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A TASK FORCE REPORT ON
COMMUNITY DISRUPTION INDICATORS AND RESPONSE COORDINATION

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Part I
Conceptual and Theoretical Background

The following statement is the end product of a long process of task force meetings, field testing, and reworking of analytical ideas against concrete examples of social phenomena. The overall formulation shows some relationship to "systems theory" but no attempt has been made to develop a tightly knit relationship. Rather what we use here are particular perspectives which we think throw some light on the notion of community disruption and response coordination at times of disaster. Part of the purpose of this report is to underline what has been omitted as well as what has been used, and more importantly why they have either been accepted or rejected in the development of our approach to the problem.

We deal with methodological as well as theoretical issues and questions. Thus, a major effort has been made to develop data gathering techniques that have some relationship to the conceptual and analytical ideas advanced. We assume certain kinds of information are crucial if certain concepts and analyses are to be valid in any kind of explanation or understanding sought about the problem.

In what follows, key concepts are first set forth. A justification is given for each particular usage along with a statement about assets and liabilities in using the concept (and associated empirical data) in particular ways. In conclusion, we make an attempt to show how all the various concepts can be usefully joined together, methodologically and theoretically, as a workable approach to the phenomena we are interested in studying.

Community

The notion of community often advanced in the literature is one which assumes a more or less self contained, rationally defined and internally consistent entity. This particular view has for certain purposes not proven to be particularly useful since in larger communities these characteristics do not seem to be especially dominant (although they may hold for smaller communities, in particular those organized around an explicit set of powerful values, e.g., the Amish). The fact that DRC will study most often the Gesellschaft type of community seems to justify the effort made to develop a notion of community which is not oriented to the Gemeinschaft type. However, since our notion of community does not have any pre-defined characteristics it should be able to capture both types adequately. Since we are concerned with community in disaster we have only attempted to create a notion of community that is adequate for a disaster situation (although its implications for non-disaster situations are clear but not developed in this report). The best way to relate the notion of community which this task force has accepted is to start with a very brief discussion of the historical development of the concentration of human groupings.

Human beings have settled on the face of the earth in varying degrees of density and centrality. Social and cultural life has developed in a relatively ad hoc fashion. Some sectors of the social world have been rationally defined and their boundaries are coterminous with their raison-d'etre. However, many of

the boundaries of the various sectors of human life are quite arbitrary although they may have been rationally located in terms of their general location. Also, many aspects of social life are largely free of spacial constraints.

What results are concentrations of people whose needs are being cared for by various political, economic and service entities. Many of the jurisdictions of these various groups and organizations are ad hoc and arbitrary and are more heavily indebted to historical accident, political lobbying, personal and/or corporate power than to rational planning.

As a result, it is rare that many, if any, of the boundaries of one jurisdiction of a service or political entity correspond with another or most others. Rather, we get a more accurate picture if we conceive of a series of overlays of jurisdictional boundaries on a map with some spacial locations shared by all and a rather hazy boundary where correspondence of domains decreases.

The notion that a community is an interrelated system with its many parts being rationally interconnected is also problematic. (The organismic model is found wanting.) It seems more accurate to depict concentrations of social life as the end product of historical accidents and individuals and group planning which have over time made some adjustments of each other as they have created conflict, tension, competition. Thus what we tend to have in a human concentration is a loosely linked rather than highly integrated web of interrelationships. From this it follows that any change in the environment of this concentration of social life will not necessarily effect all of it. Thus while whole sectors of a particular social entity can be disrupted not every organization, group, or individual is affected.

In light of the above, the task force decided to set aside this notion of community. We concluded that the best course of action for our purposes was to focus on those aspects of human concentrations which select themselves out as a disaster impacts them. There is no pre-defined pattern of response assumed by this viewpoint nor is there any pre-defined list of organizations or groups or individuals which are seen as always responding at a time of emergency.

What is seen as more realistic is the following scene. There exists a particular concentration of people in a particular location. It is not well-defined internally nor is it particularly highly interrelated. A specific disaster agent impacts this area and creates a variety of problems and threatens the continuity of the social, economic, political, etc. life of this population. As a result, certain groups, individuals, and organizations take steps to mitigate and/or repair the damage and reinstate a new stable level of activities to support the social life of the area.

Thus, theoretically community life becomes that subset of individuals, groups, and organizations which respond to the problems created by a disaster instead of the possible total set of individuals, groups, and organizations in that particular concentration of social life.

Methodologically then, the field team sent to a disaster area would locate its community by searching out those individuals, groups, and organizations which have assumed the various tasks necessary to put the impacted area "back on its feet." While past DRC research has probably located and documented most of the necessary task areas which need to be completed, the instrument which will be used should be flexible enough to capture any new task area which may have been missed.

From a methodological viewpoint, we must also consider the problem that since specific tasks have not been specified (nor have particular individuals or groups or organizations for these tasks) that the information on any one disaster may be somewhat idiosyncratic. This, however, is not as large a problem as it seems. The response to a disaster operates under several constraints. Cities in America, for example, all tend to delegate the same certain responsibilities to the same organizations across the country. State and federal laws and regulations, responsibilities and organizations also help to make responses to disaster in different areas quite similar. It might also be mentioned that, at a descriptive level, certain types of disaster agents seem to create the same tasks and thus tend to homogenize the response patterns of communities into a few types of responses. Thus, in as much as communities in America share basic patterns of solving day to day situations, they will have similar skills, structures and organizational divisions of labor, upon which they draw from and depend upon in a disaster response.

In considering the possible disadvantages of this conception of community, the task force was concerned that for purposes of comparability of findings such an approach would be problematic. It was concluded, however, that arbitrary definitions of a community as co-terminous with city limits was even more problematic. Thus, while the proposed notion of community may make the initial field work quite tentative, in the long run all groups, organizations and individuals responsible for community response to disaster should have been recognized and studied.

A Biographical Approach to Communities in Disaster

The task force feels that such an approach to community is largely a biographical approach, that is, the focal concern and search for understanding of a particular community response is sought inductively. By this we mean the authority of the particular case being studied overrides theoretical explanations which are too broad to account for the idiosyncratic and/or historical factors which may be highly significant for an accurate understanding of a particular community and its response to disaster. The field instruments designed by this task force have been organized in such a way as to facilitate the biographical approach. It has been the task force's conclusion that this approach to communities in disaster offers the following advantages.

- 1) It treats each disaster as a unit in and of itself, which makes the data collected as coherent and meaningful as the situation from which it was collected; this will help reduce distortion.
- 2) Since each disaster will have a somewhat different course of events and will hinder community life from returning to pre-disaster patterns for varying amounts of time, the biographical approach will allow the research on each disaster to be continued until a restabilization has occurred, thus making unnecessary a more arbitrary cutting off point in research.
- 3) Since a biographical approach is much less structured than a one model approach, and since the state of our present knowledge does not present an adequate single model of community response in disaster, a biographical approach will allow for the possible emergence of empirically based "ideal types" if such are to be found. This seems reasonable since much of the research is exploratory in nature.

4) This approach could also have enough structure to allow for comparability between the various communities studied under disaster conditions. Nexuses of comparability arise from two sources in such an approach: a) In as much as it is fair to say that communities share a common structural dimension, they will also have equivalent organizations and services which keep the community operating. Thus, this approach could build into it instruments to collect comparative data. b) In as much as disasters create similar problems or types of problems for communities, the life history of each individual community response will show like problems. Each case report could thus be structured in such a way as to make problems comparable.

5) A biographical approach also would allow data concerning solutions to problems to be collected systematically and in a way which would be readily comparable.

6) The historical aspect of the biographical approach allows us to include past activities on the part of a community in their response to previous disasters since community life is seen as an ongoing activity. The focus on historical aspects also allows us to study pre-disaster, interorganizational patterns and would allow us to identify any major shift in the pattern of interorganizational relationships as a result of the disaster.

7) The biographical approach would also be flexible enough to deal with, study and analyze the importance and effect of powerful individuals in any community response.

8) The biographical approach also lends itself easily to the study of contextual variables which are part of the community's profile. Such variables as disaster sub-culture, degree of organizational richness, disaster planning, etc., would be intervening, contextual variables which may be essential to a thorough analysis of a community response.

9) Since we view the response to a disaster as largely an emergent phenomena, the biographical approach should allow us to capture and chart the developmental aspects of a particular response. Thus, the biographical approach is seen to be broad enough to incorporate the idiosyncratic features of community response to disaster and the task-oriented research instruments operate to organize our information in such a way as to allow for the identification of empirical types or patterns of response. Thus, while not all studies of community response will be comparable, types of disaster and the response to them should be more comparable if any empirical commonalities exist.

The implicit possibilities which the task force anticipates are generally conceived of as follows. Research should uncover independent variables, namely types of disaster agents. That is, different disaster agents may well create common response tasks for communities. Research should be able to specify types of intervening variables such as disaster sub-culture, organizational richness, disaster planning, degree of community disruption (e.g., disruption indicators) as well as specify their effects on the dependent variable of our research, namely community response.

The field instruments designed by this task force attempt to collect data on these types of variables as well as attempting to understand and/or explain how they influence each other.

Coordination

Next we will describe what we mean by coordination in community response and how the task force proposes to capture the patterns of coordination in response.

Our notion of community focused around the idea that those individuals, groups and organizations who become involved in response to a disaster are for our purposes the community to be studied. The task force decided that the best way to approach the study of coordination was via the tasks which were undertaken as a result of the disaster agent. Since there is no absolutely necessary connection between who does a task and the nature of the task, we believe it to be more economical and fruitful to focus on a list of task areas instead of a list of potentially involved organizations. While we expect quite regular patterns of organizations and the tasks they perform, we feel that focusing on task is more useful. It is useful for at least two additional purposes. Organizations may be involved in more than one task at one time and as such would have to be analyzed separately in relation to the tasks performed. Therefore, if a focus on task were taken initially in the field work our data would already be collected in an analyzable form. While in one sense the information collected is the same either way, it is the task force's feeling that it is in a more analyzable form if collected under the task heading instead of the organization heading.

Collection of material by task area is useful for another reason. While it is not always clear who is organizing and directing recovery activities, it is always possible to locate them. It seems more direct to contact the recovery crews as they perform their tasks in order to find out who is in charge. This is the case because telephone communication is often out and the availability of such information in the post-impact turmoil is often sketchy and incomplete, if not contradictory. Focus on task would allow a field team to proceed directly to the recovery activity and "work up the line" to uncover authority patterns, task allocations for organizations involved, problems encountered in completing the task, etc. Some contact with the line members of an organization would help build a perspective which could be applied to that given by the staff members of the same organization.

It seems quite clear that a task-oriented instrument is quite useful for several reasons. A disaster agent can create several types of tasks for a community. To date some of the tasks which have been examined are damage mitigation, warning, evacuation, search and rescue, community order, restoration of essential services, coordination, temporary housing, financing and rebuilding (e.g., design, loans, grants). While other tasks will be found in disaster situations, a field team could direct its search to cover some of the above types of tasks.

Perhaps one of the major advantages of a task-oriented instrument is that it brings groups, organizations and individuals into research focus only when they become involved in disaster response. No organization is involved apriori, and no level of involvement (e.g., municipal, state, federal) is assumed to be more central. The task oriented instrument seeks to establish who was responsible for the completion of disaster generated tasks. Thus, individuals, groups and organizations, by their involvement, become part of the community response whether or not they are geographically proximate or distant to the impacted area.

The field instrument is designed in such a way as to deal with a given task. It is quite similar to a sociometric study of a small group or power relations in communities. Essentially, it attempts to determine the nature of the interaction between individuals, groups and organizations involved in each disaster-generated task area. An attempt is made to capture the nature of pre-disaster contact between these organizations and also in their disaster context. An attempt is made to capture authority and power constellations as well as the patterns of exchanges of personnel, equipment and information.

An attempt is also made to capture the type of contact used (formal meetings, informal, etc.) to decide how to best complete the disaster-generated task. Also, an attempt is made to locate the types of problems that were encountered when attempting to complete a particular task.

What the field instrument should provide then is a picture of how a particular task was handled by specifying: 1) which individuals, groups and organizations were involved, 2) what authority relations were established, 3) what patterns of exchange developed, 4) what type of contact was utilized, 5) how central or decentral was this task response to the overall community response set, 6) where problems were encountered in each task area.

Thus, essentially our notion of coordination (already implicitly given) is a task oriented notion. The instrument will give us an indication of which individuals, groups and organizations worked on a given task and if they coordinated (i.e., attempted to rationally align and dispense their resources collectively or coterminously to increase their overall effectiveness by minimizing duplication, etc.) with other groups. If overall coordination for all task areas was attempted, it will also be captured by the instrument.

One of the more general possible products of this instrument is that possible response types (in terms of tasks) may be found and be in a form which would make them analyzable as outcomes of features of disaster agent types and other specified intervening variables.

Response Coordination and Systems Theory

The theory of the task force and its field instrument shows some common notions with systems theory. There are certain aspects of systems theory which were seen as quite fruitful and others whose application to the disaster situation were quite problematic. The task of this section of the report is to make clear which selected aspects of the systems approach we have accepted as well as the aspects we have discarded.

Problem-Solving Orientation

System theory argues that systems are under stress and that they attempt to elaborate themselves to successfully deal with this source of "tension." This notion seems particularly true in a disaster situation where a particular configuration of social life has been threatened and likewise its continuity as a going concern is placed in varying degrees of jeopardy. Assuming that this depiction of individual and group response to "public troubles" is accepted, the task force focus


on tasks seems to share this same conception. We assume that a community assesses its damages, projects its needs, formulates tasks and attempts to complete these tasks to restore the community to a more stable relationship with its environment (i.e., ensure its continuity as a going concern). It is our assumption that most, if not all, organizations involved in disaster response tend to operate on the basis of formulating the nature of the problem which leads to the determination of tasks to be completed.

Information

In order for those involved in community coordination to formulate the problems, define and assign the tasks, information seems crucial. The information needed can best be categorized as : 1) assessment of damage, 2) definition of task area priorities, 3) assessment of group and/or organization abilities, 4) assessment of task area demands (e.g., men, equipment). The field instrument attempts to determine the direction of information flow as well as some indication of its nature.

Feedback

The E.O.C. phenomena in disaster situations and the existence of frequent large meetings by those officials centrally involved in a disaster response seem quite compatible with the feedback notion. While feedback processes are difficult to find and study in more normal situations and are thus generally problematic for systems theory, in disaster situations, the notion seems quite useful. Buckley has given an adequate figure representation of the feedback process.



(Buckley, 1967: 173)

EOC activities tend to verify this action of setting disaster task goals with a daily report on progress and a resulting corrective action or change in task as a result of progress being made. The stressed importance of information becomes clearer in this light.

Changing Environment Sensitivity

Systems theory stresses that a system can not long exist without somehow keeping watch over the environment within which it operates and adjusting to changes in it. The disaster context inflates both the magnitude of the changes in the environment (since all out efforts are being made to repair the damage and eliminate the disruption) and the need to continually monitor changes and progress in the results of disaster response in order to be able to modify and change disaster response patterns. Since the post-impact community context is in great flux, environment sensitivity is quite crucial and updates on various tasks is frequent and generally seen to be essential.

Organization of Relationships

Systems theory emphasizes that the organization of relationships is one of the more important aspects of a system. While the task force was not particularly convinced of this argument or its rationale, it did agree that the organization of relationships between individuals, groups and organizations in response to disasters is important for an understanding of any particular community response. As mentioned earlier, since organizations could be involved in a variety of responses, the field instrument will collect information of the pattern of relationships for each task area.

Constraints - Variety

The constraint-variety notion stresses that a system never operates in a situation without being constrained by certain features of the environment, its own organization as a system, and its pattern of relationships with other systems. It also stresses that the environment is never constant and that variety is introduced as the environment changes. The task force is interested in how the variety introduced by a disaster agent is handled by a community system which has the constraints of its normal modus operandi in non-disaster times. It is also interested in the effects of the intervening variables such as disaster sub-culture and disaster planning which would tend to act as intermittent constraint patterns to deal with intermittent variety. Thus, the task of any field team would be to locate the constraints which the community response operates under as well as to locate the type of variety the disaster agent confronts the community with. Also any setting events (intervening variables) and their effects should be specified.

Unwanted Features of Systems Orientation

Several aspects of the systems orientation are not seen as fruitful either because they would: 1) force unnecessary rigour, 2) their impact is too vague to be useful, or 3) the validity of the notion is problematic.

Morphogenesis

That simplification can be adaptive is evident in disasters. The notion that a system survives by the process of elaboration of its structure is problematic. Elaboration does not necessarily imply or guarantee the healthy adjustment of a system. The notion of morphogenesis implies that complexity results from the accumulation of successful mappings to the environment. The task force sees no necessity to posit a continuous process of structure-elaboration, at least not for our purposes. While we would expect a community to generate disaster plans, at least temporary strategies (a form of constraint) to deal with the variety introduced into its environment by a disaster agent, all this can be done without maintaining a morphogenic, holistic notion of system.

As a matter of conjecture, we would be inclined to argue that much of the disaster response activities (e.g., EOC structures) is an attempt to simplify the more elaborate structure by which the community normally operates. Thus, while in one sense the construction or emergence of a new disaster plan or modus operandi may be specified as an elaboration, it may be essentially an attempt to achieve simplicity.

System

While the specific characteristics of a system could be elaborated, we have decided it is not useful to our purposes. It would tend to lead to unnecessary rigour in the data collection and analysis which does not seem helpful or particularly crucial. Since we perceive the community not as a rationally planned, logically integrated whole, we see no reason to view a system as such either. Rather we will view community and its response as an ad hoc response which is shaped by the idiosyncratic and historical structure which existed in that community prior to the disaster agent impact. Thus the notion of systemness seems vague and of questionable utility. If the notion of system is not really empirically evident, then the attempt to calculate the degree of correspondence to an ideal type does not seem useful.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be said that in light of our notion of community, the task orientation of the field instrument seems justified. An attempt has been made to develop an instrument which searches for patterns in the empirical world and which does not tend to impart order to that world by its use. Our approach is inductive and we feel that in light of our conception of community, this is justified. We have attempted to avoid rigorous conceptual clarity because it would be premature at this time.

PART II

COMMUNITY COORDINATION

FIELD INSTRUMENT MANUAL

General Community Information Sheet

The general orientation of this study is that a particular disaster agent (independent variable) has impacted the community under study. We want to study how the community responds in its attempt to recover from this disaster. Thus, community response is the dependent variable. There are, however, many possible contextual variables which have an effect on this response to the disaster agent. Such intervening variables as disaster sub-culture, disaster planning, organizational richness, impact mitigating structures, non-disaster community coordination patterns, etc., all have effects on community response. Thus, the yellow "General Community Information Sheet" asks the field team to make note of any setting events or contextual variables which are significant in the explanation of the particular community response under study.

Organization Task Information Sheet

Since we cannot assume that any organization is homogeneous in terms of its structure or the tasks it undertakes, the green field instrument has been developed. When an organization is first contacted this sheet should be used on a higher level member of the "line" in the organization (e.g., the captain of a division of the Police Department). In this position, he should be in a position to know which tasks the organization has been involved in as well as be able to direct the field team to those members of the organization most centrally involved in this task response. By this taping of one informed member of the organization, the field team can then seek out those individuals in the organization who know what exactly was done by that organization in a task area, as well as who they worked with to complete the task.

1) Organization _____

2) Position of Respondent (Informant) in that Organization _____

3) Which task(s) was he responsible for in the emergency response and with which organization did he work?

task _____ Organizations worked with _____

task _____ (list in order of importance)
Organizations worked with _____

task _____ (list in order of importance)
Organizations worked with _____

(list in order of importance)

4) If more than one task,
Which task was the most demanding of his time and the resources at his command?
(Rank in order from most to least) _____

5) If more than one-man organization,
What other tasks did other personnel become involved with?

a) person (name & position) _____

task(s) (list) _____

b) person (name & position) _____

task(s) (list) _____

c) person (name & position) _____

task(s) (list) _____

6) What are the normal responsibilities of this organization, functionally speaking

What are the limits or jurisdictional boundaries of these responsibilities, functionally speaking?

7) Was this the first disaster this organization was ever involved in in the local community? Yes _____ No _____ If yes, indicate date of last response _____
What tasks did this organization handle at that time and with what other organizations?

task _____	Organizations worked with _____
task _____	Organizations worked with _____
task _____	Organizations worked with _____

8) How does this particular response differ from previous disaster experience, either in terms of the tasks handled or the organizations worked with?
(Be specific):

Response Coordination Field Instrument

While the general rationale for this field instrument is given in the Response Coordination Task Force report, a brief statement of what we hope to acquire by this instrument will briefly be given. The instrument is task oriented. An organization may have been involved with one or more organizations in one or more task areas. Thus the following set of questions are to be asked for each respondent for each task area, for each organization coordinated with to complete that task. For example, if Civil Defense has 6 staff members, each with a responsibility for a particular task (e.g., search, rescue, warning) each individual should be interviewed. If the same respondent has been involved in several task areas then each person should be interviewed about his involvement in each task area. If in their work on a task, they coordinate with one or more than one organization, that relationship should be questioned for each organization. In terms of the mechanics of administering the instrument the following steps should be taken:

- 1) Fill out the sheet as you ask the questions. This way the information is already in usable form and is available in the case of tape recorder dysfunction.
- 2) This sheet attempts to document the nature of one organization's relationship with another organization concerning the nature of their contact for one task area. Thus, a form is to be completed for each organizational contact for each task area. Thus, if Civil Defense worked on warning with three organizations, three sheets would be filled out to chart how this was accomplished. If it worked on search and rescue with two police organizations and the fire department, three more sheets would be required. If OD worked with one organization concerning temporary housing, then one sheet is to be filled out. If this is all CD was involved with, then a total of 7 sheets would be required to trace their involvement.

While this may seem like a phenomenal task, this is really not the case. While one organization or individual may be central in the community response and thus be involved in several tasks with several organizations, most organizations are involved in one task with one or two organizations. Thus, while some interviews would be lengthy due to the centrality of involvement, this is warranted for this very reason. This may require an interview at a time more removed from the immediate disaster, but this is a common strategy for central figures.

Also, a closer look at the instrument shows that very few, if any, organizations would be involved in all of the activities listed. Thus, while each question is asked, not all of them are relevant and thus the administration of the instrument is quite rapid.

- 3) If an organization, when working with another organization on the completion of a task would transfer more than (1) one of the following: personnel, equipment, information, instructions, then a separate sheet should be filled out for each type of transfer (section 3 of instrument) which was made. It is rare that more than one type of transfer is made, but if this does occur, the information concerning this transfer (e.g., what, how much, by what type of contact, how important was the transfer, etc.) is necessary for a complete picture.

Turning to the instrument itself, a brief summary of the intent of the questions will be given.

Section 1

In this section we want to know which organization is being interviewed, what task area this organization was involved in, position of the individual respondent in the organization, when the task was originated and completed and if the task was completed 1) independent of another organization, 2) by absorption of another organization's resources, or 3) in coordination with another organization. This will give us an indication of who worked with whom in each task area and will give us a beginning on perceiving any sociometric patterns.

Section 2

This section of the instrument tries to capture the power, responsibility or dominance structure in the community response pattern as well as showing how this came about. Thus we know who was responsible for gearing up the response for each task area.

Section 3

Here any transfers, the amount, the direction of transfer and the type of contact utilized will help to specify further the nature of any coordination which took place for any task. Again direction of transfer is sought to get a clear picture of where the resources were and who utilized them.

Section 4

In this section an attempt is made to see what the non-disaster contact patterns were between the two organizations coordinated to see how important and consistent non-disaster community contacts are in shaping the emergency response patterns.

1) Organization being interviewed _____

Position of respondent _____

Task _____

When initiated _____ When completed _____

How was task completed: (1) other organization coordination with (name) _____

(2) other organization's resources absorbed (name) _____

(3) accomplished independently _____

2) IF INVOLVED WITH ANOTHER ORGANIZATION:

Who initiated this arrangement? _____

How was this arrangement arrived at? (circle one) formal meeting informal meeti

phone call other _____

3) WERE THERE ANY TRANSFERS? (circle one) personnel equipment information instruction

If personnel or equipment: no. _____ type _____ direction of transfer _____

If information or instructions: seeking _____% giving _____%

Position of individual contacted in other organization _____

Types of contacts:

formal meeting

both present but no interaction (freq & duration) _____

both present and interacted (freq & duration) _____

informal (face-to-face) (freq & duration) _____

phone, radio (freq & duration) _____

in memos, reports, letters (freq & duration) _____

How important was this transfer to complete this task? _____

Direction of contact(s): self-initiated _____% Other initiated _____%

4) NON-EMERGENCY CONTACT:

Purpose _____ Frequency _____

Type: formal meeting _____% informal face-to-face _____%

phone _____%

Direction of contact(s): self-initiated _____% Other initiated _____%

Was it particularly easy working with this organization in this task area and why?
Or were there difficulties in working with organization and why?