Presentism: The Problem of Truth, Meaning and Reference
| Author(s) | Faline, Matthew | |
| Date Accessioned | 2015-10-07T18:12:19Z | |
| Date Available | 2015-10-07T18:12:19Z | |
| Publication Date | 2015-05 | |
| Abstract | Presentism is the view that all of reality is exhausted by the present. That is, the only objects and individuals that exist are those that exist in the present; anything else literally does not exist. How then is a presentist able to ground the truths of propositions uttered in the present which seem to be about wholly past individuals? I examine three possible solutions proposed by the presentist, concluding all three suffer from the shifting truth-maker objection. I then look at how a presentist might employ a descriptive theory for the meaning of names to avoid apparently committing themselves to the existence of non-present individuals. This is then contrasted by the direct reference theory of names as argued for by Kripke, before concluding the descriptive view is unacceptable as a theory of meaning. After considering the proposed solutions presented by the presentist, I argue that Presentism should be avoided due to its counterintuitive consequences in favor of Eternalism. | |
| Advisor | Richard Hanley | |
| Program | Philosophy | |
| URL | http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/17073 | |
| Language | en_US | en_US |
| Publisher | University of Delaware | en_US |
| Keywords | Philosophy | en_US |
| Title | Presentism: The Problem of Truth, Meaning and Reference | en_US |
| Type | Thesis | en_US |