Cache-collision timing attacks against AES-GCM
| Author(s) | Huang, Bonan | |
| Date Accessioned | 2011-06-28T12:04:06Z | |
| Date Available | 2011-06-28T12:04:06Z | |
| Publication Date | 2010 | |
| Abstract | Side-channel attacks that utilize timing, power consumption, and electromagnetic radiation to gain information about an encryption/decryption implementation have been demonstrated experimentally to be an effective attack against a variety of cryptographic systems. We define a general attack strategy against AES-GCM using a simplified model of the cache to predict timing variation due to cache-collisions in the sequence of lookups performed by the encryption. The attacks presented should be applicable to most high-speed software AES-GCM implementations and computing platforms, we have implemented them against Openssl-1.0.0-beta3 running on Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU 5110 and Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU 5520. This is the first time in publication to successfully attack the AES-GCM algorithm. While the task of defending AES-GCM against all timing attacks is challenging, a small patch can significantly reduce the vulnerability to these specific attacks with no performance penalty. | en_US |
| Advisor | Li, Xiaoming | |
| Degree | M.S. | |
| Department | University of Delaware, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering | |
| URL | http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/9765 | |
| Publisher | University of Delaware | en_US |
| dc.subject.lcsh | Cache memory | |
| dc.subject.lcsh | Computer algorithms | |
| dc.subject.lcsh | Cyberterrorism | |
| Title | Cache-collision timing attacks against AES-GCM | en_US |
| Type | Thesis | en_US |