

University of Delaware
Disaster Research Center

HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE DISASTER SERIES
#4

POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND PROBLEMS
OF THE LOCAL RED CROSS DISASTER RELIEF
IN THE 1960s

David S. Adams

FORWARD

In the middle 1960's as part of a series of studies of the activities of emergency organizations in disasters in the United States, the Disaster Research Center (DRC) undertook a comparative analysis of the operation of local Red Cross chapters. A limited circulation working paper on policies, programs and problems of local Red Cross chapters in disaster relief was produced in 1970 as a result of that work.

In the intervening years a number of changes have occurred, particularly in the official policies of the Red Cross with respect to long-run disaster relief. Thus, some of the observations and statements in the following report are not applicable to the present day situation and activities of the organization. However, for purposes of providing an historical record, and since some of what is described and analyzed is still highly relevant to the present time, DRC has decided to issue a somewhat modified version of that original working paper. Apart from minor editorial changes, the only difference between these publications is the elimination of the last chapter in the original report because it is no longer relevant.

Russell R. Dynes
E. L. Quarantelli
Co-Directors
Disaster Research Center

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In a disaster of any magnitude that occurs in American society, the Red Cross is certain to be present. Much of the mass care which is necessary during such emergencies becomes the responsibility of the Red Cross. Too, unlike other emergency organizations, the Red Cross has continuing responsibilities in the rehabilitation phase. Because of such extensive involvement in disaster activities, only a limited aspect of this involvement can be considered here. The concern here is to depict the operations of this organization during the emergency period -- the nature of the problems it encounters and the possible organizational sources of the difficulties it may have in carrying out its activities. In this sense, the report is problem oriented rather than concentrating on achievements.

While the focus of the report will be on the local chapter of the Red Cross in its disaster activities, these local activities have to be seen in the context of their relationship to national level policy and to Red Cross personnel based outside the community. Consequently, after a brief discussion of the data upon which this report is based, attention will be given to the general structure of the Red Cross. In the second chapter, the disaster orientation of the Red Cross is outlined, particularly as this orientation is revealed in the emergency demands which the organization accepts as legitimate. The bulk of this second chapter, therefore, concerns the tasks which members of the Red Cross perform in disaster.

Subsequent chapters will consider the Red Cross mobilization of personnel and supplies to perform these tasks in emergencies (chapter three) and certain problems which occur within the organization as a result of this mobilization (chapter four). One of the consequences of mobilization is, of course, the sudden convergence of national personnel and local volunteers on the Red Cross. Chapter four will deal, then, with the intraorganizational consequences of these dual structures of the Red Cross in disaster operations. Chapter five will consider interorganizational relationships in these operations.

The Data Used in This Report

The empirical bases of this report are varied. The largest single source of data has been the accumulated Disaster Research Center field interviews. These interviews were conducted with local staff members of the Red Cross who were actively involved in the emergency relief programs of the organization in some fifteen disasters in the United States. (Data obtained about Red Cross operations in civil disturbances have not been used in this report.) The interviews gathered in these disasters range from a few

The "Quasi-Governmental" Structure of the Red Cross

The American National Red Cross was incorporated by act of Congress on January 5, 1905.¹ This act repealed the earlier Congressional charter of 1900. The new charter provided for presidential appointment of certain members, including the chairman of the central governing committee of the Red Cross. Initially, the president was to appoint twelve of the eighteen members of that committee. The number of presidential appointments would be reduced by half as soon as the committee should organize "six or more State or Territorial societies" of the Red Cross. The remaining six presidential appointees would continue to include the chairman; the other five were to be representatives of the departments of state, war, the navy, the treasury, and justice. In addition, the 1905 act stipulated that the yearly financial report of the Red Cross should be submitted to the secretary of war whose department would "duly audit" that report and send it to the Congress. Finally, Congress retained "the right to repeal, alter, or amend this Act at any time."

These requirements made the Red Cross a "quasi-governmental" organization, a status which the charter of 1900 had not clearly established. In this respect the new status of the Red Cross was (and continues to be) unique: the financial records of no other charitable organization, for example, are subject to yearly governmental audit. This new status, according to a history of the Red Cross, was "more comparable to foreign Red Cross societies which had long since been directly linked with their governments."² Insofar as The American National Red Cross was the national embodiment of international agreements reached in Geneva, it seemed logical that the organization should be closely associated with, if not an internal element of, the federal government.

John W. Davis, a solicitor general of the United States and counsellor to the Red Cross, summarized the meaning of the organization's relationship to the federal government in a letter to the chairman of the Red Cross War Council in 1918. Davis wrote, in part:

When any question arises as to the scope and activities of the American Red Cross, it must always be remembered that its charter is not only a grant of power but an imposition of duties. The American Red Cross is a quasi-governmental organization, operating under Congressional charter, officered in part, at least, by governmental appointment, disbursing its funds under the security of a governmental audit, and designated by Presidential order for the fulfillment of certain treaty obligations into which the government has entered. It owes, therefore, to the government which it serves the distinct duty of discharging all those functions for which it was created.³

In summary, the quasi-governmental status of the Red Cross ultimately is a function of the international character of the organization. Established by treaty obligations, The American National Red Cross is subject to direct governmental supervision. Presidential appointments and yearly financial

audits are provided for by Congressional action and the charter itself is subject to amendment by the Congress. The tasks of the organization are likewise mandates of the federal government, obligations which affect not only the national policies of the Red Cross, but the disaster and nondisaster programs of every chapter in the United States. The actions of each member of the Red Cross, staff and volunteer, may be said to be finally, then, the business of no less than the Congress, the department of defense, and the president of the United States. Such a status is unique to the Red Cross among other welfare organizations of a similar type.

The Local-National Relationships of the Red Cross

The idea that the organization is "local" is a major theme in Red Cross publicity. The Red Cross is a humanitarian service to the community members. Additionally, all Red Cross funds are voluntary gifts from the public and are dispensed in disaster relief on the same basis as gifts and not as loans. The Red Cross suggests, therefore, that its organization is simply the medium through which members of the community help each other. It is this line of reasoning which prompts the Red Cross to argue that it is necessarily a "local," virtually ubiquitous, organization. "When disaster strikes," reads a campaign slogan, "the Red Cross is there." From this point of view, everyone is a "member" of the Red Cross, every community is served by the Red Cross.

Originally Red Cross chapters were to be established on a one-to-a-county basis, but the enthusiasm for Red Cross work generated by the First World War led to the formation of several chapters in some counties. Although this proliferation of small chapters has not continued, neither have the chapters so established disappeared. Indeed, the total number of chapters in the nation has remained remarkably stable for many years, even while total membership fluctuated greatly. Some consolidation -- or at least establishment of closer ties -- among neighboring and sometimes overlapping chapters has occurred, but this process has not been at all complete. The "local ethic" itself tends to mitigate against such consolidation; however, much centralization would increase efficiency. It is not surprising, therefore, that resistance to the loss of autonomy has been expressed, especially among small chapters threatened by absorption into a large city chapter.⁴ This same reaction to the consolidation of small, local units into larger and more efficient ones occurs, of course, in many other areas of American life: in school, welfare, and political systems, for example.

In addition to this local character, the Red Cross is organized on a national basis. The national headquarters of the Red Cross is in Washington, D.C. The country is divided into four areas with headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia; Atlanta, Georgia; St. Louis, Missouri; and San Francisco, California. As of June 30, 1968, there were 3,299 Red Cross chapters in the United States which, including the professional staff of area and national offices, are served by 13,450 career personnel. The total volunteer membership of the American Red Cross is estimated at 2,200,000; this figure, of course, includes

both Red Cross Youth and adult volunteers.⁵ And, as is true of such estimates in most voluntary organizations, this figure does not necessarily represent only "active" membership in the Red Cross.

The problem of centralization versus local autonomy has been as much a dilemma in the Red Cross as in any other national organization; the Red Cross has not found any complete solution to the problem. What has been more or less settled since 1905 is that the Red Cross chapters, no matter how they may differ in size and in the scope of their activities, have certain unavoidable obligations to the communities they serve, and hence to the national organization for it is from the organization's Congressional charter that its legal and moral obligations to the country as a whole derive. The Red Cross is a corporation; chapters are defined as "the local units of the corporation within the States and Territories of the United States."⁶ They are specifically defined as not constituting "separate legal entities."⁷ Rather, they are required by the laws of the organization to act only as the local representatives of the national body. All contributions which a local chapter may receive therefore belong to the national organization. On this matter the bylaws specifically state:

All funds and property received by or coming into the custody of any chapter or local unit are the property of the corporation to be expended or applied only for the purposes authorized by the charter and only in accordance with the policies and regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors.⁸

Because the Red Cross depends solely on voluntary contributions for all its funds (it receives no financial support from the federal government), every chapter must conduct a yearly membership and money-raising campaign. Such campaigns may be conducted by independent action or, increasingly, in association with community chest or united fund drives. Of the funds collected in these campaigns, a predetermined proportion is retained by the local chapter and the remainder is sent to the national headquarters. One Red Cross publication includes the following explication of these financial arrangements:

The chapter divides the money received in its annual campaign according to a ratio determined annually. The ratio varies from year to year according to the program requirements of the national organization and the chapters. If, for example, a chapter is raising \$15,000 for itself and \$10,000 for the national organization (total goal, \$25,000), it keeps $\frac{3}{5}$ ($\frac{15,000}{25,000}$) of whatever sum it collects and sends $\frac{2}{5}$ ($\frac{10,000}{25,000}$) to the national organization. Thus, of each dollar collected, this chapter retains 60 cents and sends 40 cents to the national organization.⁹

Special bequests and other gifts made to the organization or to one of its chapters are considered part of the general fund unless specific instructions for the money's use accompany the gift. In the latter case, individual records are kept of the disposition of these funds as, for example, of a gift designated for relief operations in a specific hurricane. Additional information on disaster fund campaigns will be provided in chapter two.

Since the Red Cross is also organized on an area basis, one might expect these area offices to be mediating structures between local and national organizations. While this happens to a certain extent, these area offices are staff offices, acting as an extension of national level policy. Under the direction of the area manager, the area staff, known as field (or disaster) representatives, advise and assist local chapters during nonemergency periods in the establishment and maintenance of Red Cross programs. They interpret Red Cross national policy to local members whenever questions of procedure are raised. The field representatives also serve an ameliorative function whenever differences of opinion or other internal dissension threatens the effectiveness of local chapters. Reports on the status and activities of chapters in their area are submitted by the representatives to the national organization. Thus, the representatives not only interpret the national Red Cross to the chapters but present the local chapters' programs to area and national levels.

Like the local chapter board of directors and the national organization board of governors, area offices do have a volunteer advisory council attached to them. Unlike their counterparts at the local and national levels, however, these advisory councils do not have direct authority over area operations. Rather:

Functions of the council are to advise the national organization on matters of interest to the area's chapters, afford a medium of contact between chapters and the Board of Governors, and provide a medium of contact, discussion, and communication between chapters.¹⁰

The area offices, then, do not make policy. Instead, they interpret national policy to the local chapters and, by way of the area advisory council and the reports of field representatives, communicate the concerns and problems of these chapters to the national organization. Area office personnel are staff in the generic sense of that term. The only exception to this generalization occurs in the event of disaster. The activities of area staff in such environments will be described in chapters three and four.

Professional Staff-Volunteer Relationships

Most local chapters in communities of any size have full-time professional staff members. The number, of course, varies with the size, program, and financial resources of the chapter. While not necessarily assuming their typicality, those chapters studied by DRC have staffs of from 2 to 163 persons. Most of these staff members are concerned with the ongoing daily nondisaster tasks of the organization. With disaster impact within one of these communities, the local professional staff is usually supplemented by other professional staff coming from other chapters and from area and national offices.

Even with the presence of professional staff members in a local chapter, Red Cross tends to see itself as being a "volunteer" organization. Its funds are administered under the supervision of a local volunteer board of directors. Members of the board are selected because they are representative of the local community. The chapter chairman, as well as the chairmen and members of the various committees within the local organizations, are all volunteers. They are responsible for the chapter's programs and perform the bulk of the tasks the chapter undertakes. Staff personnel are present only to advise and assist in these tasks. The following statement is a typical Red Cross summary of its "volunteer" structure: "Nationally and locally the American Red Cross is governed by volunteers, most of its duties are performed by volunteers and it is financed by voluntary contributions."¹¹

Red Cross literature emphasizes this volunteer structure of the organization. In terms of numbers, this is an appropriate emphasis as the ratio of staff to volunteers in the total organization is in the vicinity of 1 to 171.¹² In terms, also, of the policy-making bodies of Red Cross, this may be correct. Both nationally in the board of governors and locally in the boards of directors, the Red Cross is a volunteer organization. However, such an emphasis does not indicate the interplay of this volunteer structure with its counterpart in staff personnel. Even though the majority of chapters are made up entirely of volunteers with the exception of a staff director or executive secretary, significant decision making and coordination are likely to come from whatever local staff is present and from area field representatives of the national organization.

Red Cross chapters are volunteer units in that every staff division of the chapter is subject to the decisions of a volunteer advisory committee attached to that division. Thus, the staff of the first aid and water safety division of a Red Cross chapter -- the director and staff instructors -- are responsible to the volunteer members of the division's advisory committee. Likewise, the director of the accounting office must make financial reports to the volunteer members of the finance advisory committee. This pattern is repeated for each of the services and offices within a given chapter: e.g., the divisions of service to military families, Red Cross Youth (the junior Red Cross and college programs), and public information office are linked to volunteer authority through the welfare, youth, and public information advisory committees.

Membership on these committees is by selection. The Red Cross follows a similar policy in making up its advisory committees as it does in the selection of the members of the chapter board of directors. The director of each service and office, together with the volunteer officers of the chapter and staff manager, seek persons for these committees whose positions in the community are both "respected" and relevant to the work of the division. The members of a finance advisory committee, for example, may include a bank official and other persons whose occupations are associated with the management and investment of organizational funds. The membership of the public information advisory committee, similarly, would be likely to include representatives of the community's mass media -- an editor, a radio and television station executive, and persons who work in the media, such as an advertising director.

Administrative staffs of local Red Cross also have individual counterparts among the volunteer officers of the chapter. Theoretically, these volunteers stand in relation to individual administrative staff in much the way advisory committees are associated with the service divisions and support offices within the chapter. The executive secretary or chapter manager has a volunteer counterpart in the chapter chairman; the director of disaster services has a double in the volunteer disaster chairman; and so forth. The volunteer chairmen, like the volunteer members of advisory committees, are line members of the chapter; professional personnel are staff members. This, at least, is the officially defined relationship between the volunteer and staff structures of Red Cross chapters.

Neither the staff nor the volunteer structures of the Red Cross can be considered independently of each other. The Red Cross, to that extent, is not a "volunteer" organization. Rather, the peculiar quality of the Red Cross is contained in the articulation of the staff and volunteer structures. More specific information on this articulation, especially in disaster operations, will be presented in subsequent chapters of this report.

Summary

The uniqueness of the Red Cross lies in the paradoxical character of the organization. Its structure is at once both national and local: it is by law associated with the federal government and in spirit an expression of the charity and benevolence of local communities. Likewise, the Red Cross is both a professional and an amateur organization: it is maintained solely by voluntary contributions and its policy-making bodies, nationally and locally, are composed of volunteers. At the same time, it is an organization maintained by a paid staff whose function is to provide a trained and professional base for the performance of disaster and nondisaster tasks which the organization cannot, because of its Congressional mandate, escape.

These structures have been generally described in this chapter. It has been suggested that certain consequences for the disaster operations of the Red Cross stem from these structures. In the next chapter, the specific tasks of the organization will be described. In subsequent chapters, the consequences of the dual structures of the Red Cross for the performance of these tasks will be considered.

NOTES: CHAPTER I

1. U.S., Congress, An Act To Incorporate The American National Red Cross, Approved January 5, 1905, Public Law 4, 58th Cong., 3d Sess., 1905.
2. Foster Rhea Dulles, The American Red Cross, A History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 78.
3. The American National Red Cross, Disaster Action: Chapter Preparedness, rev. (Washington: The American National Red Cross, September 1966), Manual A, p. 9.
4. Dulles, Red Cross, A History, p. 326. In some instances, however, consolidation of chapters in a metropolitan area has been achieved. Notable examples are the Chicago Mid-America Chapter which includes some eight counties and the Cincinnati Chapter which extends over the Ohio-Kentucky state line.
5. The American National Red Cross, Annual Report: For the Year Ended June 30, 1966 (Washington: The American National Red Cross, 1966).
6. The American National Red Cross, Charter and Bylaws (Washington: The American National Red Cross, February 1964), chap. i, p. 22.
7. Charter and Bylaws.
8. Charter and Bylaws.
9. The American National Red Cross, This Is the Red Cross, rev. (Washington: The American National Red Cross, March 1955), p. 32.
10. This Is the Red Cross, p. 37.
11. Charter and Bylaws.
12. Annual Report.

CHAPTER II

THE TASKS OF THE LOCAL RED CROSS

The tasks of the Red Cross are of two types: the "mandatory" tasks which are imposed by law on the organization and the "permissive" tasks which the Red Cross has assumed or initiated in the course of its eighty-six-year history in the United States. This report is concerned primarily with the mandatory tasks of the Red Cross. Following a brief discussion of the permissive tasks, these mandatory tasks will be considered in some detail.

Permissive Tasks of the Red Cross

These tasks are permissive in the sense that neither the Congressional charter of the Red Cross nor the national organization requires that local chapters perform them. Thus, when chapters do extend these services to their communities, these activities are local in character. Area-national staffs are prepared to provide assistance and advice in establishing and maintaining these programs, but they do not require that all local chapters engage in them.

The national organization has defined seven permissive tasks. Broadly speaking, they may be categorized as the "educational" services, including the safety services, nursing services, and food and nutrition services; and the "cooperative" services, namely, the Red Cross Youth (which is established in association with local public schools), college-affiliated programs, and international services (the latter carried out in association with the international federation of Red Cross organizations, the League of Red Cross Societies).

Permissive tasks also include the volunteer and the blood donor programs. The volunteer services encompass the total operations of the Red Cross and include the recruitment, training, and assignment of volunteer workers to every phase of the organization's activities, from serving as national officers to making hospital bandages, keeping blood donor records, and raising funds during the Red Cross annual campaign. The blood program is a nationwide network of collection, storage, and distribution centers maintained by the national Red Cross. It is the only one of the permissive tasks which local chapters cannot perform "independently" as it requires professional, medical, and technological staff and integration into the regional and national system.

All other permissive services may be provided by local chapters essentially on their own initiative, the services they offer being tailored to the requirements of the community. Thus, considerable variation exists among Red Cross chapters in the extent to which they are individually involved in these programs. They range from the large city chapters (most frequently studied by DRC field teams) with established programs in virtually all of the Red Cross activities and with professional staffs to coordinate these programs, to small

town and rural chapters (by far the majority in the nation with only minimal professional assistance and consequently with minimal involvement in these permissive tasks).

Mandatory Tasks of the Red Cross

Two mandatory tasks of the Red Cross are defined by the charter of the organization. Further, these duties are, according to the charter, defined by "the spirit and conditions" of the Geneva Conventions to which the United States became a party in 1882 (one year after Clara Barton founded the American Red Cross). In its amended form, the section of the 1905 charter dealing with the first of these duties reads as follows:

First. To furnish volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of Armed Forces in time of war, in accordance with the spirit and conditions of the conference of Geneva of October, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, and also the treaties of the Red Cross, or the treaties of Geneva, of August twenty-second, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, and July twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and twenty-nine, to which the United States of America has given its adhesion, and also of any other treaty or convention similar in purpose to which the United States of America may hereafter give its adhesion.¹

The second mandatory task of the Red Cross is its duty during peacetime. The 1905 Congressional charter states that it is the function of the Red Cross:

To continue and carry on a system of national and international relief in time of peace and apply the same in mitigating the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great national calamities, and to devise and carry on measures for preventing the same.²

These mandatory tasks are reflected in the two services which every Red Cross chapter must, in some way, provide for the community it serves: service to military families and disaster services. Of the first of these mandatory programs -- Red Cross service to members of the armed forces, veterans, and their families -- the charter stipulates that the Red Cross is to function as "a medium of communication between the people of the United States of America and their Armed Forces."³ In both war and peace, the Red Cross is a link between the men and women of the military and their families and communities at home, obtaining emergency leaves and providing other case work services for members of the military, such as counselling, financial assistance, and reporting and communications service. This program necessarily involves both the local and area-national levels of the Red Cross. The organization's telecommunications system, which is the medium through which case workers receive and transmit messages from servicemen and their families, is national in scope. The system is operated by the Washington office of the Red Cross and is, according to the Red Cross, "the most extensive nongovernmental, noncommercial communications system in the United States."⁴

The second mandatory task -- disaster preparedness and relief -- is, like service to military families, both a local and an area-national operation. Indeed, the two phases into which disaster relief is divided by the Red Cross -- emergency mass care and disaster rehabilitation -- are responsibilities, respectively, of the local chapters and of the area-national organization. Because the focus of this report is on the emergency phase of Red Cross disaster relief and on the local chapter's operations, only mass care will be considered here.

The Emergency Mass Care Phase of Red Cross Tasks

All chapters are required to establish disaster preparedness programs and to train their membership in disaster relief skills, especially in those useful during the immediate post-impact period. Four major activities and a number of supporting tasks are defined by the Red Cross as within the responsibility of the organization during this period.

Unlike the specific case work policies governing the allocation of rehabilitation funds, the policies effective during the emergency mass care phase are relatively broad and unstructured. Mass care services are made available to all who may require them during the emergency phase of the disaster. Both victims of the disaster and disaster workers, regardless of the organizational affiliations of the latter, are eligible for Red Cross services.⁵ Red Cross policies during this phase of the disaster program, in contrast to those of the rehabilitation phase, are immediately understood and generally appreciated by those whom the organization serves.

This broad policy of meeting the emergency needs of all who require them is reflected in the range of mass care tasks which Red Cross chapters perform during emergency periods. Red Cross manuals divide these tasks into "service" and "support" tasks. The former are performed directly for disaster victims and workers and include the four basic emergency responsibilities of the Red Cross: the provision of food, clothing, shelter, and medical and nursing care. The support tasks are necessary for successful provision of these emergency services. These tasks include disaster fund raising, public information and equipment-supply facilities, and, although the Red Cross does not so categorize them, disaster survey and disaster communications and transportation facilities.⁶ Red Cross service and support tasks are briefly summarized in table 1.

Although the service tasks Red Cross chapters perform are constant in every disaster operation (and, to that extent, support tasks are constant too), the form which these tasks take in any one disaster environment may vary considerably from that of another emergency. This variation, of course, is a function of the differences in available resources from one chapter to another. But it is also a function of the variability of demands associated with disasters themselves. All disasters are not alike; hence, the emergency operations of disaster organizations like the Red Cross must be flexible enough to fit the several environments created by the impact of disasters. It may be useful to consider the service and support tasks of the Red Cross in terms of two generalized types of disasters.⁷

TABLE 1

DISASTER SERVICE AND SUPPORT TASKS PERFORMED
BY LOCAL RED CROSS CHAPTERS

Service Tasks

- | | |
|------------------------|--|
| 1. Food | Provision of food for both victims and disaster workers, including immediate emergency feeding at the scene of the disaster, refreshment services at places where refugees congregate, mass feeding in shelters, and the delivery of food to isolated persons. |
| 2. Clothing | Handling and disbursement of donated clothing and purchase orders for new clothing. |
| 3. Shelter | Provision of temporary shelter, if possible with relatives, friends, or neighbors; if necessary, in public shelters operated by the Red Cross. |
| 4. Medical and Nursing | Provision of medical and nursing care in all Red Cross-operated shelters and in emergency first aid stations, and provision of blood as required. |
| 5. Family Service | Provision of assistance to individuals and families by describing available sources of aid and by insuring that welfare communications are answered. |

Support Tasks

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| 6. Disaster Fund Raising | Development and management of disaster fund campaign. |
| 7. Public Information | Inform both victims and public of the Red Cross disaster activities. |
| 8. Survey | Assessment in general terms of the size and type of disaster with an estimation of the necessary mobilization and performance required of the chapter. |
| 9. Communications and Transportation | Establishment and maintenance of communication and transportation among all Red Cross facilities. |
| 10. Equipment and Supplies | Coordination of procurement, storage, and distribution of Red Cross equipment and supplies. |

Some disasters impact with little or no period of warning preceding them. Such "instantaneous" disasters like tornadoes and explosions do not allow pre-disaster mobilization of workers or pre-impact evacuation of those in danger. Frequently -- although certainly not always -- such disasters are of a limited or "focalized" scope: the affected area is rather clearly limited. Tornadoes, for example, normally do not inflict physical damage on an entire community. On the other hand, disasters like floods and hurricanes are likely to impact large geographical areas and are frequently preceded by a warning period. Disasters of this type may be called "progressive-diffused." Employing these distinctions in disasters -- which yield the "instantaneous-focalized" and "progressive-diffused" types -- the variations in the forms of Red Cross emergency tasks will be discussed.⁸

Mass Care Emergency Tasks in Instantaneous-Focalized Disasters

A pervasive idea in all Red Cross disaster relief programs is that persons affected by disaster should be encouraged to make use of their own resources -- interpersonal, physical, and financial -- and should accept Red Cross relief only when these other resources are unavailable or have been destroyed. Refugees are therefore encouraged to seek emergency shelter, food, and clothing from relatives, neighbors, or friends who are nearby and have not been directly affected by the impact. Aid of this type is most likely to be available following focalized disasters in which persons temporarily homeless are able to find shelter with other members of the community, thus relieving the Red Cross of the necessity of opening public shelters. Normally, when such personal sources of disaster relief are available, refugees need little encouragement to seek them out.⁹ Red Cross personnel will, however, assist in this search.

Although public shelters in these disasters may not be required for refugees, the instantaneous nature of the impact may require that "shelter" be available for rescue and clean-up workers. Because tornadoes, for example, cannot be prepared for in the same sense that hurricanes can, facilities for feeding and sheltering rescue workers must be provided ad hoc. Red Cross sometimes provides this. Whether these workers are Red Cross volunteers or not, they can receive Red Cross "mass care."

Such was the case in a metropolitan suburb impacted by a tornado. All disaster refugees found temporary shelter elsewhere, but police, firemen, and other rescue workers were provided with food and shelter during the emergency period by the Red Cross. For several days after the impact, this Red Cross "shelter" continued to provide hot meals for upwards of six thousand workers. One Red Cross staff member very simply explained why this operation was necessary:

There wasn't anything else open around this area and all the firemen and policemen, every officer in the area, were wanting something to eat. By one o'clock that night they were all hungry.

Subsequently, the Red Cross also assumed the responsibility for feeding all of the National Guard troops cordoning off the impacted area. Whenever other sources of food and shelter are unavailable to disaster workers, the Red Cross provides those services, even when, as is frequently true of instantaneous-focalized disasters, such services are not required by disaster refugees themselves. Nor is the provision of food restricted to "shelter" operations: the Red Cross also maintains mobile canteen units which will provide coffee, sandwiches, and the like to disaster workers in the field.

At least one Red Cross service to disaster victims is constant in every emergency. Welfare inquiries from relatives and friends of persons living in a stricken area always follow the news of impact and, although the Red Cross is not the only organization to which such inquiries are directed, it does receive many of them. Case workers and volunteers in the service to military families units of local chapters normally take these inquiries and, through the refugee registration lists kept by Red Cross and hospitals and the coroners' reports, attempt to answer all these inquiries.

In addition to the convergence of welfare messages, disasters are invariably followed by a convergence of donations, of which the most frequent item is clothing. Again, Red Cross is not the only agency subject to this convergence, but it does receive a great proportion of these gifts and will undertake the sorting and distribution of them. Part of the mass care program of the organization is the dispensing of clothing and food to any who request it. Although other organizations are involved, such as the Salvation Army, the Red Cross is probably the most important source of this type of disaster relief.¹⁰

Support tasks, naturally, depend on the type and extent of service tasks the Red Cross is providing in a given disaster. All relief operations of the organization are preceded by a survey of the disaster, on the basis of which some estimation of the size and nature of Red Cross participation is made. This estimation will suggest not only the extent of mass care services Red Cross will have to provide, but also how much support will be required to facilitate these services. Demands on the communications and transportation systems and on Red Cross equipment and supplies can be roughly estimated from such initial surveys. The successful performance of these support tasks is positively related to the successful fulfillment of the organization's service responsibilities. In chapter three the discussion of mobilization will include more detailed comments on the performance of these support tasks.

If disaster survey, communications and transportation facilities, and the availability of equipment and supplies are directly related to the capacity of the Red Cross to provide mass care services, two other support tasks must be considered to be only indirectly related. The tasks of informing the public of Red Cross disaster operations and of raising disaster funds can, in effect, be performed independently of services like mass feeding and emergency medical care. Public information is related to the "public image" of the organization and thus may ultimately affect, one way or the other, the performance of service tasks, but its effects are not direct. The purpose of this public relations job, according to one Red Cross publication, is "to interpret the

needs of disaster victims and the role of the Red Cross in meeting these needs to the community or communities affected and to the public at large."¹¹ The release of news and human interest stories to the mass media agencies, both local and national, constitutes the primary responsibility of public information personnel. They are not personally involved in the provision of services to the public.

Similarly, the raising of disaster funds is a support task required by the organization, not by Red Cross personnel working directly with disaster victims. Like the release of disaster information to the public, the raising of disaster funds is an organizational response to certain "spontaneous activity" typical of post-disaster environments and independent of the Red Cross. It is a response to the convergence of donations mentioned above, just as Red Cross public information activities may be considered a response to the convergence of information demands. The Disaster Relief Handbook puts it this way:

The occurrence of a disaster results in spontaneous activity on the part of the affected and nearby communities. This activity principally consists of direct relief measures, such as donations of food and clothing and contributions of funds. . . . Providing an opportunity for people to contribute funds for the relief of disaster victims is an essential part of a disaster relief operation.¹²

In effect, the Red Cross fund campaign is a channelling of this spontaneous desire to help victims of disaster. This campaign, however, very rarely succeeds in raising locally enough money to cover the cost of the mass care and rehabilitation programs. The local chapter is expected to provide additional money from its own disaster fund, and, if that is not sufficient, the national organization will make up the difference. Although the performance of Red Cross mass care services is not dependent, therefore, on the success of the disaster fund campaign (local chapter and national disaster funds can be used to pay for these services), every chapter involved directly in disaster operations is expected to conduct such a campaign.

Mass Care Emergency Tasks in Progressive-Diffused Disasters

The differences in Red Cross tasks during the emergency phase of a progressive-diffused disaster as opposed to an instantaneous-focalized disaster stem from differences in the character of the disasters themselves, not from any alteration in the organization's responsibilities. Progressive disasters normally involve a period of warning preceding the impact during which Red Cross and other organizations may prepare for the emergency. In the case of hurricanes and floods, this preparation includes evacuation of persons threatened by the impact. In this evacuation the Red Cross may take part, but the major responsibility for the task lies with other governmental agencies, especially with civil defense. When requested by personnel of this agency, Red Cross members are willing to assist in this operation, but the Red Cross

itself assumes no authority over this operation or responsibility for its successful completion.¹³ Typically, however, Red Cross headquarters are subjected to requests from the public for such assistance in evacuation, but these requests are always referred to civil defense. In one city chapter preparing for the impact of a hurricane, Red Cross staff assigned to telephone inquiry during the warning period were certain from the volume of calls and from their content that someone had mistakenly issued a statement that the Red Cross was in charge of evacuation. Although the public confusion which resulted was never completely cleared up, the division of labor between the two organizations was quickly reasserted.

When there is enough warning time, Red Cross will assume the responsibility for evacuating physical goods threatened by impact. In certain suburban areas of the midwest impacted by severe floods, Red Cross personnel provided furniture evacuation for families desiring it. In this operation Red Cross does assume full authority for directing the pick-up, storage, and return of a family's possessions. The organization cannot, of course, insure the furniture against damage which may result from the evacuation.

The major tasks which Red Cross performs during the warning period preceding a diffused disaster are associated with the provision of shelter for persons expected to be temporarily homeless. This is, in fact, the principal consequence for the Red Cross of the differences between focalized and diffused disasters. Unlike conditions associated with the former, the latter frequently dislocates so many persons that it is not feasible to expect that all affected persons will be able to find temporary shelter with relatives, friends, or neighbors. Red Cross is responsible, under these conditions, for the provision of public shelters. During the warning period, therefore, the task of Red Cross personnel is to alert volunteers who operate or assist in the operation of shelters, to assure that these shelters are stocked with the necessary food and other supplies, and to alert the public to the location of these shelters. For the duration of the emergency mass care phase of the disaster operation, the principal tasks of the Red Cross remain those associated with the operation of these shelters; that is, the provision of food, clothing, and nursing and medical care for individuals and families making use of the shelters. These are the unique tasks of the Red Cross: federal disaster funds under Public Law 875 (Federal Disaster Act) and distributed through the Office of Emergency Planning cannot be used to reimburse other agencies and organizations which provide similar services. More discussion of the disaster tasks of the Red Cross and those of other governmental agencies under the terms of this act will be included in chapter five.

In metropolitan areas repeatedly subjected to the impact of hurricanes or floods, the operation of public shelters can be a large-scale task. The support task required to sustain the operation of a dozen shelters is necessarily large-scale as well. The initial survey, communications between each of the shelters and the Red Cross headquarters, acquisition and transportation of supplies for these shelters, and the overall administration of emergency mass care are themselves enormous responsibilities. Subsequent discussions in chapter three will focus on the performance of these support tasks.

In such diffused disasters the constant support tasks -- public information and fund raising -- remain essentially the same as those performed in focalized disasters. The difference, of course, is in the scope of these support tasks. Interest in these disasters is nationwide, even international, and the responsibilities of public information personnel are therefore expanded. Similarly, the disaster fund raising may, in fact, be a national campaign. The relationship between the performance of these tasks and the success of the service tasks is still rather indirect.

Summary

The American Red Cross has been a disaster mass care and rehabilitation organization since its founding in 1881. Since that time -- and in an increasing volume of yearly operations -- the Red Cross has responded to thousands of separate disasters. These operations have been conducted in addition to the organization's normal tasks during nonemergency periods and in addition to the responsibilities it takes on during times of war. Red Cross, therefore, is more than a disaster relief organization, but it has an impressive background of experience in such relief. This background is reflected both in the policies which guide its relief operations and in the techniques which it has devised to meet its disaster responsibilities.

Although these policies and techniques have been revised over the years, Red Cross disaster responsibilities have not altered during this time: its tasks remain those associated with the provision of temporary shelter, food, clothing, and medical care for persons directly involved in disaster, and with the provision, when necessary, of longer term rehabilitation for individuals and families lacking sufficient resources to rehabilitate themselves. The Red Cross definition of "disaster" suggests the importance of both phases of the organization's relief:

Disaster creates a situation catastrophic in nature in which numbers of persons are plunged into helplessness and suffering and as a result are in need of food, clothing, shelter, medical and nursing or hospital care, and other basic necessities of life. It also creates a situation in which the established social organization within the community is suddenly disrupted.¹⁴

This chapter has presented an overview of the tasks of the Red Cross, especially of those associated with disaster relief during the mass care phase. It is the purpose of the next two chapters to consider these mass care tasks in somewhat more detail: first, from the point of view of chapter mobilization to perform them, and, second, from the perspective of operational problems encountered in the actual performance.

NOTES: CHAPTER II

1. The American National Red Cross, Charter and Bylaws (Washington: The American National Red Cross, February 1964), chap. i, pp. 3-4.
2. Charter and Bylaws, chap. i, p. 4.
3. Charter and Bylaws.
4. The American National Red Cross, This Is the Red Cross, rev. (Washington: The American National Red Cross, March 1955), p. 2.
5. Official Red Cross policy on providing mass care services for disaster workers is stated in the following:

Canteen services -- sandwiches, hot or cold drinks, and so forth -- should be provided for rescue workers and others. Regular meals may be provided for levee workers, rescue workers, or similar groups if they are working under conditions in which normal feeding facilities are not available.

The American National Red Cross, Disaster Action: Chapter Preparedness, rev. (Washington: The American National Red Cross, September 1966), Manual A, p. 70.

6. Red Cross Disaster Manuals include survey, communications, and transportation under the rubric of "services." For the purposes of this report, that term has been restricted to those tasks which directly "serve" disaster victims and workers. See Chapter Preparedness, pp. 29-30, 51-54.
7. The disaster types discussed in the following section of this chapter are derived from Lowell Julliard Carr, "Disaster and the Sequence-Pattern Concept of Social Change," American Journal of Sociology 38 (1932): 209-210.
8. Logically, these two dimensions (instantaneous-progressive and focalized-diffused) yield four types. The two not considered here are the instantaneous-diffused (e.g., earthquake) and the progressive-focalized (e.g., fire). Insofar as nuclear attack may be considered an instantaneous-diffused type, the operation of Red Cross under such conditions is considered in chapter six. It was felt that the repetition which would characterize a discussion of all four types would be unnecessary, given the purpose of this report. Were this a discussion of disasters rather than of a specific disaster organization, a complete consideration of disaster types would be appropriate. For such a discussion, see Russell R. Dynes, Organized Behavior in Disaster: Analysis and Conceptualization, Disaster Research Center Monograph Series (Columbus: Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University, 1969), chap. iii.

9. The importance of relatives in sheltering disaster refugees is documented in the following studies: Samuel Z. Klausner and Harry V. Kincaid, "Social Problems of Sheltering Flood Evacuees: Final Report" (New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, n.d.), pp. 31-42; Michael Young, "The Role of the Extended Family in a Disaster," Human Relations 3 (1954): 388-391; and Enrico L. Quarantelli, "A Note on the Protective Function of the Family in Disasters," Marriage and Family Living (August 1960): 263-264.
10. The spontaneity of this convergence has been reviewed in Charles E. Fritz and J. H. Mathewson, Convergence Behavior in Disasters: A Problem in Social Control (Washington: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, 1957), pp. 15-26. It has also been learned by the Red Cross:

Unsolicited gifts of used clothing begin to arrive almost with the first news of a disaster, and plans must be made for the receipt, storage, and distribution of the appropriate serviceable donated items. It is seldom necessary to make an appeal for clothing.

Chapter Preparedness, pp. 33-34.

11. The American National Red Cross, Disaster Relief Handbook: A Manual for National Personnel, rev. (Washington: The American National Red Cross, 1966), chap. v, pp. 3-4.
12. Disaster Relief Handbook, chap. v, p. 16.
13. Because evacuation of persons threatened by impact is included under governmental responsibilities for the "protection of life, property, public health and welfare, and the maintenance and repair of public property," the Red Cross cannot assume the authority to enforce evacuation of affected persons. The Disaster Relief Handbook (chap. i, p. 3) states categorically:

The Red Cross supports and assists the work of government and authorities in alleviating the distress caused by disasters, but does not assume responsibility for governmental function.

In some communities at least, this relationship is clearly indicated by the fact that civil defense and other local governmental officials must declare public shelters open before Red Cross personnel can legally begin to operate them. This division of authority sometimes leads to inter-organizational disagreements (see chapter five).

14. By Red Cross criteria, the "numbers of persons" necessary for disaster relief are more than five families. Red Cross assistance is available, however, for five or fewer families who may be subjected to similar "helplessness and suffering" as a result, for example, of a fire. The definition of disaster may be found in every disaster-related publication of the Red Cross, e.g., Disaster Relief Handbook, chap. i, p. 7.

CHAPTER III

MOBILIZATION OF THE RED CROSS IN DISASTERS

One of the characteristics Red Cross shares with some other disaster-oriented organizations (like civil defense) is that in emergency situations personnel resources are expanded.¹ Trained volunteer members who are not an active part of the day-to-day operations of the Red Cross are mobilized. Area-national personnel and walk-in volunteers are added to the local organization. Also, all available local staff are "mobilized" in the sense that normal tasks they perform in nondisaster environments are abandoned and emergency responsibilities are taken on. These changes in both the structure and the function of the organization are the subject of this chapter.

The principal focus will be on these changes as they affect the staff and trained volunteers of a Red Cross chapter. Some comments, however, on the mobilization of area-national staff and the addition of walk-in volunteers to the membership of the chapter will be made in the course of this discussion.

The Mobilization of Area-National Staff

One of the first responsibilities of a local Red Cross chapter in the event of disaster impact is to inform the area office in which jurisdiction the chapter is located. The Red Cross disaster manual for chapters makes this responsibility very clear:

Report at once the occurrence of the disaster to the appropriate area office representative by the quickest means of communication, stating the nature of the disaster and giving all available information about the situation and the Red Cross action being taken.²

On the basis of this initial report and estimates of the resources required to provide adequate and efficient disaster relief (particularly as these estimates are contrasted with resources locally available to the chapter), a decision can be made on the advisability of mobilizing area disaster staff and resources to supplement those of the local chapter. Such a decision is made by the area manager. He may, "with the concurrence of the area and national directors -- disaster services, and with the approval of the vice president -- disaster services," delegate authority for the "administration, direction, and control" of the disaster operation to a director.³

Area-national staff assigned to the disaster relief program work under this field director. He, in turn, is responsible to the manager of the area in which the disaster occurred. Normally, the field director is appointed from among the disaster staff of the same area, but this is not obligatory. If such staff are already assigned or are otherwise unavailable, a staff member from another area may be appointed to the position and personnel from

other areas may be assigned to work with him. In major disasters area-national staff from all four jurisdictions of the national Red Cross are assigned to disaster operations. Red Cross literature reports, for instance, that "850 national and chapter staff members from 48 states" were actively involved in the relief operations which followed the impact of Hurricane Betsy in September 1965.⁴

Progressive disasters like hurricanes provide area-national staff with an opportunity to make pre-impact plans and preparations. "Hurricane Watch" is a national Red Cross program designed to provide weather information to local chapters in advance of impact, thus giving chapters "more time to implement preparedness plans with maximum effectiveness."⁵ The Atlantic and Gulf Coast states have been divided into three geographical areas, their "operational headquarters" being the Southeastern, Eastern, and Midwestern area offices, respectively. From these offices, weather information relevant to hurricane threat is released to local chapters. The latter have been grouped into a number of "districts," one chapter in each designated as "district headquarters" from which area-office weather information is further disseminated to local chapters within the district and to which reports of the local preparedness activities of these chapters are sent. In addition, the district headquarters serve as the operational centers for area-national staff assigned to the disaster. Depending on the probable point of impact of a given hurricane, area-national staff designate certain chapters unlikely to be directly involved in the impact as "staging points." Here, reserve staff, equipment, and supplies are accumulated to be dispatched to impacted areas as required. Other "inland" chapters are designated as "evacuee reception points" and instructed in advance by area-national staff to prepare to provide mass care emergency services to hurricane refugees sent to them from impacted areas.⁶

Some degree of pre-impact readiness can also be associated with natural disasters like floods and tornadoes and in the areas most likely to be impacted by these disasters, area-national staff are normally alerted to the threat of such disasters. Unlike hurricanes, however, these disasters cannot be "followed" before impact and area-national staff are not assigned to local chapters until after the disaster strikes. Hurricane Watch permits such pre-impact assignment; frequently, area-national staff begin arriving in a threatened community before the storm has actually struck. Hurricane Watch suggests, therefore, that local staff can begin preparing for the impact of area-national staff, as well as the hurricane, on their chapter; more on this in chapter four.

The Mobilization of Local Staff

Except in the very largest Red Cross chapters, disaster services staffs do not exist independently in nondisaster times. This means simply that few, if any, of the professional personnel with major responsibilities in disaster act full-time on an everyday basis in terms of these responsibilities. Rather, these personnel perform nonemergency tasks (that is, excepting service to military families personnel, permissive tasks). Only indirectly in the

formation of disaster plans, the compilation of local disaster handbooks, and similar advance planning for emergencies are these personnel engaged in disaster tasks in nondisaster environments.

When disaster strikes or threatens to strike, however, all normal (permissive) tasks are abandoned for disaster responsibilities. Because disaster services, as mandatory tasks, take priority over all the permissive tasks Red Cross may at other times perform, only personnel in the service to military families division continue to perform essentially the same tasks in emergency situations as they perform in normal times. Their tasks are mandatory and like the disaster services themselves can be neither abandoned nor delegated to another agency. All other professional personnel, including secretarial and clerical staff, assume new tasks directly relevant to the disaster.

As a result, discontinuity between normal and disaster responsibilities is characteristic of most Red Cross staff. Personnel who normally perform coordinating, teaching, and secretarial tasks take on disaster responsibilities which differ radically from their nondisaster tasks. When the entire staff of a chapter, from the manager to the maintenance man, is mobilized for emergency, there is, necessarily, discontinuity between the one set of tasks and the other. Only personnel who are normally associated with nursing services and public information -- in addition to the staff of the service to military families section -- find that their normal tasks can be adapted, i.e., their output increased, to meet the demands of a disaster situation.

The designation of the assistant manager as disaster director appears to happen frequently. Where there are, for example, several assistants to the chapter executive, one of these is designated the coordinator of disaster services. Like every other disaster assignment, this position normally does not require full-time responsibility: every assistant manager has other tasks not associated with disaster preparedness or supervision. For example, one assistant manager-disaster director supervises the chapter's college program and its international activities as well as serving as the chapter's personnel manager. Even in communities where disasters like hurricanes and floods can be anticipated almost every year, a full-time assignment as disaster services director would not, according to one Red Cross assistant manager, occupy more than one-third of an individual's time: "I would pace the floor the other two-thirds of the year," he said.

Nor could other members of the staff be justified as full-time disaster service personnel. Their responsibilities, however vital during emergencies, would not in themselves constitute full-time positions. In this sense, too, the Red Cross may be said to be a dual organization: members of the staff of a Red Cross chapter have a dual set of tasks, "normal" and disaster. Mobilization of the staff in the event of disaster threat or impact requires a shift from one set of tasks to the other. Clearly, the effectiveness of this mobilization depends in large measure on the extent to which the staff is prepared for the change. Those whose normal tasks are disaster-relevant are, like Boy Scouts, always prepared; those whose normal tasks have little relevance to a disaster environment may not be as ready for the shift. At the

end of this chapter a brief discussion of Red Cross disaster plans will include some additional information concerning the preparedness of Red Cross staff for disaster operations.

The Mobilization of Walk-In Volunteers

Walk-in volunteers are a part of the convergence which accompanies virtually every disaster.⁷ Red Cross is frequently the focal organization for the convergence of these volunteers, probably as a result of presenting itself to the public as a "volunteer" agency. These volunteers, however, are not always easily assimilated into the organization's disaster activities. Because they are largely untrained in disaster-relevant tasks, because it is often impossible to screen these volunteers to find those who may have useful skills, they may be, at times, organizational liabilities rather than assets.

The following statement is admittedly a view of only the liabilities of walk-in volunteers but it suggests the potential difficulties associated with unscreened volunteers:

It will probably take years to undo the harm done the chapter by the use of untrained and uncontrolled volunteers. This is by no means a criticism of those trained volunteers who did such a magnificent job, but only of those untrained volunteers who gave out misinformation wholesale, who loudly criticized the organization within earshot of clients and those who were mentally ill. . . . Unfortunately, for a considerable time, armbands and other identification items were completely accessible to anyone. These were picked up by a considerable number of neighborhood bums, who stole everything not nailed down, including the porter's uniforms.

Walk-in volunteers, however, are obviously not all "neighborhood bums." Many untrained individual volunteers can be useful, if transitory, members of the Red Cross. Red Cross staff indicate, however, that volunteers who offer their services as members of an ongoing group are generally more useful and efficient than individual volunteers. One Red Cross staff member indicated the greater efficiency associated with the use of group-volunteers than with individuals in the following:

We were very fortunate in being able to work with groups which helped tremendously. . . . This was not the case at the downtown headquarters I understand. They worked through individuals and, of course, when you need as many volunteers as we needed in this thing, you'll just spend all your time trying to recruit individuals and this should not be.

DRC data contain other descriptions of the assistance rendered the Red Cross by groups from religious organizations, schools, colleges, and a variety of civic and fraternal associations. The advantage in such group-volunteers lies in the fact that the internal structure of the group -- the leadership

relations among the members, for example -- are previously defined. These untrained volunteers are not "uncontrolled." Trained Red Cross personnel can instruct one or two of the members of these groups in the tasks to be performed and these persons can pass the information on to the other members of the group, take charge of their activities, and relieve Red Cross personnel of this responsibility. Of one group of volunteers from a Mennonite church, a Red Cross staff member made the following assessment: "They just float in and say, 'Here we are.' They go about their work and in a few hours it's done and then they say, 'Goodbye.' They do a beautiful job."

All group-volunteers are not as well prepared for disaster service as the one referred to here, but generally such groups are easier to work with and more efficient than individual volunteers. The Red Cross staff member whose observation on untrained individual volunteers was quoted above, followed this observation with recommendations for the use of group-volunteers:

Suggestion: A long, hard look at our disaster volunteer recruitment methods, the centralization of recruitment in the office of volunteers, and the creation of other potential reserves of volunteers. Case in point: the religious, who have already expressed an eagerness to take training in the various aspects of Red Cross disaster procedures and to act as volunteers. Other reserves might be the fraternities, sororities, and other campus groups.

Walk-in volunteers are a natural element of disaster environments and, to that extent, are inevitable. The emphasis in Red Cross disaster mobilization is to supplant these untrained persons with trained volunteer members of the organization. The problem which remains -- what to do with walk-in volunteers who are not required but whom the Red Cross is reluctant to turn away -- will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Mobilization of Trained Volunteers

Three possible relationships exist between normal and disaster tasks among trained Red Cross volunteers. Some volunteers are trained only for disaster services; others may be prepared only for normal tasks; and there may be some whose normal tasks can be readily translated into disaster-relevant activities. A shelter committee, for example, is prepared to operate only in the event of disaster and does not normally have nondisaster tasks, nor is its disaster task relevant to the day-to-day operations of the chapter. Similarly, volunteers trained in other mass care activities are not likely to have training for normal tasks as well. When emergencies are infrequent, these members of the chapter may only rarely perform the tasks for which they were trained. The disaster handbook of one chapter contains the following admonition to these volunteers, stressing their importance despite the lack of "day-to-day activity":

As a volunteer assigned to a disaster post you are most important. The fact that you are on standby duty without day-to-day activity

may seem to lessen the importance of your assignment. Actually, the very fact that you hold yourself in readiness to serve this community on short notice during critical times makes you one of the most valuable volunteers of the Red Cross. Flexibility is the keynote in your assignment. As a disaster worker, you must be prepared to meet various needs as they arise. Plans are always being upset. Supplies are of an emergency type only. Even though you may have been assigned because of some specialized knowledge Red Cross depends on your ability to "roll with the punches."

Other volunteers whose training is for work which is a part of the normal nondisaster activities of the Red Cross may be employed during a disaster. Like many of the staff, these volunteers may take on tasks wholly unrelated to those they perform in nondisaster periods. In one chapter, for example, a number of such volunteers are designated as "disaster auxiliaries" with no specific assignment in emergency except to be available to assist in whatever facet of the operations they might be useful.


Finally, first aiders and other trained volunteers whose assignments are in themselves appropriate to the organization's disaster operations are also mobilized during an emergency. Together with the volunteers trained exclusively in disaster services, these volunteers make up the bulk of a chapter's personnel available for mass care emergency mobilization. In the ranks of the trained volunteers of Red Cross, then, and not among the professional staff, are to be found the exclusively disaster-trained personnel.

In the event of disaster threat or impact, the mobilization of Red Cross is, numerically at least, the mobilization of its trained volunteers. Figure 1 presents, in a somewhat simplified form, the organizational chart of the volunteer disaster-services personnel for one large city chapter. The chart depicts the horizontal articulation of several staff positions with these volunteer positions, but the abundance and elaboration of the volunteers correctly suggests that the supervision and performance of the disaster operation is essentially the responsibility of the trained volunteers. This is as it should be, ideally, but not, one suspects, as it actually is in most mass care operations.

Volunteer supervision and performance of the Red Cross disaster program is the result of two characteristics of the chapter depicted in figure 1. First, in terms of staff, trained volunteers, and jurisdiction, the chapter is one of the largest in the nation. Second, the area in which the chapter is located is subjected almost every year to the threat of disaster and, as a result, emergency organizations operate there in what has been called a "disaster subculture."⁸ This means that disaster operations for these organizations -- including the Red Cross -- have become "normal emergencies." Impact is not "disastrous" in the sense that it brings totally new and unexpected demands on Red Cross members; rather, the trained volunteers and staff of the local chapter know from past experience where they should go, what they should do, under whom they should work, and so forth. The size and disaster experience of the chapter allow, therefore, an unusually expanded and differentiated volunteer structure, very unlike a small town chapter or even a city chapter not part of a disaster subculture.

FIGURE 1

DISASTER SERVICES ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



Under the direction of the chapter chairman, the disaster chairman, and the latter's assistant -- all of whom are trained volunteers -- there are eight deputy chairmen, each the head of individual disaster-related services. Of these eight, three divisions are made up of the volunteers charged with the performance of direct disaster relief tasks (family services, mass care, and medical services) and one division includes five subcommittees whose members perform the tasks necessary to support these services (survey, communications, transportation, supply, and maintenance). The volunteers involved in these divisions are responsible for the basic relief Red Cross provides in disaster. Every Red Cross chapter is required by the charter of the organization to provide these services and must, therefore, include volunteers trained in the tasks associated, directly or in a support capacity, with them. To that extent, the organization of disaster service and support volunteers should not vary significantly -- except in numbers and in the sophistication of their training -- from one chapter to another.

The elaboration of the volunteer structure described in figure 1, however, is suggested in the four remaining disaster-service divisions. These are "luxury" divisions whose differentiated tasks in most chapters are not performed by independent committees of volunteers -- if these administrative support tasks are performed at all. The planning and consulting services and the administrative services divisions include volunteer members of the chapter with specialized scientific and technical knowledge and with managerial and executive abilities who are available to "aid and guide" the disaster chairmen in the performance of their service and support tasks. The members of the liaison relations division occupy positions in other community agencies and organizations from which the Red Cross solicits assistance, cooperation, and active participation in emergencies. Finally, the members of the volunteer recruitment and resources division are charged with the responsibility of mobilizing and classifying volunteers who wish to serve in an emergency.

In addition to these "luxury" divisions, the chapter described here includes what the national Red Cross has called "disaster action teams" and what this chapter calls "emergency task forces." A relatively new idea in the national organization, disaster action teams are three-to-six-member units, representative of the range of Red Cross services to disaster victims, and prepared twenty-four hours a day to provide on an immediate basis these emergency services. According to the national organization, such a team "serves as the chapter's first on-the-scene contact with the disaster situation."⁹ More specifically, the functions of a disaster action team include the following:

- Meets the immediate urgent needs of the disaster victims for necessities such as food, clothing, shelter, first aid, and other personal humanitarian services as required.
- Makes contact with ranking public officials and other appropriate authorities at the scene of the disaster.
- Makes a rapid appraisal of the total situation and immediately gets this information to chapter headquarters.
- Determines the immediate need for additional Red Cross services and

support and relays this information immediately to chapter headquarters.

Makes sure that all Red Cross activities are well identified.¹⁰

In large-city chapters such as the one described in figure 1, these teams most frequently represent the Red Cross in the comparatively limited relief operations which follow disasters involving fewer than five families. In one large city, for example, the local Red Cross chapter responds yearly to over five hundred disasters, the greatest number of these involving disaster action teams only.

When an emergency requires the services of a larger number of disaster volunteers, the mobilization of the total volunteer structure, Red Cross chapters rely on a telephone fan-out system. Chapter handbooks for disaster operations normally include a diagrammatic "who calls whom for disaster duty," such as the one presented in figure 2. In addition to telephone communication, Red Cross chapters employ the mass media -- radio and television -- to alert their members to the threat of disaster or to its impact. The input to the Red Cross may be from a number of sources, depending on the nature of the disaster: the weather bureau, for example, or the Red Cross Hurricane Watch, the fire department, the police department, or the local civil defense. Some larger chapters have equipment which allows them to monitor local police or sheriff's department radio communications; such chapters, however, are in the minority. Chapter five will consider the interorganizational relations of Red Cross chapters and will include more information on these inputs.

Red Cross Disaster Plans


Extensive revisions in Red Cross disaster manuals in recent years have produced three model disaster plans in which minimum preparedness for meeting community emergencies is described. Based on criteria of location, occurrence of disaster, and potential for disaster, these models are designed to take into account the variations in size and resources among Red Cross chapters. These variations and criteria produce the three models: first, large, strategically located chapters with a history or potential for major disaster; second, similar chapters which have not experienced major disaster; and third, small chapters with a history or "obvious hazard" of major disaster.¹¹

The traditional disaster services are required of all three plans. The variations involve the number and differentiation of personnel charged with preparedness for performing these tasks. Thus, in the first model -- "Pattern A" -- minimum chapter organization for disaster includes eight separate emergency units: food, clothing, and shelter services, medical-nursing service, family service, and survey, communications, and transportation support units. The other two models require chapter organizations of intermediate elaboration. In providing these models, the national organization has emphasized, first, the importance of disaster relief in the total Red Cross program, and second, the variations both in chapter size and resources and in the potential for major disaster. These are differences which disaster manuals produced before the present decade did not explicitly take into account.

FIGURE 2

WHO CALLS WHOM FOR DISASTER DUTY: AN EXAMPLE
OF A RED CROSS CHAPTER TELEPHONE FAN-OUT
SYSTEM

(Hurricane Shelter Operations)



Summary

This chapter has demonstrated that the mobilization of Red Cross personnel for emergency service cannot be discussed, as the structure of the organization cannot, in holistic terms. Rather, the dual structures of the Red Cross must be considered individually. Within each of these structures, the staff and the volunteer, mobilization involves two distinct elements: area-national and local staff on the one hand, and walk-in and trained volunteers on the other.

In effect, then, the mobilization of the Red Cross in disaster involves four somewhat different processes. Area-national staff are physically relocated to administer the disaster relief operations. Local staff undergo what may be called a task shift, switching from their normal responsibilities to special assignments for the disaster. Volunteers trained for disaster duty, who in normal environments are relatively inactive in the organization, become hyper-active in the chapter's disaster operations. Finally, individuals and groups with no previous experience in Red Cross work volunteer their services to the organization.

The principal effect of mobilization on the structure of the local chapter is to greatly enlarge the active membership of the volunteer element, adding large numbers of both trained and walk-in volunteers. Additions are also made to the staff structure of the chapter but these personnel are added at the top of the organization as area-national administrators who are never really assimilated into the local organization. The bulk of the volunteers as walk-ins are added at the bottom; they, too, are typically "members" of the organization only for the duration of the emergency.

In the following chapter problems in the actual performance of mass care and support tasks in disaster environments will be considered. In the context of this discussion, considerable attention will be paid to certain problems which are functionally related to the addition of personnel to the two structures of the Red Cross.

NOTES: CHAPTER III

1. For a theoretical discussion of these characteristics, see Russell R. Dynes, Organized Behavior in Disaster: Analysis and Conceptualization, Disaster Research Center Monograph Series (Columbus: Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University, 1969), pp. 166ff.
2. The American National Red Cross, Disaster Action: Chapter Preparedness, rev. (Washington: The American National Red Cross, September 1966), Manual A, p. 2.
3. The American National Red Cross, Disaster Relief Handbook: A Manual for National Personnel, rev. (Washington: The American National Red Cross, 1966), chap. ii, p. 3.
4. The American National Red Cross, Betsy: American Red Cross Disaster Action in Hurricane Betsy, September, 1965 (Washington: The American National Red Cross, n.d.), p. 1.
5. The American National Red Cross, Hurricane Action, rev. (Washington: The American National Red Cross, April 1966), p. 1.
6. Hurricane Action, pp. 2-3.
7. For a discussion of disaster convergence, see Charles E. Fritz and J. H. Mathewson, Convergence Behavior in Disasters: A Problem in Social Control (Washington: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, 1957).
8. "Disaster culture" is discussed in Harry Estill Moore et al., . . . And the Winds Blew (Austin, Texas: Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, University of Texas Press, 1964), chap. x. It is from this discussion that the concept "disaster subculture" has been derived by the Disaster Research Center.
9. The American National Red Cross, Disaster Action Team (Washington: The American National Red Cross, March 1966), p. 1.
10. Disaster Action Team, p. 2.
11. Chapter Preparedness, p. 74.

CHAPTER IV

PROBLEMS OF RED CROSS EMERGENCY MASS CARE AND SUPPORT TASKS IN DISASTER

This chapter contains a discussion of the performance of the basic emergency tasks Red Cross chapters undertake in disasters. Beginning with the disaster survey, which logically precedes Red Cross relief operations, this discussion will consider problems in the provision of mass care to the victims of disasters and to those working in the search, rescue, and security activities which follow impact. The support tasks necessary for this mass care -- the operation of communication and transportation systems -- will also be considered.

In the course of this discussion, the present chapter will focus on some of the operational problems which DRC and other relevant literature suggests accompany Red Cross disaster programs. This discussion, however, should not be considered a criticism of the organization: if the accomplishments of Red Cross are not stressed, it is simply because they are assumed. Indeed, they are achieved in spite of some of these problems. To the extent that the problems Red Cross personnel face in disaster are major, their accomplishments are that much greater.

Disaster Survey

In some instances, a disaster survey may precede any Red Cross relief operation. Preliminary surveys of the extent of physical damage, the number of persons killed and injured, and the boundaries of the impact are invaluable in estimating the personnel and resources the Red Cross will require to meet the emergency needs of those affected by the disaster. Red Cross disaster literature summarizes the responsibility of the survey unit in the following:

Immediately after a disaster the survey unit has the responsibility to obtain detailed and accurate information about the effects of the disaster throughout the chapter's area of jurisdiction.¹

As has already been indicated, the disaster chairman or some other representative of the chapter has the immediate responsibility of relating this information by the quickest means available to the office of the area in which the chapter is located.

Unfortunately, surveys are not always possible, at least immediately after the impact. When disasters, like floods, affect large diffuse areas, it is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the extent and nature of the damage for some time. In addition to the physical distances involved, the progressive character of the disaster itself makes an accurate survey improbable. Estimates of the flooding after Hurricane Betsy, even within the New Orleans metropolitan area, were very approximate for at least forty-eight

hours after the initial impact of the flood. Very generally, it is probably correct to say that accurate surveys of progressive-diffused disasters are more difficult to obtain than surveys of the damage accompanying instantaneous-focalized disasters.

Even in the latter type of disaster other factors over which humans have no control may complicate the survey process. The timing of impact, for example: in a number of tornado touchdowns, impact has been in the early evening as in Topeka, Kansas, and surveys, as a result, have to be postponed until the following day. All that can be known with any degree of accuracy during the first night is the outside limits of the stricken area; no information is available on the severity of the damage or the number of persons involved. In such instances the mobilization of the Red Cross can be based only on "official" approximations of damage. One Red Cross staff member explained the importance of these rough, but "official" reports:

You see, we don't really start to mobilize until we get word from somebody who actually saw the damage -- because otherwise we would be answering every false alarm from anyone. So as soon as we get official word from city officials, why, we begin mobilizing.²

Because a survey is, in the same staff member's words, "a foot-by-foot walk through the disaster area to determine how many houses have been hit and also whether you could live in them," it is impossible to carry out after dark.

Red Cross, therefore, may be faced with insuperable initial problems: if disaster survey is impossible, to what extent should the organization mobilize its personnel and resources? And, which of these personnel and resources should be called up? Criticism of the Red Cross for delay in providing its disaster services, for insufficient personnel and supplies -- to the extent that these criticisms are justifiable -- may, therefore, be a function of the difficulties the organization faces in estimating the degree and scope of the damage.

Mass Care: Food, Shelter, Clothing, and Medical Care

The focus of all the disaster tasks of a local Red Cross chapter is the provision of emergency mass care. Food, shelter, clothing, and medical care must be provided for all who request it. When a chapter is not adequately prepared or is overwhelmed by the scope of a disaster and is thus inadequate in meeting the needs of disaster victims and rescue workers, its mass care program suffers at least initially. Thus, the response of one Red Cross chapter to the impact of an earthquake was severely restricted by the fact that the physical resources of the chapter -- its local headquarters -- were heavily damaged by the disaster.

Assistance is available from two sources when local staffs and trained volunteers are, for whatever reason, inadequate to the demands of a disaster. Area-national staff may be mobilized and walk-in volunteers, previously not

associated with the Red Cross, may be added temporarily to the organization. As was suggested in chapter three, however, these additional personnel operate in radically different positions in the Red Cross structures: the area-national personnel, at the top of the staff structure; the walk-in volunteers, at the bottom of the volunteer structure. This discussion of the performance of mass care tasks will be divided into two parts, the first dealing with the local chapter's performance of these tasks vis-a-vis the mobilization and presence of area-national staff and the second, with that performance in terms of the addition of untrained, walk-in volunteers.

The Performance of Mass Care Tasks and the Mobilization of Area-National Staff

It may be useful to consider certain of the problems in the performance of mass care tasks as resulting from two elements sometimes characteristic of the relationship between local and area-national staff. The first element is what may be called "functional overlap" -- the merging of officially discrete local and area-national disaster responsibilities; and the second, "structural separation," that is, the physical and organizational segregating of local and area-national staffs. When these two elements characterize a Red Cross disaster operation -- when both local and area-national staffs are involved in mass care and rehabilitation, but when these two levels of the organization perform independently of one another -- then problems like task duplication, conflicting decisions, and incomplete communications may result.

The first source of these problems is the overlapping of authority and tasks between area-national and local personnel. Theoretically, the emergency mass care program for which the local chapter is responsible should be phasing out as the rehabilitation program, for which area-national staff are primarily responsible, is beginning. Thus, the change in the type of relief and shift in authority for the programs should be accomplished with little or no difficulty. However, just as the area-national staff attempt to integrate local personnel into the rehabilitation phase (since that program will ultimately be a local responsibility when area-national staff are demobilized), so local staff often require personnel and financial assistance from area-national staff during the chapter's mass care program. A completely discrete division by authority and task functions between the two levels of the organization thus is not always desirable during disasters. But, on the other hand, functional overlap is sometimes forced on the organization.

The extent to which the mass care and rehabilitation phases of Red Cross overlap is, in fact, frequently a result of the nature and scope of the damage created by the disaster. Where damage to homes is severe and widespread -- where the disaster is progressive and diffuse, affecting a large area for an extended period of time -- a great many families may require public shelter for several weeks. Mass care programs, therefore, must continue even after area-national Red Cross staff have begun their rehabilitation work. Such was the case in a city impacted first by a hurricane, then by diffuse floods resulting from a hurricane-caused tidal surge. Hurricane shelters are normally

required only for a few days at the most; here, however, public shelter had to be provided for many refugees for nearly a month. Because the mass care program would be long-term, and clearly beyond the capacity of the local chapter to provide, the resources of the chapter and those of the area-national organization were consolidated in the operation of a "super shelter," providing mass care services to as many as 10,000 evacuees. This shelter replaced the dozens of independent shelters for which the local chapter had been responsible but which it had found increasingly difficult to staff and supply. Only by transferring its authority for mass care to the area-national staff could the local chapter solve the operational problems this major disaster had produced. One member of the chapter staff described the local chapter's disaster situation in the following:

In other past disasters we've been fortunate enough just to have the emergency phase and then when that's over to have everybody return to their normal assignment and the national organization takes over the rehabilitation phase. But this thing was so enormous and went on for so long and so many volunteers were needed in the relief center as well as at the shelters that it would seem that the operation should be conducted by one person.

That "one person" was the area-national field director.

In this same disaster, overlapping of authority and tasks occurred in the opposite direction as well. The total rehabilitation efforts of the Red Cross involved more than 34,000 families. To service such an enormous number of families required many more personnel than the area offices of the Red Cross could muster. The use of local staff and volunteers in the rehabilitation phase is not unusual in disaster programs, but normally these persons have previous casework experience or can be supervised by area-national staff. In this instance the program was so vast that trained volunteers and direct supervision were often impossible. As a consequence local staff, sometimes inexperienced in the policies and procedures of this phase of Red Cross work, were supervising persons even less experienced than themselves, that is, walk-in volunteers. This task overlap left unspecified the matter of decision-making authority. One member of the chapter staff pointed this out from his experience:

I didn't have the authority to make decisions for the national organization. I felt that my place was out in the community with our people who needed help at that time, yet I couldn't leave because nobody was there to represent Red Cross.

Although these examples of overlap are unusual in that they were required by an unusually severe and diffuse disaster, they do suggest the extent to which the official division of authority and tasks is modified in Red Cross disaster programs.

Problems in coordinating the two levels of the Red Cross also appear to arise with structural differences between local and area-national staff. In any disaster operation, area-national staff are "outsiders"; chapter staff are

"locals." As types, the two have varying interests in the disaster situation and, similarly, varying modes of task performance. Area-national staff are more "professional," more "cosmopolitan" in the sense that their allegiance is to the total Red Cross organization and its policies rather than to a particular chapter and its disaster program in one community.³ They are thus more "bureaucratically" oriented in the performance of disaster tasks. This orientation is a result both of their "professional-cosmopolitan" status and of the rehabilitation phase of disaster relief with which they are charged, this phase of the operation being somewhat more formal and structured than the local's mass care phase.

These differences are particularly clear among Red Cross public information personnel. The interests of local PI directors -- the establishment and maintenance of good relations with members of the local media -- and of their area-national counterparts -- the "telling of the Red Cross disaster story" to both local and national media -- are sometimes seen as divergent, if not contradictory. Thus, one local public information director made the following assessment of area-national personnel and their functions in disaster. They are, he said:

Merely professional people, staff people to offer guidance and to make sure that certain routine things and certain casework activities are carried out by the people they bring with them. But it's the local chapter which is responsible for the public relations, for the effectiveness of the disaster relief, and for the actual relief.

Another public information staff member held much the same opinion but was much less charitable toward an area-national PI director with whom he had worked on other disasters:

Now he was the same fellow they sent down /before/ and he's a very unfortunate gentleman. . . . I was always afraid he was going to louse up our relations /with the local media/. . . . The first time we had him in our office at an extra desk, but none of that this time. He was up on the second floor. And we took his phone away and dispatched him /to another location/ as soon as possible.⁴

Although the latter instance of differences between local and area-national staff appears to be partly a matter of personality, the basis for the disagreements remains the varying structural interests of the two individuals.⁵

Another source of differing opinions on disaster operations between "locals" and "cosmopolitans" is the use of volunteers. Area-national staff sometimes tend to view all volunteers -- both trained and walk-in -- as "amateurs." Indeed, one study reports that some view almost all chapter personnel, paid staff as well as unpaid volunteers, as disaster "volunteers."⁶ This point of view is reflected in the following statement from a local Red Cross staff member. "Our national people were telling us one thing," he recalled:

They thought we weren't doing a particularly good job for awhile. . . . They had reference to the fact that we were using so many volunteers who had just come in off the street, but our staff was pushed so far and spread so thin that we had to use them. With just a minimum of instruction /these volunteers/ went to work for us and many of them did an outstanding job, but some of our national people didn't appreciate this.

If in this particular situation, the area-national staff thought that the local staff was remiss, according to one member of the chapter the feeling was mutual: "The area felt that we could do more and the local people thought the national could have done more."

A correlate of these differences appears to be the physical separation of the two levels of the organization -- not in the functional sense as officially defined by the Red Cross, by mass care and rehabilitation programs, but simply in physical terms to avoid conflict. Such was the case, apparently, of the PI personnel mentioned above. Describing a more general separation of the two staff levels, one chapter member said: "It was like a void. Local people would be on one side of the room and national would be on the other and they'd look at one another. It was like we had a big board right down the middle." He ventured an explanation for this "void" in the fact that certain members of his chapter had what he considered unrealistic expectations for the performance of area-national staff in a disaster. "The national staff moved in," he said, "and the contention was, 'Well, national staff is here, we don't have to worry any more.'"

Although avoidance may solve some problems, especially interpersonal ones, when this independence is combined with an unclear division of labor and authority (with functional overlap), it is likely to aggravate or create others. The disaster director of one chapter indicated in the following statement that he was well aware of the problems associated with local and area-national independence:

This thing /the disaster/ was not only involved with /the local community/, it was getting bigger and bigger by the minute. So this complicated the whole operation up here because the area staff had taken over across the hall. We had recognized this /in a previous disaster operation/ as being one of the problems, but we hadn't figured out how to solve it -- the fact that you've got two separate operations involved here.

Another member of the same chapter staff gave an example of the kind of duplication which resulted from this separation:

The fatality list . . . was taken from the coroner's office by the national staff without notifying the proper chapter personnel. This resulted in extreme embarrassment to the chapter representative who went to pick it up from the coroner's office, and a rather poor opinion of our intelligence on their part.

With two independent disaster headquarters, the normal difficulties associated with communication and decision making in disasters are compounded. In effect, a combination of "functional overlap" and "structural separation" equals an optimum situation for organizational problems.

On the other hand, when a clearly defined and mutually acceptable division of labor and authority exists between local and area-national staffs, the separation of their relief programs can be an operational asset. When a local chapter is experienced in disaster work and has staff and trained volunteers sufficient to meet the demands of the mass care phase, then the establishment of a separate Red Cross unit for the rehabilitation phase may be an efficient procedure. An area-national staff member made the following assessment of such a situation.

This building is serving two disaster functions right now. The . . . chapter has their own disaster within their own jurisdiction. . . . So the chapter is handling this job. And then in the meantime we have been coming in and the chapter's making space available to us. This is very nice of them, but we are going to have people coming in from all over and setting up the overall headquarters so then we consider it wise to shop around in the community for a headquarters other than the local chapter headquarters. In a sense, it doesn't pay to have two jobs going on in one building because it causes confusion in the minds of people.

It may also cause confusion, he suggested, in the bookkeeping: local and area-national accounts, when merchants are given the same address for both, have become mixed up, the local chapter paying for area-national supplies and vice versa. "You know how it is," he said, "so we establish separate headquarters." This is, in any case, the officially defined Red Cross procedure for local and area-national staffs in disasters.

In the following section of this discussion, the performance of mass care tasks will be considered in terms of the mobilization of volunteers. These personnel are added at the bottom of the volunteer structure, as opposed to the addition at the top of the staff structure of area-national personnel; the consequences are therefore somewhat different.

The Performance of Mass Care Tasks and the Mobilization of Volunteers

The term "organizational breakdown" has been used to describe the typical state of local volunteer organizations following disaster impact. Its referent is the behavior of members of an organization, "informal" and "spontaneous" behavior because it is not defined by the organizational roles of the individuals involved. "Role," therefore, is a crucial element in understanding the effects of a large-scale mobilization of volunteers on organizations like the Red Cross. Very broadly, two volunteer Red Cross "role relationships" are possible, corresponding to the types of volunteers discussed in chapter three.

Walk-in volunteers have no existing role within the organization; trained volunteers possess organizational roles, but of varying degrees of explicitness and relevance to disaster. In this basic respect, then, both types of volunteers stand in marked contrast to area-national staff whose organizational roles in disaster are highly structured. The following discussion will consider first the "role-less" walk-in volunteers and, second, their trained counterparts in the Red Cross.

Walk-In Volunteers

Volunteers without previous experience in Red Cross or disaster work are most often employed in "mechanical" types of tasks. Preparing sandwiches, unloading, storing, and distributing emergency supplies, and tasks of a similar nature are necessary to Red Cross operations but they do not require a knowledge of the organization's policies in disaster relief. Walk-in volunteers are infrequently assigned tasks which require such knowledge. The most important exception to this rule involves those whose professional status may have prepared them to perform adequately in Red Cross relief efforts. In fact, such volunteers are likely to be recruited by the Red Cross for exactly these disaster-relevant professional skills. Thus, social workers, for example, even without specific Red Cross or disaster experience, are already familiar with casework practices and they can, with a minimum of instruction, be utilized in the organization's rehabilitation phase.

When nonprofessional walk-in volunteers do assume positions requiring some knowledge of Red Cross procedures, their unfamiliarity with them may result in misunderstandings and operational difficulties. In one city, for example, additional shelters to those officially established and staffed by the Red Cross were opened by groups of neighborhood families. Only after the local Red Cross became aware of the existence of these shelters could the organization begin to assign trained volunteers or staff members to them. One staff member described the "unofficial" operation of one of these new shelters and some of the subsequent difficulties he had with the leaders of the shelter. Generally, the "unofficial" operations were "magnificent":

These were just neighborhood people who came in and just saw a job to be done, and did it. It was magnificent. . . . The woman who had tried to organize things and had set up things to a degree, came in when she learned that I was in the building, that the Red Cross had arrived. She came in to talk with me and said, "Now, is there anything different /I should be doing/?" I said, "No, just keep doing what you're doing; I think you've got . . . beautiful control and you just continue. If there's any way I can help you, you just let me know." Because I wasn't about to go out there and say, "The Red Cross has arrived!", you know, and wave a flag for something that had already been done. It was well done, and done by people who know one another. . . . I can't think of . . . a better setup.

Obviously, however, these leaders of this informal shelter did not adequately cover all of the disaster tasks associated with operating a shelter. There

were necessary precautions for the safety of the refugees -- sanitation checks and similar tasks -- and certain standard procedures (like registering all evacuees) which either had not been done or had been only partly accomplished. The Red Cross staff member's biggest problem, vis-a-vis the "formal" leaders, developed over a plan to re-evacuate to another and, he felt, safer school. The neighborhood leaders balked, refused to leave, and a kind of competition for the control of the situation followed. Such difficulties would be much less likely when trained volunteers with defined positions in the organization and some knowledge of Red Cross procedures occupy decision-making statuses in shelter operations.

Problems in the performance of emergency tasks are seldom the result of too few disaster volunteers. Convergence during the post-impact phase of disasters, referred to earlier in this report, includes volunteers as well as messages and material.⁸ Consequently, problems are likely to reflect the excessive, rather than insufficient, numbers of these volunteers. The simplest form these problems take is that of finding something for walk-in volunteers to do. Red Cross staff often express the desire to be able to screen these volunteers during an emergency, but clearly this is not possible, given both the public image of the Red Cross as a "volunteer" organization and the immediate demands of a disaster operation. Speaking of this dilemma, one Red Cross staff member made the following statement:

So the door was pretty much open and anybody who came in with a willing face and willing arm, why we put a Red Cross band on him and put him to work -- which is a dangerous process. But sometimes you don't have time to take pedigrees and find out what the person's motive is.

When disaster demands are high and constant, the motivations of walk-in volunteers are not especially relevant: "It's ability and willingness to want to do the job, which is getting materials and stuff out." But when the emergency demands begin to diminish, or when there are periods of high demand followed by periods of slack, these varying motivations may be the source of difficulties.

Such difficulties were associated in one disaster with a large group of high school and college-age volunteers. "After the real push was over," said a staff member, "they had time to sit down and think, it became a problem in knowing that these kids were in it for the lark. Although I will say that they worked like Trojans up until this point." But young volunteers present certain problems unique to them: unlike most adult walk-ins, they do not have family and job obligations which preclude their assistance "after the real push is over." Rather, according to another member of this same chapter, it began to look as if the boys and girls were never going home. An additional dimension of the problem developed because these volunteers were spending the nights at the chapter house. The staff member took it upon himself to send them home; in the following statement, he explained why he did:

It was not that I thought anything was wrong, but it just didn't seem right. It was an opportunity for something to happen that

would bring bad publicity and bad public relations to our side if anything would happen to one of those teenage girls. They were sleeping in the building with the teenage boys and college-age boys around all the time.

Problems of this kind were summed up by another member of the chapter: "Red Cross says, 'We have a place for everybody.' Well," he observed, "we don't have a place for everybody."

The convergence of untrained, walk-in volunteers is not constant through the emergency phase of every disaster. It depends on such independent variables as the time of day and the day of the week of the disaster impact. Evenings and weekends, according to Red Cross staff in several cities, are optimum times for walk-in volunteers. More people are free of business obligations and are available to assist in emergencies than would be during the day, Mondays through Fridays. (More assistance from other voluntary organizations is probable during the evening or on the weekend for the same reason.) Given these variations and the "half-life" of walk-in volunteers which typically does not extend past the excitement of the emergency period, it is sometimes necessary for Red Cross chapters to hire additional labor to do the work previously performed by volunteers.

Trained Volunteers

If sufficient trained volunteers are available to a local chapter, problems like those discussed above -- authority conflict, excess volunteers, and hired help -- may be reduced, if not avoided altogether. To the extent that volunteers with defined positions within the chapter and previous Red Cross disaster experience are prepared to meet the emergency demands which follow impact, the chapter does not need to rely on untrained, walk-in volunteers. This, of course, is the ideal situation and probably never actually occurs: trained volunteers are often fewer in numbers than the emergency requires and those available may be less than adequately experienced, disasters being uncommon events in the vast majority of communities. Nor does the Red Cross, even when trained volunteers are experienced and available, turn away those who walk in to offer their services. These features, then, are inevitable: it is always possible to wish for more and better qualified disaster volunteers in any given set of emergency circumstances. The following comments concern operational problems with trained volunteers which stem from other features of the Red Cross and of disasters: first, those associated generally with the dual structure of the Red Cross, and second, those peculiar to the variations in disasters.

Trained volunteers in the Red Cross are unsolicited members of the chapter. This sets them apart, as was suggested in chapter one, from those other volunteer members of the chapter referred to as "recruited advisors," the latter being selected to serve on chapter boards because of their "respected" status in the community. This is the crucial difference between the advisors and the volunteers: the preselection of a particular banker, for example, to fill a vacancy on the chapter's financial advisory committee as opposed to the unsolicited presence among the chapter's workers of a businessman and an industrial worker.

Thus, Red Cross chapters do not always find it possible to draw the right volunteers for a specific task. Rather, available volunteers must be placed in vacant positions; the organization has to use whomever it can get, even persons whose experience and motivation may not be completely functional for the task. The status "carry-over" which typically occurs in the process dictates that a volunteer is placed in the structure at a level consonant with his status in the larger community, the white collar volunteer at a higher level than the blue collar.

Authority relationships between members of the Red Cross staff and volunteer structures -- generally somewhat ambiguously defined as was suggested in chapter one -- are of a type which might aggravate such status differences. They are probably less frequent during normal times than during an emergency. Quantitative DRC laboratory data suggest, in fact, that under conditions of stress there is a significant increase in the number of these relationships as compared with the number under nonstressful circumstances.⁹ Field interviews with Red Cross personnel also indicate that this increase in decision making and command giving is typically observed by those directly involved. Additionally, these authority relationships may be made even more problematic by the hurried and sketchy instructions which volunteers often feel accompany directives from members of the Red Cross during emergencies.

In summary, disasters bring together in a situation which demands immediate and unusual actions, members of the two structures of the Red Cross -- volunteers and staff. Ideally, disaster preplanning should define the relationships between these personnel but, as has been suggested here, the differing community and organizational measures of their statuses may lead to difficulties during emergency operations which under nonemergency conditions might never have arisen. Quite apart from these structural sources of operational problems in mass care programs, the nature of the disaster itself can affect the capacity of volunteers to respond. It is to the problems generated in this way that this discussion will now turn.

The "breakdown" in local voluntary organizations during the post-impact period of disasters is likely to be associated with the kind of disaster to which the organization must respond. Impact preceded by little or no warning probably tends to increase the "breakdown" in staff and volunteer activities since the organization has no time to plan a specific coordinated response to the disaster before it occurs. Progressive disasters, on the other hand, allow time for preplanning, for the mobilization of trained volunteers, for the opening of shelters, and for the collection and distribution of emergency supplies of food and clothing. "Informal" and "spontaneous" activities by volunteer (and staff) members of the Red Cross after the impact of such a disaster are likely to be less frequent than in the emergency period following an instantaneous disaster. When the instantaneous disaster is also an unusual event, one with which the affected community and its organizations have no previous experience, organizational breakdown is that much more likely. Progressive disasters which are relatively expected events in a community and around which a "disaster subculture" has developed do not provoke breakdown in voluntary organizations, except perhaps when such "normal" disasters are "abnormally" severe.

Even in the latter instance, if the trained volunteers of the chapter are experienced in disaster operations, a minimum of breakdown can be expected. For example, in one city which is subjected to flooding virtually on a regular basis, an especially severe flood did not present many problems which were beyond the capacity of the local Red Cross to solve with the trained members of its volunteer structure. The manager of the chapter made the following general assessment of the capabilities of his organization with respect to those problems.

In our operation there were very few problems that sufficient manpower hasn't been able to solve for us. . . . The problems that came up and were called to my attention were not unsolvable, it was just a question of who did we have who could get on that problem and come up with what appeared to be the best answer.

A member of the area-national staff assigned to the city during this flooding also described the volunteer structure of the chapter in especially positive terms.

The city happens to be very fortunate in that they've got a well trained disaster staff. They've got plenty of volunteers who know their functions. They've got a good volunteer organization. . . . It's surprising what they knew even before the flood crested. They knew that the light company removed five thousand meters from the houses. They were removed because the light company knew that the water would come over these meters and ruin them. Well, this meant something to the chapter. Every meter represents a family, so something like five thousand families would be affected.

Obviously, instantaneous disasters do not permit this kind of preplanning, nor would Red Cross personnel likely be as sophisticated in reading the signs of progressive disaster if they were not experienced in responding to them.

It is revealing to note that in this same chapter some indication was given by the manager that the staff-volunteer distinction is consciously avoided, perhaps because for many of the staff and volunteer chapter members, disaster experiences and competence are essentially equivalent. The manager stated that as far as he was concerned, the only difference between staff and volunteers was that the former are paid by Red Cross, the latter are not.

There are some of us here who report to this office every day of the week and make our livelihood out of it and then there are others . . . who make their livelihood somewhere else, but we try to see that there's no "he's staff, I'm volunteer" comments. We are all staff: the only difference is that some of us are paid staff and some are unpaid staff.

A combination of characteristics like these -- a de-emphasis on staff-volunteer differences, a history of progressive disasters, and the development of a "disaster subculture" -- probably makes for an unusually effective disaster response among trained volunteers, one unlikely to be subject to "organizational breakdown."

If such a combination is desirable in minimizing breakdown and, thus, maximizing organizational coordination and efficiency during the emergency phase of disaster operations, it is, unhappily, a relatively infrequent occurrence. For many Red Cross chapters faced with disaster, the situation is unique, volunteers (and staff) have little or no actual experience in disaster work, and the members of the two structures of the chapter have not previously had to coordinate their activities and decisions under the emergency demands of a post-impact period. Speaking from a background of many years in Red Cross disaster work, the disaster director of one of the largest chapters in the United States indicated that such breakdown -- independent and spontaneous action by both staff and volunteers -- is an expected part of the organization's initial reactions to disaster. "I have never seen a disaster plan work in the way it was planned to go," he said, "because people simply don't follow a plan when disaster strikes. Everybody is on his own for the time being."

Support Tasks: Communication and Transportation

Under these conditions the crucial support tasks, communication and transportation, are difficult to perform. But difficulty in these tasks stems not only from the inexperience of Red Cross personnel but also, in many cases, from the lack of the necessary equipment and supplies.

Typically, Red Cross disaster plans rely on the telephone as the principal means of communication for mobilizing personnel and coordinating mass care tasks. Most convenient certainly, the telephone is generally a very unreliable medium of communication in disaster, especially during the immediate post-impact period when Red Cross personnel would be required to make the greatest use of it. Even when telephone service is not completely disrupted, Red Cross chapters discover that existing switchboard systems are insufficient to carry the load of incoming calls. Additional lines installed for the emergency help alleviate the communications convergence, but rarely relieve the problem completely.

The problem according to many Red Cross personnel is not so much with the incoming calls (personnel in the service to military families division never complain of receiving too few requests for information), but with intraorganizational calls. Messages to Red Cross personnel working in shelters are difficult to send by telephone; similarly, feedback from workers in the disaster area must often be delayed because Red Cross personnel cannot reach the chapter's headquarters by telephone. Interorganizational communications between the Red Cross and other disaster relief agencies are haphazard at best. The disaster services director of one Red Cross chapter described the problem graphically in the following:

You had to make sure that you got all your business transacted because you never knew whether you could call back or not. A lot of people would say, "Well, call me back." Of course when you tried to reach them later, you couldn't get through and they didn't know you were trying to reach them, so they weren't returning your call. This presented some problems.

He said that attempts were made to keep a few of the emergency lines open for outgoing and intraorganizational calls but that these attempts were foiled. Duplication of efforts was also a function of these communications difficulties, according to the same staff member.

People would call in /he said/ and they'd get you on one line and then you'd be cut off and they'd get somebody on another line. So that'd be two people working on every project.

As other emergency organizations have discovered, the Red Cross communications system functions most efficiently when an independent radio system is available to them. Many chapters, therefore, incorporate elements of amateur radio groups into their disaster volunteer committees and, during the emergency period, make use of these facilities for intraorganizational communications. Such radio links are especially useful in maintaining contacts between Red Cross shelters and the chapter headquarters. Mobile systems are also very helpful in the disaster survey, especially when the scope of the impact is wide, when the disaster is diffused. A communications volunteer reported that Red Cross surveys of the extent and severity of flood damage were greatly facilitated by mobile radio: "The only way you can survey something," he said, "is if you can get the information back to headquarters; this is the way we do it."

Large city chapters which can afford the investment may be equipped with their own radio system and mobile units. Such chapters, therefore, do not require the services of amateur groups and, in fact, members of one large chapter staff indicated that they discourage amateur radio systems: they must either rely on the telephone or recruit volunteers with the necessary abilities and equipment. Other sources than amateur clubs are available, however. Taxis with two-way radios and other businesses which possess delivery or service vehicles with radio systems may be recruited for Red Cross use. The basic problem with these systems is that they are often employed only after telephone communications have failed; thus, the mobilization of the dispatchers and drivers employed in the business becomes itself a very difficult process.

The disaster division of labor among relief organizations relieves the Red Cross of all transportation tasks except those directly related to the operation of shelters and other mass care facilities. Thus, as will be explored in somewhat more detail in chapter five, Red Cross is not responsible for evacuation of those threatened by disaster, transportation of disaster victims to hospitals, or even the transportation of refugees to Red Cross shelters. Members of Red Cross chapters become involved in these tasks -- indeed, this is part of organizational breakdown during the emergency -- but they remain outside the official responsibilities of the organization. Like communications, however, the collection and distribution of disaster supplies is a crucial task which must be adequately performed if the mass care program is to be carried out. And again, like communications, this task requires equipment which most Red Cross chapters do not possess.

In addition to the use of the private vehicles of volunteer members of the organization, many Red Cross chapters also have standing agreements with

business enterprises or public agencies, like defense installations, which provide for the loan of vehicles, and in some instances drivers as well, for Red Cross use during emergencies. Pre-disaster plans may also be made with food companies in which the companies agree to make the emergency deliveries themselves. Or, as in one city frequently impacted by hurricanes, markets located close to the schools chosen as public shelters are selected as suppliers of emergency food, thus minimizing the problems of distribution. Such plans as these may be disrupted, however. When disasters strike on a weekend, for example, the owners and managers of food stores and the suppliers of other necessities like ice are less easily contacted. When the disaster is so diffused that other shelters must be opened for which no preplanning was made, supplying the refugees housed there is a very difficult business.

Generally speaking, the problems Red Cross faces in adequately performing the support tasks of communication and transportation are compounded by the fact that they must to a certain extent be improvised after the fact. Pre-planning is necessary and is carried out, but it is impossible to know, even during the pre-impact warning period (if there is one), how extensive these facilities must be to meet the needs of the emergency period. The difficulties of the situation are frequently increased by the necessary reliance of the Red Cross on other organizations, private businesses and governmental agencies, for communications and transportation equipment and personnel. That the Red Cross must depend on other organizations for certain authority as well as equipment and that it must provide other organizations with disaster services in the course of attempting to provide these services to disaster victims, is the subject of the following chapter.

Summary

This chapter has focused on some of the problems local Red Cross organizations typically experience in the performance of their emergency mass care tasks. The largest section of this discussion has considered some of the consequences of the addition of personnel to the local Red Cross chapter during this immediate post-impact period. Specifically, these were the consequences of the assignment of area-staff personnel to the disaster operation, the addition of walk-in volunteers, and the mobilization of trained volunteers. Given the dual structures of the Red Cross -- the distinction between the area-national and local staff and between the staff and volunteer components of the local organization -- their elaboration in "membership" during a disaster, at the top of the staff structure and at the bottom of the volunteer structure, has certain negative consequences for the capacity of the Red Cross to perform its emergency tasks. The basic rationale for this expansion, of course, is to increase the local organization's resources for the emergency, but, as has been suggested here, this increase frequently is itself the source of operational problems.

It should be stressed again that this has been a "problematic" approach to Red Cross activities in disaster. That the Red Cross does in fact meet the demands placed on it in disaster has been an assumption, not a hypothesis.

NOTES: CHAPTER IV

1. The American National Red Cross, Disaster Action: Chapter Preparedness, rev. (Washington: The American National Red Cross, September 1966), Manual A, p. 29. The manual (p. 30) suggests the following checklist for the chairman of the survey unit:

The extent and description of the affected area, including streets or other identifying boundaries.

The number of known dead and missing and the estimated number of persons injured, ill, and hospitalized.

The estimated number of (1) homes destroyed, (2) homes with major damage, and (3) homes with minor damage.

The ratio of home owners to renters in the disaster area.

The estimated total number of families suffering loss.

The locations at which Red Cross assistance to disaster victims is needed.

The kinds of assistance needed.

The conditions of roads, bridges, communication facilities, and public utilities in the disaster area.

2. A discussion of the interorganizational relationships of Red Cross will be presented in chapter five.
3. Cf., Alvin W. Gouldner's classic statement on "locals" and "cosmopolitans," "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Rules I, II," Administrative Science Quarterly 2 (1957-1958): 281-306, 444-480.
4. Having rendered this member of the area-national staff "harmless," the local staff member indicated how he and his assistants attempted to make up for this slight by cooperating with the other area-national staff: "We didn't want the national office to feel that we weren't cooperating with them, so we knocked ourselves out to be as cooperative as we could with the other people they sent."
5. For additional examples of differences between public information personnel at the local and the area-national levels, cf., Mary Merritt Boggins, "Red Cross Public Relations Problems, Policies and Operations in a Disaster-Stricken Area" (master's thesis, The Ohio State University, 1966), pp. 83ff., 99-100.
6. William H. Form and Sigmund Nosow, "Final Report on the Flint-Beecher Tornado," unpublished report (Committee on Disaster Studies, Social Research Service, Michigan State University, 1954), p. 119; later published in William H. Form and Sigmund Nosow, Community in Disaster (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958).

7. He added, however, that this was hardly the case:

Your job is just starting then. They bring in new people, half of them don't even know how to get off the /highway/ to get /down-town/. . . . I heard two men from the national staff trying to pronounce /the name of a certain street/. They couldn't even write it, let alone pronounce it. They didn't know where it was.

Thus, to expect the national staff to "take over" completely under these circumstances was, he felt, clearly unrealistic.

8. Cf., Charles E. Fritz and J. H. Mathewson, Convergence Behavior in Disasters: A Problem in Social Control (Washington: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, 1957).
9. Thomas E. Drabek, Laboratory Simulation of a Police Communication System Under Stress, Disaster Research Center Monograph Series (Columbus: College of Administrative Science, The Ohio State University, in press).

CHAPTER V

INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS OF THE RED CROSS IN DISASTERS

Three distinctive types of relationships may exist between the Red Cross and other agencies and organizations involved in disaster operations. The purpose of this chapter is to describe these types of relationships and to discuss some of the consequences of each for the functioning of the Red Cross in emergency situations.

The first of these relationships may be called a "defining" one. Since the chartering of The American National Red Cross in 1900-1905, a number of other federal agencies have been created which have as their principal responsibility relief to persons affected by disaster. Protection of the autonomy of the role of Red Cross in disasters has been written into the laws creating these agencies, but, in addition, the national Red Cross has certain written "understandings" with these agencies which attempt to define more clearly the disaster division of labor among them. These "understandings" also exist at the state and the local level. In the first section of this chapter, these "defining" relationships will be discussed. The lack of a "defining" relationship between Red Cross and the Salvation Army, which probably accounts for their sometimes strained relationship, will also be considered in this section.

The Red Cross is not a self-sufficient disaster organization. It cannot provide disaster relief entirely on its own, in large measure because of the financial limitations placed on it by its total reliance on voluntary contributions. It must, therefore, enter into "assistance" relationships with other organizations. As was suggested in the last chapter, Red Cross is frequently required to seek the assistance of other organizations in performing the communication and transportation tasks which support its mass care program. Equipment and supplies which the chapter does not itself possess may be accepted as donations, borrowed, or bought from other organizations -- governmental or private. From professional organizations, the Red Cross may also seek assistance in the form of emergency personnel, doctors or nurses, for example. Pre-disaster "understandings" may be drawn up at both the national and the local levels between the Red Cross and the organizations from which it seeks assistance. The second section of this chapter will consider these understandings.

A third form of interorganizational relationship in which the Red Cross engages in disaster operations is with elements of the local government. In the discussion of these interorganizational relationships Red Cross "understandings" with municipal authority will be considered: its relationship to local mayors and city councils, to local civil defense, and to police, fire, and other emergency departments of the community government. These include both "defining" and "service" relationships, the latter being those in which the Red Cross provides certain services in disaster response to departments like the police, fire, and civil defense. This third type of relationship is the immediate context in which the Red Cross performs its disaster tasks; taken with its local "assistance" relationships, it provides a basis for understanding much of the nature of local Red Cross disaster programs.

Defining Interorganizational Relationships

The most important of the "defining" relationships exists between the Red Cross and, on the one hand, civil defense, on the other, the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP). Both CD and OEP have crucial responsibilities in the event of disaster, but in neither case are these responsibilities to supersede or replace those traditionally belonging to The American National Red Cross.

Statements of understanding between the Red Cross and the civil defense indicate that the division of labor between these two agencies is drawn on the basis of "family" and "community" services. The Red Cross is responsible during the emergency phase of the disaster operation for the family mass care program; the civil defense, for the protection of persons and property and for the maintenance and/or restoration of "usual" community services. During the warning phase, however, civil defense is solely responsible for alerting the public to the danger and for evacuating those persons likely to be affected by impact. In this phase of disaster operations, the Red Cross may assist civil defense but the former is in no way legally responsible for the success of the endeavor. During the rehabilitation phase, on the contrary, the Red Cross is solely responsible for assisting families in their recovery from the effects of the disaster, especially those families who are not eligible for relief loans and other assistance from governmental or private sources.¹

The division of labor between these two agencies -- the Red Cross and the civil defense -- is summarized in table 2. Because Civil Defense is typically designated as the coordinating body for all organizations in disaster relief operations, it may be considered the principal agent of the "responsibilities of government" as listed in that table -- whether civil defense personnel actually carry out these responsibilities or not. In this respect, the authority in natural disasters of civil defense personnel (and of officials whose positions in local government may automatically incorporate them into the authority structure of civil defense) may affect the operations of the Red Cross. This dimension of the relationship between the Red Cross and the civil defense will be discussed in the third section of this chapter.

Like the understandings between the Red Cross and the civil defense, the statement of understanding drawn up between the Red Cross and the Office of Emergency Planning (established by Public Law 875, 81st Congress, as amended) is essentially designed to keep inviolate the traditional disaster tasks of the Red Cross.² The law itself contains an explicit statement of their inviolability:

Nothing contained in the Act shall be construed to limit or in any way affect the responsibilities of the American National Red Cross under the Act approved January 5, 1905 (33 Stat. 599), as amended.³

But the agreement between Red Cross and OEP contains an additional statement which enforces this general limitation in perhaps the most effective way possible: it withholds federal funds for disaster reimbursement from any agency

TABLE 2

RESPONSIBILITIES IN NATURAL DISASTER:
RED CROSS AND GOVERNMENT*

Responsibilities of Government

Warning and Evacuation

Emergency Community Services: police protection, health and sanitation services, etc.

Usual Community Welfare Services: institutional care of the sick, public assistance grants, etc.

Assistance in Community Restoration: repair of sewage and water systems, removal of debris, restoration of public transportation and communication systems, public buildings, etc.

Aid for Recovery of Families: disaster loans, special advice and counselling, etc.

Responsibilities of Red Cross

Emergency Mass Care: food, shelter, clothing, and medical care.

Emergency Services on Individual Family Basis: welfare inquiries, emergency orders for food, clothing, etc.

Aid for Recovery of Families: case-work services, grants for food, clothing, home repairs, household furnishings, medical and nursing care.

*Based on material in The American National Red Cross, Disaster Action: Chapter Preparedness, rev. (Washington: The American National Red Cross, September 1966), Manual A, pp. 12-13.

performing tasks which are the responsibility of the Red Cross. On this point, the statement of understanding reads as follows:

Federal funds authorized under Public Law 875 will not be used to reimburse State and local governments for expenditures made by them within the area of Red Cross disaster responsibility. . . . It is not intended that Federal funds will serve as a substitute for, nor in any way affect the necessity for, voluntary contributions to the Red Cross by the general public which provides the Red Cross with the funds necessary to discharge its responsibilities in disasters resulting from natural causes.⁴

The effect of this agreement has, in several disasters studied by DRC, made it exceedingly costly for civil defense organizations or local governments to open and operate public shelters in natural disasters. When civil defense in one community opened the city hall as a public shelter, they did not realize, according to a Red Cross official, "what responsibility you're accepting when you start opening up one." They found out, he said, when the charges for services came in: "They're madly looking for someone to pay the bill."⁵ A suburban community made a similar discovery: after initially indicating to Red Cross personnel that they felt they could manage emergency relief on their own, the realization that federal funds would not be available to reimburse the local government for the operation of public shelters led to a request for assistance from the Red Cross. "Now," said a Red Cross staff member, "they're begging us to come in."

Despite the understandings between the Red Cross and the civil defense and the Office of Emergency Planning, which protect the traditional disaster tasks of the Red Cross from other governmental organizations and agencies (and vice versa), misunderstandings like those already mentioned sometimes occur. At the local level, especially in the immediate pre-impact period and during the first few hours which follow disaster, the division of labor between Red Cross and other organizations may not always be clearly defined for the public. As already indicated, Red Cross headquarters sometimes receive requests for evacuation in such volume that radio announcements have to be made admonishing threatened persons to call the civil defense or whatever organization had the responsibility. In the field situation, of course, Red Cross staff and volunteers often do become involved in evacuation. Officially, they are assisting the local civil defense. In a similar way, Red Cross volunteers sometimes spontaneously engaged in rescue and first aid activities, although, again, such tasks officially belong to civil defense. A staff member described how Red Cross volunteers became involved in search-and-rescue first aid in the following:

Some of our disaster people in the /impacted/ area are Red Cross instructors in first aid. So they came out and they were actually doing first aid right on the streets. Not disaster aid, but first aid . . . and this is unusual as far as Red Cross chapters go . . . because of the medical facilities /available/ in this county in general -- because you snap your fingers and there's an ambulance. But this was a spontaneous thing that had nothing to do with our

organization [for disaster]. We're not organized for this: it was an individual . . . meeting the situation as it came up.

Thus, what was called "organizational breakdown" in chapter four may be seen here as the blurring of interorganizational division of labor in the post-impact period. DRC data suggest that it is not an uncommon occurrence; these data also suggest that it is not a crucial problem for the organizations involved, at least at the level of Red Cross volunteers and their counterparts in other organizations. Administratively, however, such overlapping of disaster responsibilities may ultimately create accounting difficulties. These difficulties are compounded by the presence during the emergency period of great numbers of walk-in volunteers whose particular organizational allegiances are unclear. Who did what for which organization may be a question which can only be answered ambiguously.

Similar overlapping frequently occurs between the Red Cross and the Salvation Army in disasters. Salvation Army as well as Red Cross accepts the responsibility for relief of the suffering of individuals and families affected by the disaster. Both organizations operate canteens, distribute food and clothing, provide shelter, and minister to the emotional distress of disaster victims and refugees. The misunderstandings and disagreements which sometimes characterize the relationship of Red Cross and Salvation Army are probably a consequence of these similar disaster responsibilities and the somewhat dissimilar disaster relief policies which characterize the two organizations.

The relief policies of the Red Cross are based on the organization's rights (and obligations) in disaster operations established by its Congressional mandate. As has been suggested in this chapter, these disaster responsibilities are circumscribed by the responsibilities of other governmental organizations like civil defense and OEP. Hence, as compared with a private organization like the Salvation Army, the Red Cross must operate within a relatively structured set of definitions. Anticipating public complaints it will receive in the course of its disaster operations, the Red Cross is therefore anxious to demonstrate through vigorous protection of its sphere of responsibility and through mass media publicity that it has adequately fulfilled its public charge.

Throughout the relief operations of the two organizations, their positions on monetary donations are somewhat in opposition. The Salvation Army avoids appeals for funds, even to the extent of refusing donations except those made through the mail. The Red Cross fund campaign, on the other hand, is one of the constant elements of its disaster relief program. Salvation Army welcomes donations of clothing and food since such supplies left from its disaster relief can be used in its day-to-day welfare programs. Red Cross, on the contrary, typically receives far too much clothing and food. Airport hangers and warehouses filled with donated items are not unusual in Red Cross disaster operations and these enormous quantities present major problems in disposition at the conclusion of the program. ("What can we do with them," asked one Red Cross staff member, "we can't burn them.") That Red Cross disaster campaigns tend to emphasize the donation of money rather than food and clothing reflects this convergence as well as, again, the organization's policy of making use of local retailers in filling the disaster needs of refugees.

These variations in disaster policy are probably the source of much of the tension which sometimes marks the Red Cross-Salvation Army relationships. An understanding between the two organizations would help to avoid certain of them, but so long as both are active in the same kinds of disaster relief during the emergency period, it does not appear that overlapping tasks can be eliminated. The good intentions of personnel, their desire to help, and even their legal responsibility to do so, are seldom enough to overcome certain operational difficulties when these difficulties stem from the basic structural characteristics of a given organization.

Assistance Interorganizational Relationships

Assistance to the Red Cross during disaster operations can come from a variety of agencies and organizations. Emergency personnel may be supplied by professional organizations like the American Medical Association or the American Radio Relay League; disaster equipment may be provided through the National Defense Transportation Association; and food supplies may be arranged through the National Restaurant Association and the American Food Service Association. With these and other organizations the national offices of the Red Cross have understandings which "enable the Red Cross to draw upon the personnel, equipment, and facilities of federal and private agencies to assure effective use of available resources and coordination in disaster relief."⁶ A complete list (as of September 1966) of the governmental and nongovernmental organizations with which the national Red Cross has understandings is provided in table 3.

These national understandings are not in themselves sufficient, according to the Red Cross disaster handbook. "Agreements for the use of community resources," it suggests:

Should be developed by the chapter with the local unit of the respective organizations, based on the national understandings. These agreements develop mutual respect within the community, prevent competitive activities, and assure coordinated use of community resources.⁷

Depending on such variables as the size and complexity of the community and its history of disasters, local chapters maintain assistance agreements with these organizations and with purely local organizations like private retailers and voluntary associations.

The discussion of "recruited advisors" (in chapter one of this report) suggests that some of these interorganizational assistance relationships of local Red Cross chapters may be a part of the existing structure. The selection of representative community leaders to serve on the chapter's board of directors and the various advisory committees of local Red Cross frequently expedites emergency relationships with local business and professional organizations. Pre-disaster arrangements may be made, for example, with the manager of a local food market who serves on one of the chapter's advisory

TABLE 3

RED CROSS UNDERSTANDINGS WITH NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
FOR COOPERATION IN DISASTER*

Governmental Agencies

U.S. Weather Bureau
U.S. Department of the Army
U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Public Health Service
U.S. Department of Agriculture
U.S. Veterans Administration
Small Business Administration
Office of Emergency Planning
U.S. Post Office

Nongovernmental Agencies

American Dental Association
American Hospital Association
American Legion
American Radio Relay League
American Food Service Association
Boy Scouts of America
Girl Scouts of America
National AFL-CIO Community Services
National Association of Broadcasters
National Defense Transportation
Association
National Restaurant Association
Veterans of Foreign Wars

*The American National Red Cross, Disaster Action: Chapter Preparedness,
rev. (Washington: The American National Red Cross, September 1966).

committees. In one community, in fact, some teams of shelter leaders are made up of members of the managerial staff from a chain of food stores. One such volunteer explained the procedure in the following statement:

The way it's set up /here/ is through companies. Before anything happens, your company will set up teams and groups and so forth. My job is manager of this shelter and we have four units that alternate on and off duty. They all work with /name of a local chain of food markets/. /Other companies/ do the same thing.

The agreement with the Red Cross also specifies that the salaries for such "company teams" continue while they are serving with the Red Cross, thus eliminating the financial sacrifice which might otherwise limit the emergency service of male volunteers.

Other members of the chapter's advisory committees typically represent other businesses with which the Red Cross would have assistance relationships during an emergency. Bankers, for example, are included, thus permitting the Red Cross access to financial facilities when such businesses may be closed as a result of the disaster. These "built-in" interorganizational relationships do not always function smoothly, however. One chapter opened its disaster fund account at a competitor of a member of its board of directors. When this advisor learned of it, he was able to exert enough pressure on the staff of the chapter to have that account closed and a new one opened at his own bank. It is necessary that Red Cross chapters, in their disaster agreements with local businesses, pay particular attention to the competitive relationships among similar enterprises and select among them so as to insure continued good relations with them all.

Recruited advisors also typically include representatives of local professional groups. A representative from the local association of doctors, for example, can do much to insure the cooperation of medical personnel in an emergency program. Similarly, Red Cross chapters include somewhere in their volunteer structure members of professional nursing associations and, frequently, representatives of social work organizations. The assistance of professional personnel from both these groups can facilitate shelter and subsequent rehabilitation programs.

Pre-disaster plans also involve various voluntary associations in the work of the Red Cross. Such groups from local churches, schools, and fraternal organizations have an advantage over individual walk-in volunteers (as explained in chapter three) in that they often assist the Red Cross as intact groups, already structured in leadership. Red Cross staff members are virtually unanimous in preferring these group-volunteers over individuals, even when both are relatively inexperienced in disaster work. In this regard, uniformed group volunteers, like members of a college ROTC unit or even nuns, have been found by some Red Cross chapters to be especially functional in maintaining order in public shelters when, for one reason or another, auxiliary police, civil defense, or National Guard personnel are not available. According to one Red Cross staff member who served as shelter director during a disaster, the uniformed volunteer nurses assigned to the shelter were more frequently

sought out as persons in authority than she was.⁸ When uniformed volunteers assist trained Red Cross personnel in public shelter operations, their voluntary services are especially valuable.

An indication of the extent and variety of the interorganizational relationships of Red Cross chapters is provided in table 4 which lists the types of business, professional, and voluntary organizations with which one chapter maintains assistance agreements. This list is based on the chapter's pre-disaster planning and does not, therefore, include the other organizations which during an emergency are likely to walk in and offer their services. The success of Red Cross mass care programs is dependent in large measure on the preparedness of organizations and groups such as those listed in table 4 to assist the local chapter with supplies, equipment, and personnel. Thus, the Red Cross takes on in these interorganizational assistance relationships a truly communitywide perspective. More than most other disaster-activated organizations, the Red Cross relies on the assistance and cooperation of business, professional, and voluntary groups in the performance of its emergency tasks.

Red Cross Relationships with Local Government

The quasi-governmental status of the Red Cross which affects its relationships nationally with such agencies as the Office of Emergency Planning and, at the state level, with civil defense, also has consequences for the relationships of local chapters with community government. By virtue of its Congressional charter, the Red Cross cannot legally be refused the right to carry out its emergency and rehabilitation programs in any community subjected to natural disaster. Nonetheless, local chapters always attempt to establish a pre-disaster written understanding with the mayor or city council of all municipalities within the chapter's jurisdiction. These understandings reinforce and localize the disaster relief obligations of the national Red Cross and, in the event of a disaster in the community, they provide the basis for local Red Cross action.

In addition to these pre-disaster understandings, the Red Cross typically requests that the mayor of an impacted community issue a post-disaster proclamation declaring the Red Cross "the official disaster relief agency for assistance to stricken families and individuals."⁹ Such a proclamation establishes the right and the obligation of the Red Cross to carry out its disaster relief and rehabilitation programs and, in addition, urges the public to support these programs through active cooperation and financial contributions. As has already been suggested, the Red Cross will not involve itself in a community's disaster response if it is specifically requested to stay out. Such refusals are rare and normally the total Red Cross disaster program is not subject to the specific approval of municipal governments.

Elements of the Red Cross disaster programs are, however, sometimes dependent on actions taken -- or not taken -- by the local government. In this sense, relationships with the local government, like those with local

TABLE 4

TYPES OF PRE-DISASTER INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
MAINTAINED BY ONE COUNTY RED CROSS
CHAPTER, BY EMERGENCY TASKS

Disaster Survey:	Representatives from building, real estate, safety engineering, and insurance appraisal enterprises assist in the survey.
Shelter:	Agreements with hotels and motels for emergency shelter when public facilities are not required; written agreements with the school board and administrations, churches, fraternal organizations, and the like for the use of their buildings as public shelters.
Food:	Assistance agreements with food wholesalers and supermarkets, and with 24-hour restaurants and catering services for supplies; also with voluntary groups, like women's church guilds, to cook and serve food.
Clothing:	Agreements with clothing stores to supply clothing in bulk or to fill clothing orders for individuals and families and with voluntary organizations to sort and distribute donated clothing; also agreement with the Army to provide cots and blankets on loan.
Medical Care:	Assistance from hospitals, doctors, and nurses groups to provide personnel.
Communication:	Agreements with the telephone company, amateur radio groups, taxi companies, and with motorcycle and youth groups for messenger services.
Transportation:	Assistance agreement with the National Defense Transportation Association for vehicles; with warehouses for storage when furniture evacuation is possible.
Public Information:	Ongoing understandings with the local news media and with national wire services.

groups and businesses, reveal clearly that the Red Cross cannot act as an independent organization.

In some cities, for example, where local schools are used as public shelters, the authority to declare these shelters open rests not with the officials of the Red Cross but with the mayor of the community and with the local civil defense. Because the Red Cross had been criticized in the past for waiting too long before opening the shelters, its staff was particularly anxious in one disaster studied by DRC to open the shelters in plenty of time. They felt, however, that reluctance on the part of the mayor and civil defense to make the necessary decision hampered their own mobilization and preparedness. Red Cross staff members placed the blame for the delay and confusion on the lack of communication between the Red Cross and the city government. One member suggested that a "hot line" between the chapter and the local civil defense or a disaster liaison person would improve this vital interorganizational link.

These difficulties reflect the somewhat ambiguous authority relationship between local civil defense and local Red Cross in disaster situations. Both are "officially designated" as disaster organizations: the civil defense as the coordinating body for all emergency operations, the Red Cross as the principal agent of individual and family relief. The extent to which civil defense can "coordinate" the relief activities of the Red Cross remains a vague and disputable question in some communities. The disaster division of labor between "government" and Red Cross which Red Cross handbooks and literature invariably include (see table 2) defines the interorganizational relationship in terms of disaster responsibilities, but does not clearly indicate the authority relationship between the two agencies. That there does exist an authority overlap is suggested in the following excerpts from an "understanding" between civil defense and Red Cross:

The . . . civil defense is the recognized governmental agency responsible for the coordination of all groups, both public and private, participating in a natural disaster relief operation.

And, further, the civil defense:

In carrying out its responsibilities . . . will have complete financial and administrative control over its activities.

The Red Cross, however, is defined as having the same control over its responsibilities.

The American National Red Cross will maintain administrative and financial control in carrying out its natural disaster relief program.¹⁰

It is not clear to what extent the "complete control" of the civil defense in coordinating all relief groups overlaps with the "administrative and financial control" guaranteed to the Red Cross in the performance of its responsibilities.

In the event of enemy-caused disasters, the authority relationship between the two organizations is more clearly defined. It will be considered in chapter six.

Red Cross shelter operations are subject to inspection and approval by the local public health department. Similarly, all donated food must be inspected by the department before it can be dispensed by the Red Cross. In these and other ways -- as, for example, in the inspection of buildings employed as shelters by the Red Cross -- the local chapter is subject to the authority of certain departments of the community government. But the Red Cross also provides services to the municipality, especially to members of the police and fire departments. A brief discussion of these interorganizational relationships will conclude this chapter.

The services which the Red Cross offers these departments of government are associated with the local chapter's disaster preparedness program, especially with the mobile canteen and disaster action teams. The greatest number of emergency responses a chapter will make will be to focalized disasters affecting fewer than five families and, in these circumstances, the full responsibility for disaster relief falls on the local Red Cross organization. Normally, the canteen and a disaster action team are sufficient to meet the immediate needs of the situation. Canteen personnel provide coffee, sandwiches, and the like, to the members of the police and fire department at the scene; when private individuals or families are involved, the disaster action team is prepared to arrange for emergency shelter, food, and clothing as required.

In providing these services, Red Cross personnel may be alerted, either directly or indirectly, through the police or fire departments. Larger city chapters sometimes have a direct radio line with emergency departments of the local government, but more usual methods of mobilization are by informal report from Red Cross volunteers or the public, or by telephone message from the police or fire departments.

Mobile canteen services are also offered in disaster situations to personnel of other relief organizations. The civil defense, for example, may take advantage of these services if that organization is active in disaster response. In major disasters, the Red Cross may also accept the responsibility of providing food for members of the National Guard when they have been activated. Such was the case in Red Cross response to a tornado touchdown in a suburban community, but at least one member of the Red Cross staff indicated that he wished the Guard had brought their own mobile kitchens and relieved the Red Cross of that additional task.

The Red Cross, however, is not alone in providing canteen service to disaster workers. The Salvation Army maintains a similar program and some evidence suggests that in this element of relief the Army is generally more efficient than the Red Cross; nor is the former organization, strictly speaking, a volunteer unit. The consequence of these differences is that the Salvation Army can respond with mobile canteens more quickly than can the Red Cross.

Summary

This chapter has considered the interorganizational relationships which the Red Cross must maintain in order to accomplish its disaster relief responsibilities. Its quasi-governmental status results in a less than clearly defined division of labor in disaster programs. Especially vis-a-vis the civil defense, the tasks and the authority of the Red Cross over its disaster relief program is somewhat ambiguous. The understanding of the Red Cross with the Office of Emergency Planning functions in an important way to protect the traditional tasks and authority of the Red Cross in natural disasters, but the involvement of other agencies of federal, state, and local government with disaster responsibilities has, nonetheless, tended to circumscribe the disaster activities of the Red Cross.

This chapter has also suggested that in performing its disaster tasks, the Red Cross cannot operate as an independent organization. Because it relies totally on voluntary contributions, neither the national organization nor the local chapters possess all the equipment, supplies, and personnel necessary in major disaster relief. The organization, therefore, must turn to other sources in the community. The recruited advisors of local chapters serve as important liaisons with businesses, professions, and voluntary groups from which these emergency goods and personnel may be obtained. Red Cross chapters attempt to establish a number of pre-disaster agreements with those who possess such resources and, in meeting the needs of the particular disaster, may turn to other sources as well.

Finally, it has been suggested that the local Red Cross also has to operate in terms of the authority of local government. Despite its Congressional charter, the Red Cross seeks from municipalities pre- and post-disaster statements of its status as official disaster relief agency which, again, may function to protect its traditional role in emergencies. The Red Cross also maintains disaster links with local police, fire, and other emergency departments and provides the members of these agencies with certain services in the event of disaster. Thus, it is only within the context of these interorganizational relationships, on both the national and the local levels, that the disaster activities of the Red Cross can be understood. Such relationships also suggest some of the structural differences between the Red Cross and other relief organizations like the Salvation Army.

NOTES: CHAPTER V

1. See, for example, "Statement of Understanding Between the Ohio Civil Defense and The American National Red Cross Relative to Responsibilities in Disaster Operations," 29562AM, 071664, rev., mimeographed (April 1963).

To define the areas of responsibility of the Ohio Civil Defense and the American National Red Cross . . . issued for the information and guidance of the staffs of both agencies and others concerned . . . supersedes a similar statement issued in October, 1958.

2. "Statement of Understanding Between the Office of Emergency Planning and The American National Red Cross Relating to Disaster Operations Under Public Law 875," 22834-862, mimeographed (August 21, 1962).

Issued by the Office of Emergency Planning and the American National Red Cross to insure understanding and agreement on interpretation and implementation of disaster relief responsibilities under Public Law 875, 81st Congress, as amended.

3. Quoted in "Understanding Between OEP and Red Cross," p. 1.
4. "Understanding Between OEP and Red Cross," p. 2.
5. Subsequently, the Red Cross did pay for the food used in the shelter. Other expenses, however, like damages to the building and missing equipment, were not paid for by the Red Cross.
6. The American National Red Cross, Disaster Action: Chapter Preparedness, rev. (Washington: The American National Red Cross, September 1966), p. 91.
7. Chapter Preparedness.
8. Particularly in the operation of public shelters, the importance of uniformed personnel cannot be overestimated. What is sometimes ascribed to the "publicity seeking" of the Red Cross -- i.e., the presence of the organization's signs and insignia surrounding and on the person of Red Cross staff and volunteers -- has behind it the authority rationale suggested here. This is not to say, however, that publicity is not in itself a motivation for this behavior; it is not the only motivation.
9. The full text of a suggested proclamation is contained in Chapter Preparedness, p. 94.
10. All of these statements will be found in the statement of understanding between the Red Cross and the Ohio Civil Defense, pp. 1-2. (Emphasis not in the original.)