ON THE NATURE OF PROPOSITIONS AS SETS OF POSSIBLE WORLDS An Examination of Propositions in Modal Realism
| Author(s) | Moten, Kaleb | |
| Date Accessioned | 2019-09-20T19:01:01Z | |
| Date Available | 2019-09-20T19:01:01Z | |
| Publication Date | 2019-05 | |
| Abstract | While there is broad consensus on the roles propositions can play (they are the bearers of truth values, meanings of sentences, and/or objects of beliefs and attitudes), there is far less consensus on their metaphysical nature. Some philosophers claims that propositions are sets of possible worlds. This thesis examines this claim with a particular focus on modal realism, the idea that these possible worlds are concrete entities of the same sort as the actual world. I examine two problems: first I determine whether sets of Lewisian worlds are the kind of objects we have epistemic access to, and if this alters their ability to take the propositional role. I then compare Lewisian propositions to their structured counterparts to determine if any other theories are more accurate at modeling content. I conclude that the structured propositional view of Jeffrey King solves many of the issue Lewisian propositions encounter while being conservative enough for a modal realist to adopt it with minimal sacrifices. | en_US |
| Advisor | Richard Hanley, Ph.D. | |
| Program | Philosophy | |
| URL | http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/24459 | |
| Publisher | University of Delaware | en_US |
| Keywords | Modal realism | en_US |
| Keywords | Philosophy | en_US |
| Title | ON THE NATURE OF PROPOSITIONS AS SETS OF POSSIBLE WORLDS An Examination of Propositions in Modal Realism | en_US |
| Type | Thesis | en_US |