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[Translation]

Address of Lieutenant General Halder, delivered in the lecture course of the German Defense Academy before generals, staff officers, and members of the General Staff.

The information comes from a gentleman who had a look at the stenographic report and then made the following notes from memory.

It is not my duty nor ours to explain the political factors of the present situation and debate them; it is well known to me that in our corps of officers there are many who do not sympathize with the present political leadership of the state and with the world outlook prevailing in our Fatherland, who, indeed, directly and sharply oppose this world outlook. We, the army and the corps of officers, are, however, not intended to discuss political questions, but we have to concern ourselves merely with the purely military questions and prospects of an impending war, to study them from the technical standpoint, and, if so ordered, to act and fight. The settlement of political questions belongs solely and alone to the Fuehrer of the German Reich, who has sufficiently proved by his genius that he has at his fingertips the feeling for the proper moment for execution. Thus the army does not have to draw the sword until the Fuehrer orders.

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We must thank the Fuehrer for smashing, a short time ago, the so-called Third Front, which might have been a great obstacle to the attainment of our aims. We all know what state I mean: the former Czechoslovakia. This dangerous state might have served the western powers as an airplane base, to say nothing of other factors, for aircraft and bombers which were intended primarily for destructive attacks on the German industrial area, which is so important. This wish-dream of the western powers has now been destroyed by our talented Fuehrer, and we, the military men, have been relieved of a great worry.

So we can now turn to our principal enemy, Poland. I scarcely need to remind you of the period of the "treaties of friendship" with Poland, treaties which were never taken seriously by the people in our country or in Poland and which did not enjoy any popularity. However, the political situation at that time demanded that they be made, which likewise was not the business of the military men but of the responsible statesmen. At that time we did not have to express our opinions either, for we are soldiers, who have to execute the orders received, without asking about the "why" and "wherefore".

What interests us soldiers the most is the war potential of the future enemy. We know, from the period

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of the German-Polish treaties of friendship already mentioned, a great deal about the Polish army, for at that time our officials did not allow the time to go by unused. We also have very recent information and reports of a reliable nature which place us, or me, in a position to consider the Polish army in detail. Without wishing or being permitted to tell you everything today (that will come later), I should like to concern myself with a few questions of principle.

It is well known that the Polish soldier is the most stupid in the world, with the exception of the Rumanian. Unintelligent, bigoted, and of unbelievable clumsiness, he is decidedly inferior to our material. Poland has few motorized troops. Those that there are, are not good, as Poland possesses only a very poor war industry, without much experience, which is and will be evident from the manufactured products.

Her air arm is small: some of the existing airplanes are antiquated, that is, scarcely usable, and there are few young pilots coming on. Training leaves much to be desired. The men are frequently only slightly trained, which is true not only of the air arm but also of all the other arms. The cavalry, which is in fifth place with regard to numbers and in second or third with regard to horsemanship, is comparatively strong. In com-

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parison with her total strength, Poland possesses a rather high number of cavalry regiments, that is, 44.

Poland, our ancient hereditary foe, can place not more than 70 divisions in the field, but in so doing her whole strength will have been exhausted. By the smashing of Czechoslovakia, at least 40 divisions have been released on our side, which otherwise would have been used against the Czechs. These 40 divisions we can now use to advantage against Poland.

We must understand clearly that there is only one task for us: the complete destruction of Poland, so that she cannot pull herself together again. This time, there will not be any battles in the usual sense of the word; the thrust will and must be carried out so destructively that Poland, for very terror, will not even attempt a defense and will capitulate, in case this had not already been done before. Under all circumstances, we shall proceed with the whole destructive, smashing superiority of our armed might, so that the decision must be attained before Russia can even take one seriously meant step to help. Even if England and France immediately hasten to aid and begin to march, our army can hold the western powers in check on the western ramparts until a decision has been reached in the East. This must be gained in three weeks at most, in fact, if possible, in 14 days.

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The general attack will be so sweeping that for Poland there will be no rescue, no escape.

We shall advance with speed and power such as the world has never seen.

The Danzig question will be settled "at any rate"; the attack (against Poland) will be made from Danzig, by the Elbing Division, the SS and other formations.

Another general advance of our troops will be made from Moravia, Slovakia, Silesia, West and East Prussia, and Pommerellen; the attack from East Prussia will be made by the I and II Army Corps; an encircling attack will be made from the Rosenberg-Ratibor-Maehrisch Ostrau-Zilinia region by Groups One and Three.

After the destructive first blow, Poland will probably withdraw into the region between Warsaw and Lodz, and perhaps even behind the Vistula.

In the meantime, a new and hitherto unknown weapon will be employed by us, which will take care of the rest. I mean, our propaganda [service]. This will break down the people and the army to an extent undreamed of heretofore, will provide for revolution and rioting in the interior, in factories, at the front, et cetera, and will perform a work which will be second to no military arm. The Great Ukrainian Movement will be unveiled, supported
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and promoted by all means at our disposal, until the Great Ukrainians rise. Our propaganda will give the final blow to the Poles; our talented Dr. Goebbels guarantees that. A re-grouping of the Polish army or the bringing up of reserves worthy of the name can hardly be considered; there will be no time for that, for in the meantime the army will be destroyed and the people and army broken down. The population will see the impossibility of resistance, will give way and capitulate.

Even if Russia awakes from her dullness and surprise and attempts to hasten to bring aid, it will be too late. France will not risk an attack on our western fortifications, but will dig in behind the Maginot Line, happy if we do not attack her. But if France should become unpleasant, both France and England too will get a taste of the severest air raids of our superior air arm, which will take away from them any desire [for combat]. The morale of the interior must be broken down, both in the West and in the East; the population must not be allowed, for sheer terror, to recover its senses.

We shall advance in the closest cooperation with Italy. German troops will advance against Egypt, together with Italian troops from Libya; Italy will attack British and French points of support and possessions, un-

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til we finally break through Rumania. We shall also remain on the offensive in the Aegean Sea; the offensive must never be left to the enemy. Both in Rumania and in Galicia also, oil and oil wells must be seized first of all.

In addition to the Maginot Line, France will also be sufficiently occupied in the Pyrenees, and will not be able to think of an attack at all. I am not in a position to inform you of all the details today, because I am not permitted to do that as yet, but I shall return to some things in the next lecture. In particular, I shall have to concern myself also with the work and mission of the Italian army, to which we shall and must devote all possible help, in order to strengthen its backbone and to reach our joint objectives.