitimacy gained through residents' participation and engagement that the Favela Pacification Program can begin to alter societal marginalization and allow favela residents the opportunity to be truly seen and become complete members of society.

Pacification has begun the necessary step to approach the elimination of societal marginality. While the programs itself cannot simply enter and cause engrained aspects of marginality to disintegrate, it has set into the process into motion. In time, if Pacification continues to meet its objectives and works to eliminate the violence of its initial phase, it can break through the persistence of marginality. As appropriate living conditions begin to be provided, the government is addressing its

prior inability to support residents and is combating structural violence. Traditional social problems will no longer be able to be blamed upon favela residents as the peace of Pacification allows residents the opportunity to prove their value to society. Residents are also placed in the position to begin to reform their own identity in a way that excludes the previous labels of laziness, worthlessness, and criminality. Society will no longer be in the position to claim that marginal cause social problems; in effect forcing elites to confront the true reasons behind marginality and their own role in its production. In this lies Pacification's innovation. By addressing the roots of societal marginalization's persistence in a way that is non-accusatory and demands participation the greatest potential to eliminate marginality has emerged.

Favelas have been forced to operate under their own rhythm and rules out of necessity. They have been so neglected and discriminated against by government and society a whole that they must live by their own law. However, in 2008 the potential for change was introduced. The Favela Pacification Program has the ability to begin to break through the persistence of societal marginalization, which thus forth has never been accomplished, and within the pacified communities constructive evolution indeed has the potential to begin. Peace is a feeling that cannot be imposed, but it can be cultivated and nurtured. I have asserted that the Favela Pacification Program represents an opportunity in which to affect real change on the long ingrained pattern of societal marginalization of favela residents. However, the potential of the process having a positive impact, which would occur in the second phase, is diminished by the brutality of the first phase. It is an imperfect opportunity, but an opportunity

nonetheless to curb the mayhem and slowly begin the change that would impart upon a major portion of Rio's population their dignity, their citizenship, and their humanity; they would be able to become *gente*.

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