Presentism: The Problem of Truth, Meaning and Reference
Date
2015-05
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Publisher
University of Delaware
Abstract
Presentism is the view that all of reality is exhausted by the present. That is,
the only objects and individuals that exist are those that exist in the present; anything
else literally does not exist. How then is a presentist able to ground the truths of
propositions uttered in the present which seem to be about wholly past individuals? I
examine three possible solutions proposed by the presentist, concluding all three suffer
from the shifting truth-maker objection. I then look at how a presentist might employ a
descriptive theory for the meaning of names to avoid apparently committing
themselves to the existence of non-present individuals. This is then contrasted by the
direct reference theory of names as argued for by Kripke, before concluding the
descriptive view is unacceptable as a theory of meaning. After considering the
proposed solutions presented by the presentist, I argue that Presentism should be
avoided due to its counterintuitive consequences in favor of Eternalism.
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Philosophy